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"So close no matter how far…" 
 
(Nothing Else Matters [Hetfield/Ulrich], 
The Black Album, 1991, Metallica)   
Preface 
Transition economies have gone through a fundamental restructuring of their 
economy. This process was not without difficulties arising from the interruption 
of long lasting economic relations and the need to change institutional structures 
and responsibilities. Vietnam is no exception. During the transition, the adapta-
tion of the financial system was one of the most challenging reforms in Vietnam. 
One of the major tasks of this reform was to expand the financial system’s out-
reach to the newly emerging private sector and household economies, particu-
larly in rural areas. 
This research was carried out within the research program "Sustainable Land Use 
and Rural Development in Mountainous Regions of Southeast Asia" (SFB 564, 
Sub-project F2) of the University of Hohenheim. The work of Thomas Dufhues 
analyzes important features of the rural financial system in Northern Vietnam. 
The main research focus is on factors that impede or support access of rural 
households to the formal financial system on the one hand and the outreach of 
this system to rural households on the other. Access to financial products of the 
formal sector has a great potential for reducing poverty which is still widely 
spread in the northern uplands of Vietnam. Thus, conceptually, this research  
focuses on access and access constraints of rural households to the formal financial 
system.  
The thesis comprises cumulatively four individual articles. Each article focuses 
on different aspects of the formal financial system. The first paper reviews the 
transformation process of the financial system in Vietnam, with special attention 
to the rural financial market. Methodologically, an in-depth literature review is 
carried out, supplemented by anecdotal evidence gathered during the field re-
search. In the second article, the information polices of the Vietnam Bank for the 
Poor (VBP) as the main supplier of credit to the rural poor in Northern Vietnam 
during the years 2001 and 2002 are investigated by means of information eco-
nomics analysis. Methodologically, secondary data from the VBP and the local 
administration are combined with qualitative evidence collected at the interme-
diary and household level. The third paper analyzes the poverty outreach of the 
formal financial intermediaries by a Principal Component Analysis; household 
access constraints to formal credit are assessed by a binary logit analysis.   Preface  IV 
Both analyses are based on quantitative rural household data. In the fourth article, 
client-adapted financial services are developed using a Conjoint Analysis ap-
proach, which is a marketing research tool that combines quantitative and quali-
tative data in its analysis. 
Major results are that the rural households are well supplied with formal credits 
through the state-owned formal financial intermediaries. However, this outreach 
has been bought by immense amounts of subsidies and at the expense of institu-
tional sustainability. Furthermore, formal savings, which are highly demanded 
by the rural population, are not offered by the financial intermediaries. Whether 
the enormous government subsidies channeled into rural credit contribute to 
poverty reduction, remains a subject for future research. It is clear, however, that 
these subsides bypass households that have no demand for credit, and these 
households are often the poorest. Finally, the highly subsidized credit interest 
rates imply low savings rates, which again affect the poor most, because they 
cannot assemble enough savings to buy lumpy, non-financial assets, such as 
land and buffaloes. The backlash of cheap credit is that the poor take a beating 
on their financial savings. The transformation polices of the Vietnamese govern- 
ment concerning the rural financial system are biased towards the supply of 
preferential credits and this policy discriminates against the poorest households; 
it hampers particularly their access to formal savings products. Thus, a paradigm 
change for the rural finance sector within is called for with a change from a 
‘credit only’ to a ‘full-intermediary’ approach in the rural financial system. 
 
Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Franz Heidhues  Prof. Dr. Gertrud Buchenrieder 
Director of SFB 564 2000-06  Leader of sub-project F2, SFB 564, 2000-06 
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Abstract 
During the transition of the Vietnamese economy, adaptation of the financial 
system was one of the most challenging reforms. A major task of this reform 
was to expand the financial system’s outreach to the newly emerging private 
sector and household economies, especially in rural areas. Therefore, state-owned 
financial intermediaries such as the Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and Rural 
Development (VBARD) and the Vietnam Bank for the Poor (VBP) have been 
established. Despite general successes in terms of credit outreach, certain popu-
lation groups, particularly the poorest, which are often identical to ethnic minorities, 
seem to have been bypassed by both banks. Furthermore, the strategy pursued by 
national rural financial policy has focused mainly on credit supply. Other finan-
cial services that potentially have a deeper outreach, e.g. savings products, have 
been neglected in the development efforts of the government and its develop-
ment banks. The overall objective of this research study was to create know- 
ledge on the factors that impede or support access of rural households in Northern 
Vietnam to the formal financial system. Access can be hampered at different 
levels of the financial system, namely macro/meso level, intermediary level and 
household level. Joint analysis of the three levels is therefore appropriate. This 
implies different methodologies and data collection methods. The data collection 
took place between March 2001 and 2002 in two provinces of Northern Vietnam. 
In total, 260 households were surveyed. In addition, several participatory methods 
were applied at all levels to collect qualitative data. Furthermore, secondary data 
was collected from relevant financial intermediaries and administrations. This 
cumulative thesis is divided into four main sections investigating different levels 
of the system and applying different methodologies. The second section reviews 
the transformation process of the financial system in Vietnam with special atten-
tion to the rural financial market. Methodologically, an in-depth literature review 
is carried out, supplemented by anecdotal evidence gathered during the field re-
search. In the third section, the information polices of the VBP as the main 
supplier of credit to the rural poor in Northern Vietnam are investigated by 
means of an information economics analysis. Methodologically, secondary data 
from the VBP and the local administration are combined with qualitative evi-
dence from the intermediary and household level. The fourth section analyzes the Abstract 
 
XVI 
poverty outreach of the formal financial intermediaries using a Principal Com-
ponent Analysis, and it analyzes household access constraints to formal credit 
using a binary logit analysis. Both analyses are based on quantitative household 
data. In section fifth, client-adapted financial services are developed using a 
Conjoint Analysis approach, which is a marketing research tool and combines 
quantitative and qualitative data in its analysis. The rural financial market in 
Vietnam is still dominated by the aforementioned highly subsidized state-owned 
financial intermediaries, impeding the establishment of any viable financial 
services and hampering innovations. Through the creation of the Vietnam Bank 
for Social Policies (VBSP) (the successor of the dissolved VBP since 2003) the 
Vietnamese government has separated political lending from commercial lending. 
Evidence from development banks in other countries suggests that the VBARD, 
now freed from political lending, is likely to dismiss its peasant clientele and 
concentrate on wealthier farmers. The question is how long the Government can 
finance the VBSP, and who will serve the rural poor after the government stops 
the subsidies and the VBPS cannot carry on its operations? The sustainability of 
the financial system is still threatened by an accumulation of non-performing 
loans amassed by state-owned enterprises. In addition, the problem of non-
performing loans is spreading to the private sector – including rural households. 
Apart from representing macro-economic threats to the financial system, this 
moral hazard behavior is hindering the establishment of any viable rural financial 
intermediation. The breadth of outreach of the formal rural lenders is immense. 
However, the poorest households are seldom clients. But general poverty (as 
captured in the poverty index) does not significantly influence access to formal 
credit. This means that the poorest households simply have much less demand 
for formal credit products. Improving credit products or offering new credit lines 
would only slightly improve the credit coverage of poorer households. A more 
promising approach would be to introduce a specialized pro-poor extension ser-
vice to widen the scope of their investment ideas, combined with a general im-
provement in the infrastructure. A good market connection serves credit out-
reach in a twofold manner: First, households have better access to credit-
relevant information; and second, through better market access they may find 
new investment opportunities. Nevertheless, the number of access-constrained 
households is surprisingly low, at 16%. One explanation may be the eradication of 
former access constraints through locally disbursed group credits. However, con-
sidering the anecdotal reports of very low repayment rates, the price of eradicating 
these access constraints has likely been a decrease in financial sustainability of 
the formal lenders. Nevertheless, some barriers to access continue to exist, par-
ticularly for ethnic minorities or female-headed households. To reduce these  Abstract 
 
XVII
access barriers, locally-oriented actions should be taken, catering to the specific 
needs of those households which lack access. The establishment of the VBSP 
represents an attempt to broaden access in general. But it is questionable 
whether households that do not have access today, or do not demand the existing 
products, will demand loans from the VBSP. A more sustainable way to promote 
outreach would be to improve the knowledge of fringe groups, such as ethnic 
minorities or female-led households, about credit application procedures. The 
supply of essential credit information to these groups is impeded by the supply-
oriented flow of information and by relying for the dissemination process on local 
authorities, which favor the ethnic majority. Ethnic or gender diversification of 
bank staff could broaden the information networks available and could create 
more awareness of those groups inside the institution. In contrast to the enor-
mous credit outreach, formal savings are rarely used by rural households. How-
ever, this low effective demand for savings is due to inappropriate services and 
not to lack of willingness of the rural population to save. Thus, the most appro-
priate tool to incorporate poorer households into the formal financial system 
would be mobilization of savings by providing adapted services. 
   
Deutsche Kurzfassung 
Während der Transformation der vietnamesischen Wirtschaft war die Anpassung 
des Finanzsektors eine der anspruchvollsten Reformen. Eines der wichtigsten 
Ziele dieser Reform war es, den neu entstandenen privaten Betrieben und den 
privaten Haushalten Zugang zu formalen Finanzdienstleistungen zu verschaffen, 
wobei hierbei der ländliche Raum spezielle Förderung erfuhr. Für die Erreichung 
dieses Zieles wurden staatliche Entwicklungsbanken wie die Vietnamesische 
Bank für Landwirtschaft und Ländliche Entwicklung (VBARD) und die Vietna-
mesische Bank für die Armen (VBP) gegründet. Diese beiden Institutionen haben 
den Zugang der ländlichen Bevölkerung zu formalen Krediten erheblich verbes-
sert. Allerdings haben bestimmte Randgruppen wie ethnische Minderheiten, 
welche häufig identisch sind mit den ärmeren Bevölkerungsschichten, oft keinen 
Zugang zu diesen staatlichen Krediten. Ein weiteres Problem ist die Fokussierung 
der Regierung und der staatlichen Entwicklungsbanken auf Kredite als primäre 
Dienstleistung. Die Entwicklung anderer Finanzdienstleistungen wie unterschied- 
liche Spar- und Versicherungsprodukte, welche einen potentiell besseren Zugang 
zu marginalisierten Gruppen haben wurde, im ländlichen Finanzsystem völlig 
vernachlässigt. 
Das Ziel dieser Arbeit ist es, herauszuarbeiten, welche Faktoren den Zugang 
ländlicher Haushalte zu formalen Finanzdienstleitungen behindern oder fördern. 
Der Zugang zu Finanzdienstleistungen kann an verschieden Stellen des Finanz-
systems behindert werden, zum Beispiel auf der Haushaltsebene, der Ebene der 
Finanzdienstleister oder durch gesetzliche Rahmenbedingungen. Deswegen ist 
eine gemeinsame Betrachtung dieser verschieden Ebenen notwendig. Dies imp-
liziert wiederum unterschiedliche Analyse- und Datenerhebungsmethoden. Die 
Datenerhebung, die der Datenbasis zu Grunde, liegt fand zwischen März 2001 
und März 2002 in zwei verschiedenen Provinzen in Nordvietnam statt. Insge-
samt wurden 260 Haushalte mit einem standardisierten Fragebogen interviewt. 
Zusätzlich wurden zahlreiche partizipatorische Erhebungstechniken angewandt, 
um weitergehende Einsichten in die Haushalte, die Finanzdienstleister und ande-
re relevante Institutionen zu bekommen. Des Weiteren wurden Sekundärdaten 
von den Finanzdienstleistern und den lokalen Verwaltungen gesammelt. Deutsche Kurzfassung 
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Diese kumulative Doktorarbeit ist in vier Hauptkapitel (Analysekapitel) unter-
teilt. In jedem dieser Kapitel liegt der Schwerpunkt auf einer anderen Ebene des 
Finanzsystems, entsprechend werden schwerpunktmäßig unterschiedliche Ana-
lysemethoden angewandt. Das erste Kapitel beschäftigt mit dem ländlichen 
Finanzsystem in seiner Gesamtheit. Hier wird der Transformationsprozess des 
ländlichen Finanzsystems untersucht. Methodisch wird eine Literaturanalyse mit 
auf Fallstudien beruhenden Aussagen, die während der Feldphase erhoben wur-
den, verknüpft. Das zweite Kapitel beschäftigt sich mit dem größten Kreditgeber 
an arme ländliche Haushalte in Nordvietnam, der VBP. In diesem Kapitel werden 
Sekundärdaten der VBP und der lokalen Administration in Kombination mit 
qualitativen Erhebungen und Experteninterviews gemeinsam unter Gesichts-
punkten der Neuen Institutionenökonomie analysiert. Hierbei liegt der Schwer-
punkt auf Informationsfluss, Transaktionskosten und Prinzipal-Agenten-Systeme. 
Das dritte und vierte Analysekapitel behandelt hauptsächlich die Haushaltsebene. 
Im dritten Kapitel werden die Breitenwirkung der staatlichen Finanzdienstleister 
anhand einer Prinzipal-Komponenten-Analyse untersucht und Zugangsbeschrän-
kungen der Haushalte zu formalen Krediten durch eine Logit-Regression analy-
siert. Beide Analysemethoden basieren weitestgehend auf quantitativen Haus-
haltsdaten. Das letzte Analysekapitel entwickelt mit Hilfe eines Marktfor-
schungsinstrumentes, der Conjoint Analyse, angepasste hypothetische Finanz-
produkte. Hier werden quantitative Haushaltsdaten mit partizipativ erhobenen 
qualitativen Daten in der Analyse kombiniert.  
Der ländliche Finanzmarkt in Nordvietnam ist immer noch stark dominiert durch 
hoch subventionierte staatliche Finanzdienstleister. Dadurch wird jeder Wettbe-
werb und das Entstehen von nachhaltigen Finanzprodukten sowie die Entste-
hung von Innovationen im Bereich Finanzdienstleistungen stark behindert. 
Durch die Gründung der Vietnamesischen Bank für Sozialpolitik (VBSP), welche 
die legale Nachfolgerin der VBP ist, wurden die kommerziell ausgerichteten 
staatlichen Banken, insbesondere die VBARD, von ihren sozialen Aufgaben   
befreit. Erkenntnisse aus anderen Entwicklungs- und Transformationsländern ha-
ben gezeigt, dass Banken sich aus Kostengründen auf größere und reichere 
Kunden konzentrieren. Daher wird vermutlich die VBARD ihren Kleinkunden-
anteil stark zurückfahren. Diese werden nun von der VBSP bedient werden 
müssen. Hier kommt die Frage auf, wie lange kann die vietnamesische Regie-
rung die defizitäre VBSP finanzieren und werden arme Kleinbauern, falls die 
VBSB ihren Betrieb einstellen muss, keinen Zugang mehr zum formalen ländli-
chen Finanzmarkt haben? Die Nachhaltigkeit des gesamten formalen Finanzsys-
tems ist bedroht durch ein ungelöstes Problem von schlechten Krediten, die 
hauptsächlich von Staatsunternehmen gehalten werden. Es sind jedoch Hinweise Deutsche Kurzfassung 
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zu finden, dass dieses Problem langsam auch auf den privaten Sektor übergreift, 
insbesondere auf ländliche Haushalte. Abgesehen von den makroökonomischen 
Folgen der schlechten Kredite, verhindert dieses staatlich tolerierte Verhalten 
von "Moral Hazard" das Entstehen von nachhaltigen Finanzinstitutionen.  
Die staatlichen Finanzinstitutionen im ländlichen Raum haben eine außerordent-
liche Breitenwirkung. Jedoch nehmen die ärmsten Haushalte nur selten einen 
Kredit bei diesen Institutionen auf. Nichtsdestotrotz hat Armut, gemessen an 
einem Index (zusammengesetzt aus unterschiedlichen Armutsindikatoren), kei-
nen signifikanten Einfluss auf den Zugang zu Kredit. Das bedeutet, dass die 
ärmsten Haushalte wahrscheinlich eine geringere Nachfrage nach formalen Kre-
ditprodukten haben. Eine einfache Verbesserung der Kreditprodukte oder die 
Bereitstellung von komplett neuen Kreditlinien würde also nur geringfügig den 
Zugang ärmerer Haushalte zu formellen Krediten verbessern. Ein vernünftigerer 
Ansatz wäre die Schaffung eines auf ärmere Haushalte spezialisierten Bera-
tungsdienstes kombiniert mit einer verbesserten Infrastruktur bzw. Marktanbin-
dung. Eine verbesserte Marktanbindung kreiert nicht nur mehr Investitionsmög-
lichkeiten, sie verbessert auch gleichzeitig den Zugang der Haushalte zu kredit-
relevanten Information und somit auch deren Zugang. 
Insgesamt ist die Zahl der zu kreditzugangsbeschränkten Haushalte jedoch sehr 
gering und die Anzahl der Haushalte mit einem formalen Kredit sehr hoch. Dies 
ist zurückzuführen auf die Eliminierung von früheren Zugangsbeschränkungen, 
z.B. durch eine breite Vergabe von Landnutzungstiteln, durch die Einführung 
von Gruppenkrediten mit Gruppenhaftung und durch die hoch subventionierten 
Zinssätze. Einerseits hat die Verringerung der zugangsbeschränkten Haushalte 
aber auch dazu geführt, dass eine große Anzahl von nicht kreditwürdigen Haus-
halten Zugang zu Kredit erhalten. Andererseits hat sich durch den sozialen 
Charakter der staatlichen Finanzintermediäre eine schlechte Rückzahlungsmoral 
verbreitet. Das deutet daraufhin, dass der Preis für die enorme Breitenwirkung 
der staatlichen Finanzintermediäre eine verringerte Nachhaltigkeit dieser Institu-
tionen ist.  
Trotz dieser enormen Breitenwirkung haben vor allem ethnische Minderheiten 
und von Frauen geführte Haushalte immer noch Schwierigkeiten, Zugang zu 
Kredit zu erlangen. Um den Zugang für solche Randgruppen zu verbessern, soll-
ten allerdings keine generellen Schritte unternommen werden, sondern speziell 
auf diese Haushalte abgestimmte Maßnahmen durchgeführt werden. Die Grün-
dung der VBSP geht jedoch genau in die entgegengesetzte Richtung. Hier wurde 
versucht, die schon ohnehin sehr große Breitenwirkung, durch generelle Maß-
nahmen noch zu vergrößern. Allerdings ist es fraglich, ob die Haushalte, die bis Deutsche Kurzfassung 
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heute die Kredite nicht nachgefragt haben bzw. zugangsbeschränkt waren, die 
Kredite von der VBSP nachfragen werden. Eine nachhaltigere Vorgehensweise, 
um den Kreditzugang dieser Randgruppen zu erhöhen, könnte ein verbesserter 
Zugang zu kreditrelevanten Informationen sein. Es hat sich gezeigt, dass Rand-
gruppen oftmals einfach dadurch zugangsbeschränkt sind, dass sie entsprechende 
Informationen nicht oder nicht rechtzeitig erhalten haben. Die staatlichen Finanz-
intermediäre verlassen sich bei der Verbreitung dieser Informationen zu sehr auf 
ein Netz aus lokalen Beamten, die allerdings über keine Bankausbildung verfügen 
und dazu tendieren, bestimmte Bevölkerungsschichten zu übergehen. Hier könn-
ten zum Beispiel speziell ausgebildete und bei den Banken angestellte Frauen bzw. 
Angehörige von ethnischen Minderheiten einen besseren Informationszugang   
bzw. eine besseres Bewusstsein für die Probleme dieser Randgruppen in den 
Institutionen schaffen. 
Im Gegensatz zu der enormen Breitenwirkung von formellen Krediten sind for-
male Sparprodukte fast nicht verbreitet. Dies ist jedoch nicht in der Unfähigkeit 
der ländlichen Bevölkerung zu sparen begründet, sondern darin, dass die ange-
botenen Sparprodukte nicht den Bedürfnissen der ländlichen Bevölkerung ent-
sprechen. Lokal angebotene Sparprodukte besitzen das größte Potential und sind 
die nachhaltigste Maßnahme, um Haushalte, die derzeit keine formale Kredite 
nachfragen, in das formale Finanzsystem zu integrieren. 
  
1 Introduction 
Vietnam has been engaged in a transition process enhancing the role of market 
forces in the economy since the mid-1980s. Within this process, known as  
‘Doi Moi’ (renovation), a change took place from a centrally planned economy 
to a market-oriented economy with a socialist face (BRYANT 1998). During this 
transition, the adaptation of the financial system was one of the most challenging 
reforms Vietnam had to undertake (TEUFEL 1997; TRAN and DANG 1996). One 
of the major tasks of this reform was to expand the financial system’s outreach 
to the newly emerging private sector and household economies, not only in ur-
ban but also in rural areas (WORLD BANK 1995; WORLD BANK 1998).  
As various scholars have pointed out, broad access to appropriate and sustainable 
financial services has vast potential for poverty reduction (BUCHENRIEDER and 
HEIDHUES 2003; HEIDHUES 1995; KANBUR and SQUIRE 2001; SCHRIEDER 1996;  
SCHRIEDER and SHARMA 1999; SHARMA 2001; ZELLER et al. 1997; ZELLER 1999). 
Thus, the Vietnamese government proposes financial services as a powerful tool 
for poverty reduction, too (SIDA-MARD 1998). Therefore, state-owned and ad-
ministered formal financial intermediaries (FFIs) such as the Vietnam Bank for 
Agriculture and Rural Development (VBARD), the Vietnam Bank for the Poor 
(VBP), and the People’s Credit Funds (PCFs) were established and promoted to 
provide credit to the rural population.
1 Evidence from other developing countries 
suggests that the poorest population groups are excluded from formal financial ser-
vices, especially credit.
2
 This observation appears to apply to Vietnam, too. 
Despite general successes in terms of credit outreach, certain population 
groups, particularly the poorest, which are often identical to ethnic minorities, 
                                           
 
 
1  On March 11 2003, the VBP and the PCFs were replaced by the Vietnam Bank for Social 
Policies (VBSP) (VIETNAM ECONOMY 2003; WORLD BANK 2003).
 
2  For instance, AMIN et al. (2003) find that microcredit programs in Bangladesh do not reach 
the credit-constrained.
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seem to be bypassed by the above mentioned financial institutions (NEEFJES 2001; 
WORLD BANK 2003). Furthermore, the strategy of the national rural financial policy 
has focused mainly on credit. Other financial services that potentially have a broader 
outreach to the poorer market segment, such as different savings or insurance 
products, have been neglected in the development efforts of the government. 
1.1  Conceptual framework and objectives 
The overall objective of this research work is to create knowledge about the factors 
that impede or support access of rural households in Northern Vietnam to the for-
mal financial system on the one hand, and the outreach of this system to rural 
households on the other. Thus, the conceptual framework of this research centers 
on access and access constraints of rural households to the formal financial system.  
Access can be hampered at different levels of the financial system. For instance, 
rural households may be actively (e.g. due to particular policies or due to self-
exclusion because of a low risk-bearing capacity) or passively (e.g. due to un-
suitable financial services) excluded from access to the formal financial system. 
Equally, an inadequate infrastructure hampers access and outreach, as transaction 
costs (TCs) rise for households and lenders alike. Figure 1-1 presents the concep-
tual framework of access and outreach constraints analyzed in this research. In 
this context, the focus is more on the household side (access) as previous research 
focused mainly on the supply side (outreach). However, knowledge about the 
formal financial system and its institutions is also preeminent for the analysis.  















































Source:  Own Figure, based on considerations made by EVANS et al. (1999) and VAESSEN (2001). 
Notes:   HH = household; FFI = formal financial intermediary. Introduction 
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Figure 1-2 illustrates the formal financial system and the different research levels 
that were suggested by the conceptual framework. The upper part of Figure 1-2 
depicts the rural financial system in general with its various actors, while the 
lower part presents the different research levels and the corresponding data col-
lection methods. As Figure 1-1 has demonstrated, access/outreach barriers exist 
at different locations in the formal financial system, and so a joint view/analysis 
of the three levels depicted in the lower part of Figure 1-2 is necessary.
3 
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The rural financial system
The level of analysis
 
Source: Own  figure. 
Notes:   * The community level is defined as all institutions, policies, and infrastructure above village  
   level. PRA = Participatory rural appraisal, HH = Household, SME = Small and medium  
   enterprise. 
                                           
 
 
3  As the formal insurance sector plays only an insignificant role in rural Vietnam 
(DUFHUES et al. 2004b), this research work covers mostly the credit and savings sector. Chapter 1 
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The overall condition of the Vietnamese financial system is of particular impor-
tance as the transformation of the system is still going on. Failures within the 
transformation process are likely to weaken the sustainability of the financial 
system. A sustainable financial system with likewise sustainable financial interme-
diaries supports the long-term access of households to the formal financial market.  
As pointed out above, access constraints can also be found on the side of the 
financial intermediary. The VBP has been the main supplier of credit to the rural 
poor in Northern Vietnam (VBP 1999b). However, it is reported that households 
are often access-constrained simply because they lack sufficient information 
about the credit application procedure or about the availability of funds.   
KANBUR and SQUIRE (2001) state that information deficits undermine the access 
of marginalized groups to credit. It appears that this information deficiency 
contributes to resource misallocation in the sense that potential borrowers with 
profitable investments are excluded due to a lack of information. 
From the point of view of the household level, it is crucial to know who is actually 
being access-constrained and why? For instance, HULME  and MOSLEY  (1996) 
point to increasing evidence from other developing countries that the poorest 
20%  of the population are effectively excluded from microcredit programs. 
While the Vietnamese government has so far failed to create sustainable rural 
financial institutions, it has succeeded in providing a huge part of the population 
with formal credit. Nevertheless, the questions remain: Did they succeed in 
reaching the poor and do groups of people exist who are still access-
constrained? 
There is a universal tendency by government officials in developing countries 
to assume that they know what the poor need, and to seek control over how 
these needs are met, which very often results in services with very limited out-
reach as these services often fail to meet the true needs of the rural population 
(GIBBONS et al. 2000). Thus, there is a pressing need to examine participatory 
ways of designing and introducing new financial services into microfinance insti-
tutes (MFIs) to improve their outreach and access to them (RUTHERFORD 2000; 
WRIGHT 1999). This is especially true for Vietnam, where almost all decisions 
are made using an top-down approach and local inhabitants have no impact on 
decision making or on policy (DU 2001; FFORDE 2004).  
The central hypothesis of this study is that the transformation polices of the 
Vietnamese government concerning the rural financial system are biased towards 
the supply of preferential credits, and that this policy discriminates against the 
poorest households. Derived from the central hypothesis, the specific objectives 
of this thesis are: Introduction 
 
5
- To describe and review the current transformation of the financial system 
in Vietnam in terms of its sustainability, with a special focus on the  
implications of the financial transformation for the rural financial market.  
- To reveal information deficiencies in the credit procedures within the 
VBP by identifying crucial gatekeepers of important credit information 
and by describing the formalized and non-formalized information channels.
4  
- To determine the poverty outreach of the FFIs in Northern Vietnam and to 
analyze which population groups are still access-constrained as regards 
the formal system. 
- To analyze the supply of formal financial services, and to design client-
oriented financial services by means of participatory research.  
1.2  Organization of the study 
The thesis is organized in a cumulative style based on four individual articles pub-
lished in different journals. Each of the main sections represents one article. Sec-
tion two reviews the transformation process of the financial system in Vietnam, 
with special attention to the rural financial market. Methodologically, an in-depth 
literature review is carried out, supplemented by anecdotal evidence gathered 
during the field research. In the third section, the information polices of the VBP 
as the main supplier of credit to the rural poor in Northern Vietnam are investi-
gated by means of information economics analysis. Methodologically, secondary 
data from the VBP and the local administration are combined with qualitative 
evidence from the intermediary and household level. The fourth section analyzes 
the poverty outreach of the FFIs by a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and 
household access constraints to formal credit by a binary logit analysis. Both 
analyses are based on quantitative household data. In the fifth section, client-
adapted financial services are developed using a Conjoint Analysis approach, 
which is a marketing research tool and combines quantitative and qualitative data 
in its analysis. Finally, the thesis ends by drawing general conclusions. 
                                           
 
 
4  As already mentioned above, the VBP has been replaced by the VBSP. However, results can 
be easily extended to the VBARD, which were closely related to the VBP, and to the new 
VBSP as well, as main structures seem to be similar compared to the old VBP/VBARD 
concept.   
2  The transformation of the financial system in Vietnam 
and its implications for the rural financial market –  
An update
5 
The following section describes the transformation of the financial system in 
Northern Vietnam. Special emphasis is given to the rural financial market.  
2.1 Introduction 
The transition process of Vietnam is well known in the economic world as 
‘Doi Moi’. Doi Moi literally means ‘change’ and ‘newness’ and is the Viet-
namese term for reform and renovation. It is aimed at restructuring Vietnam’s 
legal, regulatory, administrative, investment and foreign trade apparatus and 
policies to transform its centrally planned economic system into a market economy 
with ‘socialist characteristics’ (BRYANT 1998).  
The change from a centrally planned to a market-oriented economy in the 1990s 
proved to be a difficult process and one that was anything but self-implementing. 
In contrast to other regions in transition, e.g. the former Soviet Union, Vietnam 
emphasized gradualism over radical change, with economic restructuring to 
come before privatization (CHIN and GUAN 1996; MONTES 2001). Political plu-
ralism or democratization were not promoted and the Communist party has still 
retained its political monopoly of power (LUIBRAND 2002). However, the reforms 
have achieved impressive results. The most remarkable feature of the transition 
in Vietnam is the avoidance of a decline in output and immediate significant 
growth in agriculture, industry, and services resulting in average growth rates in 
gross domestic product (GDP) of 8.1% between 1990 and 1999, a decline in 
                                           
 
 
5  This section is based on the following article: "The transformation of the financial system 
in Vietnam and its implications for the rural financial market – An update", written by 
Thomas Dufhues and published 2003 in the Journal for Institutional Innovation, Develop-
ment and Transition 7: 335-362. I would like to thank Dr. Gertrud Buchenrieder for her 
helpful comments on this article.
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inflation to the single-digit range, and foreign direct investment flooding into the 
country (WORLD BANK 2000a).  
Looking at the impressive economic accomplishments of the last decade, one 
might be persuaded to believe that Vietnam has already laid the foundation for a 
dynamic, prosperous market-oriented economy. However, this would be a mis-
take (RIEDEL 1999). Critical voices concerning the speed of transition in Vietnam 
started to emerge in the last few years. The reforms that were launched have 
slowed down, or in some cases have even been discontinued (LUIBRAND 2002).  
Besides, doubts have been raised as to the government’s general commitment to 
push economic reforms any further (RONDINELLI and LITVACK 1999). Vietnam’s 
current party leaders see a ‘New’ Doi Moi as potentially more threatening than 
the status quo (THAYER 2000). Nevertheless, it is well recognized, both inside 
and outside the government, that without further reforms the strong performance 
of the past cannot be sustained (RIEDEL 1999). 
The structural features of transition economies differ in some important respects, 
but they share similar fundamental conditions that give rise to a similar set of 
reform issues. Worldwide experience since the early 1980s indicates that a variety 
of institutions must be developed for transition (LUIBRAND 2002). This is par-
ticularly true for the financial sector or, in the words of WOLFF, (1999:59): "The 
reform of the financial sector in a transforming economy primarily means insti-
tution-building." 
In the transition process, the reform of the national financial system plays a 
key role because the efficiency and the speed of the reforms have a decisive  
influence on the success of the transformation process in the other sectors 
(SCHRIEDER and HEIDHUES 1998). Adaptation of the financial sector was one of 
the most challenging reforms that Vietnam had to undertake. After a decade of 
financial sector reforms, Vietnam expected to see the emergence of an effective 
and efficient banking system (TEUFEL 1997; TRAN and DANG 1996). However, 
the financial sector is still weak, legislative issues are incomplete and it suffers 
from a substantial amount of bad debt (LUIBRAND 2002). 
This paper aims at describing and reviewing the transformation process and 
status of the financial system in Vietnam. Moreover, possible future develop-
ments are presented and evaluated. Special attention is given to the implications 
of the financial transition for the rural financial market. Methodologically, this 
research is based on an in-depth literature review combined with anecdotal evi-
dence gained during field research in Vietnam from 2000-2002. Transformation of the financial system 
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2.2  The financial landscape in Vietnam 
In 1990, the former mono-bank system was changed to a two-tier banking system 
consisting of the State Bank of Vietnam (SBVN) as central bank and supervi-
sory institution (tier 1), and an operating system (tier 2).  
The central bank, SBVN: Until the early 1990s, independent central banks were 
assumed as important for growth and particularly for ensuring low inflation 
(TOMPSON 1998). Few institutional recommendations by economists have gained 
such rapid and wide acceptance as that of granting central banks independence 
from short-term political control.
6 However, while central bank independence has 
a clear correlation with low rates of inflation, there is no causal link between the 
two. Independence of a central bank alone does not make it an effective institution. 
Its independence must receive the support of the political system (POSEN 1993). 
The policy implementation for developing countries is that, in order to ensure low 
inflation, the best course of action is to undertake financial sector reforms (e.g., 
liberalization and privatization) rather than instituting easily reversible and practi-
cally meaningless changes in their legal/institutional structures (MAS 1995).
7  
KOVSTED et al. (2003) assess the SBVN as politically and operationally dependent 
upon support from government agencies. In some cases, the SBVN has not made 
decisions even on issues that were within its power, but has instead relied on 
guidance from the government. This indicates that the SBVN still does not have 
the status to independently execute national monetary policies. Obviously the 
binding constraint is not the lack of legislative independence. Therefore, an indi-
rect route to obtain central banks independence by gradually building and 
strengthening a non-governmental lobby for an independent central bank could be 
more promising than relying solely on the legislative transformation. The preliminary 
plans for equitization of the state-owned banks represent an important step in 
this direction, as does the continued presence of foreign banks in Vietnam. 
                                           
 
 
6  BOWLES and WHITE (1994), however, note that scholarly proponents of central banks in-
dependence are less likely to take the case as proved than policy-makers and financial jour-
nalists. Moreover, among academics the degree of independence of a central bank is still 
the subject of much controversy (STIGLITZ 2002).
  
7  This might explain why the SBVN has been very successful in fighting inflation in the past 
decade, despite its strong dependence on and close relations with the government (KLUMP 
and SPITZENPFEIL 1998).
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State-owned commercial banks (SOCBs): There are four large SOCBs in 
Vietnam: The Foreign Trade Bank of Vietnam (Vietcombank), the VBARD, the 
Industry and Commerce Bank of Vietnam (Incombank), and the Vietnamese 
Bank for Investment and Development. Before the financial reform (1988-1990), 
the SOCBs were departments of the SBVN. These financial institutions are the 
leading banks of the banking system and have a total of more than 1,200 branches 
in Vietnam. Altogether, the number of staff working for the SOCBs is around 
40,000 (KOVSTED et al. 2003). In the past, these banks solely served their speci-
fied sectors. Today, these strict sector constraints have been abolished.  
Policy Bank: The VBP was established in 1995 as the poor people’s lending 
outlet of the VBARD.
8 The VBP is called a policy bank, because the govern-
ment-mandated purpose of the VBP is not to maximize profit but to reduce 
poverty (VBP 1999b). The VBP specializes in lending to poor households, pri-
marily the rural poor.
9 The bank basically consists of a head office and has no 
physical structures of its own below this level. The VBP uses the operational 
facilities and staff of the VBARD and of local authorities in extending its ser-
vices. Nevertheless, due to its highly subsidized interest rates, many interna-
tional agencies consider the VBP to be financially unsustainable.
10 
Joint Stock Banks (JSBs): At present, 36 commercial banks exist in the form of 
JSBs (VIET NAM NEWS 2002a). The first JSBs were founded in 1989. The majority 
of JSBs were quickly established in the years following the initial liberalization of 
the financial sector. Some of them are owned jointly by the state and private 
groups and individuals; others are completely in private hands. In the beginning 
the majority of stock was held by state-owned enterprises (SOE), which were 
trying to diversify their business activities (KLUMP and SPITZENPFEIL 1998). 
Foreign Banks and Joint Venture Banks: There are 15 branches of foreign 
banks and four joint venture banks. In addition, 62 representative offices from 
20 nations operate in Vietnam; these include major international banks such as 
                                           
 
 
8  As mentioned before, the VBP was replaced by the VBSP.
 
9  Only a certain portion of the population is eligible to obtain a loan, namely the rural poor. 
The Vietnamese government classifies every household into one of five classes according 
to its living standard: Hungry, poor, medium, better-off, or rich (DUFHUES et al. 2002).
 
10  The VBP has been recognized as loss-making since the late 1990s (VBARD and DANIDA 
1999).
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Deutsche Bank, or Bank of America and CitiBank. The existing legislation, 
however, still blocks foreign banks from becoming fully fledged participants on 
the Vietnamese financial market. Despite recent progress, the Vietnamese govern 
ment has yet to establish a level playing field for competition between foreign 
and domestic banks (KOVSTED et al. 2003). 
People Credit Funds (PCFs): After the collapse of the rural credit cooperatives in 
the early 1990s, it was quickly realized that the VBARD could not fill the void left. 
The system of PCFs was established in 1993 to fill the gap (WOLZ 1999). In June 
2001, a total of 947 PCFs existed, supervised by the SBVN, and having a total of 
about 714,000 members (GTZ 2002). The intention underlying the creation of the 
PCF system was to create a three-layer organization in order to achieve a combina-
tion of close local contacts and connections while minimizing the risks associated 
with seasonality and regional shocks. As a consequence, all local credit funds were 
handled and directed by regional funds, which in turn would be supervised by a 
central credit fund handling the supply and balancing liquidity among the regional 
funds. The deposit and credit market shares of the PCF system are relatively small, 
amounting to a mere 1-2% of total market volumes (KOVSTED et al. 2003).  
Insurance and leasing companies: Up to the present, 18 insurance companies 
(state-owned, joint ventures and foreign companies) exist in Vietnam (DUNG 2002). 
A new Law on Insurance Business became effective in April 2001. Although the 
private sector’s market share is on the rise, the state-owned insurer remains the 
dominant player, with non-life and life market shares of approximately 47% and 
55% respectively. Coverage is low, with annual insurance premiums amounting 
to 1% of GDP. But premiums have grown at an average rate of 30% per year, 
reaching an estimated 321 million US$ in 2001. Vietnam also has eight finance 
leasing companies, three of which are either joint ventures with foreign investors 
or wholly foreign-owned. Five are subsidiaries of the SOCBs. In 2001, the value 
of leased assets amounted to 131 million US$ (WORLD BANK 2002b).  
Postal savings service: The Vietnam Postal Savings Company (VPSC) was estab-
lished in 1999 and operates under the authority of Vietnam Post and Telecom. Its 
main function is to provide a savings product, thus mobilizing savings for govern-
ment development investments. The operating costs of the VSPC are de facto sub-
sidized by the Vietnam Post and Telecom through the use of its staff, as the VSPC 
itself employs only 100 persons. The VPSC sees computerization as its biggest 
obstacle and opportunity. Moving from paper-based to computerized operations 
would be an expensive endeavor. This has, however, been identified as a priority to 
increase the value of existing services and would facilitate the expansion of ser-
vices to include money transfers between accounts, payment of utilities, etc.  Chapter 2 
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A money transfer service between savings accounts within the VSPC has been 
launched in Hanoi and extended to northern provinces. Recently, expansion to 
Ho-Chi Minh City was started, and the service is to be extended nationwide by the 
end of the year (WORLD BANK 2002a). 
Stock exchange: Vietnam has been endeavoring to establish a stock exchange 
since 1992. However, the differences between reform-oriented and conservative 
politicians have repeatedly delayed important decisions concerning the stock 
market. An essential step towards the creation of a stock exchange was the 
building of the State Securities Commission in 1996, which is responsible for 
the planning, implementation and performance of the stock exchange. After the 
Asian Crisis in 1997, the conservative politicians gained the upper hand and the 
establishment of the stock exchange was postponed again. In 2000, however, a 
stock trading center was opened in Ho-Chi-Minh-City, which is a strong signal of 
change in the direction of a market economy. Nevertheless, this stock trading cen-
ter is highly regulated by the government (NGUYEN 2002). Currently 19 com-
panies and 18 bonds are listed, with a total market capitalization of 105 million US$. 
All companies listed are former SOEs that have been transformed into joint-
stock companies. Trading was upgraded in December 2001, and a clearing and 
settlement system consistent with best international practices will be introduced 
by 2005 (WORLD BANK 2002b). 
2.3 Reforms  in  the  financial market 
Prudential reforms of the financial sector are most successful in countries with 
economies similar to Vietnam’s economy today. A banking system with some 
problems, but without disasters, is most capable of pursuing reforms. Vietnam 
therefore offers a good starting position for further reforms in the financial sector 
(ARDREY et al. 1999). 
2.3.1  Reforming steps in the banking sector 
The unwillingness of the authorities to undertake thorough reform of the finan-
cial sector in the past is a result of their continuing desire for a ‘market economy 
with a socialist orientation’, in which the state occupies the ‘commanding 
heights’ of the economy. Although private banks have been allowed to operate, 
reforms so far have been careful not to threaten the dominant position of the 
state-owned banks. There appears, however, to be a growing recognition on the 
part of state authorities that the financial sector cannot be managed the same 
way as other sectors because mistakes reverberate throughout the entire   
economy, threatening not only financial institutions, but the economy as a whole  Transformation of the financial system 
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(RIEDEL and TURLEY 1999). Despite recent reforms (e.g. deregulating the in-
terest rate regime or putting in place restructuring plans for SOCBs), the 
WORLD BANK (2002b) states that the efforts to transform the banking sector 
into a commercially-based operation are still in their early stages. 
2.3.1.1 Competition 
The previous banking reforms implemented in Vietnam during 1988-92 were 
substantial and contributed to solid macroeconomic performance. By 1994 (see 
Table 2-1), the banking system had changed considerably, in the sense that other 
banks began to take a growing portion of banking assets (WORLD BANK 2000c). 
But the speed of introduction and implementation of reforms declined at the 
end of the 1990s, leaving the banking sector to be dominated by SOCBs 
(LUIBRAND 2002).  
Table 2-1:  Increasing number of players in the banking sector 
  1990 1994 1999 
SOCBs
1  4 4 5 
JSBs 0  36  48 
Joint venture banks  0  3  4 
Branches and rep. offices of foreign banks  0  41  103 
Source: WORLD BANK (2000c). 
Notes: 
1 Including the policy bank, VBP. 
The competitiveness of the Vietnamese financial system is ranked very low 
(UNIDO et al. 2003). SOCBs dominate the financial sector in Vietnam more 
than they do in other developing countries, where governments usually control 
only around half of the banking system (THAI 1998). According to OH (1999) 
and WORLD BANK (2000c), the major SOCBs hold approximately 75-80% of 
total assets in the banking sector. In addition, the SOCBs are large shareholders 
in the JSBs and, as markets for SOCBs and JSBs are completely separate in 
terms of depositors and borrowers, the share of assets under complete or partial 
government control could be much higher. Due to the segmented financial markets, 
competition is not of great concern to SOCBs. After all, the Vietnamese domestic 
financial market remains highly distorted and segmented (MCCARTY 2001). 
Given that the concentration in the Vietnamese financial market coincides with 
substantial state ownership, one option to enhance competition would be   
privatization of the four major SOCBs. This, however, is a lengthy process, 
starting with the recently completed international audits and subsequent attempts to 
address the non-performing loan problem in the SOCBs, which must precede 
any attempt to recapitalize the major SOCBs (see section 2.3.2). Only after this Chapter 2 
 
14
has taken place would it be realistic to consider any form of privatization of the 
SOCBs. Another approach to making financial markets more contestable is   
liberalizing the comparatively strict entry requirements. Nevertheless, due to 
potential risks associated with foreign bank entry, introducing foreign competi-
tors may require an initial transition period, to allow time for efficiency adjust-
ments in the domestic sector and for improvements in prudential regulation and 
supervision. Because bank failures will almost inevitably occur during this process, 
the government needs to establish transparent rules for bank exit. As a conse-
quence, any liberalization of the entry process must be both managed over time 
and transparent (KOVSTED et al. 2003). The development of a competitive banking 
sector in Vietnam will not only promote increased efficiency of the banks and 
improved banking services but also promote the development of a competitive 
private business sector, because borrowers will not be limited to a few banks 
that serve only selected clients (THAI 1998). 
The lack of competition in the rural financial market is even more severe than in 
the urban financial market. Here, the state-owned banks (VBARD/VBP) are the 
main (only) supplier of financial services.
11 The VBP is completely dependent 
on the VBARD as they use the same staff below headquarters level. The 
VBARD serves the better-off clientele in the rural market, while the VBP serves 
the poorer market segment.
12 There is thus no real competition between the two 
(DUFHUES  et al. 2004a). It is not possible for other financial organizations   
(e.g. non-governmental organizations, PCFs) to compete with the VBARD/VBP, 
which are recipients of huge state subsidies covering both operating and financial 
costs. Under such circumstances, financial innovations are unlikely to occur and 
no market inducements are given to the quasi-monopoly market leaders, 
VBARD/VBP, to improve their performance. But as LLANTO (2000) states, the 
subsidies enable the VBARD and VBP to penetrate poor areas. However, they 
                                           
 
 
11  PCFs do not exist in every province and have very limited outreach compared to the VBP/ 
VBARD.
 
12  The orientation to a special market segment reduces portfolio diversification, which can 
endanger the long-term sustainability of a bank. The situation is aggravated by the fact that 
the rural banks in Vietnam mostly financed investments related to agricultural production. 
Possibilities for diversifying the portfolio of rural financial institutions in post-socialist 
economies are generally limited as only a few small and medium enterprises existed during 
the centrally planned era (SCHRIEDER and HEIDHUES 1998).
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are doing so at great expense to the taxpayer and at great cost to the develop-
ment and implementation of sustainable financial services. 
2.3.1.2  Interest rate policy  
Countries that do not possess highly developed financial sectors may use interest-
rate ceilings as a means of protecting emerging institutions. As financial sectors 
mature, restrictions on competition can be removed provided that adequate sys-
tems of prudential supervision and control of monetary growth are in place 
(COLLIER and MAYER 1989). In making this decision, it is important to consider 
how far advanced the country is in reforming the state enterprise sector and in 
establishing a ‘credit culture’ – that is, the extent to which banks have become 
accustomed to using market principles in assessing credit risks. Countries with 
inadequate regulatory and supervisory frameworks, or whose financial institu-
tions are insolvent, are likely to run into serious problems if they liberalize interest 
rates too early or too rapidly. For interest rate liberalization to succeed, the main 
economic players need to be subject to hard budget constraints so that they will 
avoid borrowing and lending unwisely. Otherwise, credit could be directed to so-
called pathological borrowers – those who would like to take the greatest risks and 
who would borrow no matter how high the cost (MEHRAN and LAURENS 1997). 
When financial deregulation is implemented – and especially where non-performing 
loans are inherited from the pre-reform era – interest rate liberalization should 
be accompanied by structural reforms, including restructuring bank balance sheets 
to remove bad debt, privatizing state-owned banks, and introducing measures to 
promote competition in the banking sector (PILL and PRADHAN 1997).  
During the last decade, the Vietnamese Government has set an interest rate ceiling 
through the SBVN. In recent years, greater flexibility in the management of loan 
interest rates has been introduced, e.g. the interest ceiling on foreign loans has 
been abolished. For lending in dong, banks have for some time been allowed to 
offer interest rates up to a new ceiling rate, defined as the base rate plus 0.3% per 
month for short-term loans and 0.5% for medium-term loans (WORLD BANK 2001). 
However, the real interest rate was lowered every year since they became posi-
tive (SENANAYAKE and HO 2001). While the standard interest rate was relatively 
high in real terms, the various preferential rates were close to the actual inflation 
rate and often below (DIEHL 1998). Finally, after a decade of pre-fixed interest rate 
ceilings, the SBVN has removed the lending rate ceiling (WORLD BANK 2002a).  
There is little experience as yet on what the true impact of the recently imple-
mented rate liberalization will be on banks’ rate-setting behavior, and thus on 
their future profitability. For now, differentiation between banks and types of 
borrowers remains limited (WORLD BANK 2002b). Despite the possibility of raising Chapter 2 
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lending rates under the past interest rate cap regime, the rates stayed quite in-
elastic and unresponsive to increased demand. The large SOCBs were and are 
clearly the rate-setters. The SOCBs explain this inelasticity as a fear of competi-
tion and a perceived duty to advance their clients’ business prospects through 
providing good rates. This could imply quite an unusual type of pricing by the 
large SOCBs, maintaining lending rates at concessional levels despite their own 
interest margins possibly being insufficient to cover their costs. As interest rate 
liberalization is a very recent phenomena, it is understandable that the banks are 
wary of taking aggressive steps towards a more market-driven competitive ap-
proach (WORLD BANK 2002a). Nevertheless, similarly to the central bank, the 
decision makers within the SOCBs do not fully exploit their opportunities. The 
transformation to a market-oriented economy obviously needs more than an 
enabling legal or regulatory framework; it also needs business actors who are 
willing and able to carry out these reforms. 
Interest rates of rural credit institutes are still highly subsidized and subject to 
close government control.
13 The provision of subsidized interest rates to the rural 
population has for a long time been the subject of debate between international 
donors and the government of Vietnam. The donors point to international ex-
perience with subsidized rural credit programs having resulted in massive loan 
losses, low savings mobilization, and bank failures.
14 In the past, subsidized in-
terest rates led to a rush for loans from VBP and VBARD, resulting in the com-
mon impression that subsidized loans are a right rather than a contractual 
agreement. In addition, the perception that loans at a higher rate are exploitative 
makes a shift to market-based rates increasingly difficult (KOVSTED et al. 2003). 
The cap on lending rates during the last decade and the view of decision makers 
that savings are not important for rural development have led to a situation 
where credit-oriented rural financial institutes, VBARD/VBP and now the Vietnam 
Bank for Social Policies (VBSP), leave the rural population without access to 
saving products. The main challenge will be to implement a safe, attractive and 
cost-covering deposit collection system at the local level. However, before this 
can happen, a paradigm change is called for. The official policies in Vietnam 
                                           
 
 
13  The VBARD was only recently freed from lending at preferential interest rates.
 
14  A detailed overview of the negative effects of subsidized credits on rural development can 
be found in (ADAMS et al. 1984).
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need to recognize the capability and the demand of the rural population to save. 
The implementation of the VPSC is a step in the right direction and it has, at 
least potentially, the possibility to achieve very deep outreach.
15 Nevertheless, 
the policies of VBARD and VBSP have not changed so far in this regard. 
2.3.1.3 Political  lending 
Historically, the state-owned bank sector was used as an instrument of public 
policy, and during the 1990s much of its lending was still influenced by social and 
political rather than commercial objectives (GOTTWALD  and KLUMP  1999). 
Nevertheless, over the past decade the four large SOCBs have slowly started to 
evolve from specialized political lending vehicles to more commercially-
oriented financial intermediaries, with the greatest progress seen in 2001 and 
2002 (WORLD BANK 2001). Recent steps to separate political lending from com-
mercial lending at SOCBs resulted in the establishment of the VBSP, the successor 
of the VBP. The VBSP has a branch network in all provinces. It enjoys privileges 
such as having its liquidity and solvency guaranteed by the government, and being 
exempt from deposit insurance and tax regimes (WORLD BANK 2002b). The VBSP 
will take over all political lending from the VBARD. Thus, the VBARD, now freed 
from political lending, will concent-rate purely on market-oriented lending. This 
separation aims at enhancing financial transparency in the country’s banking sys-
tem (SGT DAILY 2003). Through the VBSP, the Vietnamese government will con-
tinue its policy of providing preferential credits to ‘disadvantaged’ groups. As the 
interest rates are not cost-covering, it is also quite reasonable to assume that the 
VBSP will be one of the future holes into which public funds will drain. 
KOVSTED et al. (2003) suggest taking the influence of the government on credit 
allocation as an indicator for the progress of the transition from a centrally planned 
economy to more market-based economy in Vietnam. The question is how 
many funds will be channeled through the VBSP and to whom?  
However, there is still no clear distinction between profit-orientation and the 
social duties of banking, and the uniqueness of banks as financial inter-
mediaries is not well recognized in Vietnam. A bank is regarded as either a 
                                           
 
 
15 In a country where 80% of the population lives in rural areas, even the branch network 
of the VBARD cannot reach widely or deeply enough among the population at large. 
The postal savings system offers the use of a structure that is obliged to have equal  
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safe or a broker, or a distributor of government funds. This also affects the 
general perception of banks and banking functions, especially among rural 
households (KOVSTED et al. 2003; OH 1999). The founding of the VBSP may 
be a step in the right direction. As political lending will be separate from com-
mercial lending, bank staff will at least have a clear view of each operation. As 
the target group of the VBSP has been widened enormously, it seems fair to 
assume that the VBSP will become the main supplier of credit to rural house-
holds and may even outdo the VBARD.
16 It is therefore also reasonable to sug-
gest that the rural population is unlikely to change its perception of rural finan-
cial institutes as social welfare institutions. 
All policy interventions of the Vietnamese government in the rural financial 
market have the aim of extending credit outreach to the population. The reason 
behind this policy objective is a centrally fixed production target. For instance, 
the Vietnamese government has set as its target to provide 90% of poor house-
holds with credit, regardless of whether there is a demand for it. This is reminiscent 
of old socialist production planning. In a recent study, BUCHENRIEDER et al. (2003) 
found that most rural households in Vietnam are well served with credit facili-
ties. Less than 15% of rural households are access constrained. Attaining the 
aforementioned target will therefore be an immense drain on public resources. As it 
is connected to political lending, it will probably also create a large number of 
non-performing loans and a business culture that will likely hamper the creation 
of any sustainable rural financial institution for years. 
2.3.2  State-owned enterprises and non-performing loans 
SOEs: The most difficult reforms that now confront Vietnam relate to the reform of 
SOEs and their dependence on state credit (MONTES 2001; SHIMOMOTO 2003). The 
explicit subsidies from the budget of the SOEs were stopped during the 1990s but 
were partly replaced by increased credit from the banks (WORLD BANK 2000c).  
After the establishment of the two-tier banking system, all enterprises were able 
to borrow at the same interest rate. However, SOEs still continued to soak up the 
bulk of domestic lending (MONTES 2001). The former interest rate policy of 
                                           
 
 
geographic distribution (WORLD BANK 2002a).
 
16  Instead of serving only the ‘poor’, other disadvantaged groups, e.g. students, are now also 
eligible for a loan.
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granting preferential credits to SOEs squeezed banks’ profits (see Section 2.3.1.2 ). 
This encouraged SOEs to accumulate excess liquidity beyond proper investment 
opportunities, as capital costs were low. At the same time, it led banks to lose 
motivation for profit-taking businesses (OH 1999; SHIMOMOTO 2003). Neverthe-
less, the share of credits to SOEs has been lowered continuously from more than 
90% in 1990 to 25% in 2002 (WORLD BANK 2002b). The rationalization of interest 
rates is also an important step in paving the way for increased lending to private 
small and medium enterprises (SMEs), which may not have an adequate credit 
history or collateral to secure loans at administratively set low interest rates   
(WORLD BANK 2001).  
While efforts to transform and restructure SOEs have stayed on track so far, 
the process appears to be slowing down. At present, the reform mechanisms in 
place amount to an option, rather than a mandate, for enterprises to divest 
(WORLD BANK 2002b). It is necessary to prevent badly performing enterprises 
from obtaining new credit and to collect outstanding loans. So far, however, this 
measure has been considered more from a political than an economic perspec-
tive, as to do so might press SOEs into bankruptcy. Only few liquidations have so 
far taken place (WORLD BANK 2000c). According to MCCARTY (1999), the re-
luctance to close down SOEs may be influenced not only by fear of creating an 
unemployment problem or by resistance on the part of enterprise management 
due to fear of losing power; it may also be influenced by the Vietnamese vision 
that can be traced back to the economics of Marx and Lenin, which is one of 
steady accumulation: Step-by-step, more of everything. This is in contrast to 
more contemporary arguments based on an understanding of scarcity, opportu-
nity costs, and the pace of the technological change. The crucial ingredient for a 
successful modern economy is the ability to change – to open new businesses, 
and to close down old ones.  
Non-performing loans: Past emphasis on policy and direct lending has led to a 
high share of non-performing loans among the SOCBs. An inappropriate regulatory 
and supervisory system, one that did not focus sufficiently on risk and loan quality, 
permitted JSBs, for example, to conduct related-party and high-risk lending 
(WORLD BANK 2000b). According to the SBVN (2001), 13% of all outstanding 
bank loans are non-performing, though some experts suggest the figure could be Chapter 2 
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as high as 30% if international accounting standards were applied.
17 A signifi-
cant portion of these non-performing loans was given to SOEs. Many of these 
loans may never be recovered. While the exact value of non-performing loans is 
difficult to estimate, the current situation amounts to a claim by the state sector 
on future capital accumulation (WORLD BANK 2002b). The heavy reliance of the 
JSBs on SOEs as a source of deposits and for lending and the strong inter-
dependence of the SOCBs and the SOEs may put the whole financial system in 
jeopardy (LEUNG and RIEDEL 2000, WARNER 2001). The SBVN took some  
initial steps towards improving the situation and closed several JSBs. Progress 
with resolving old non-performing loans has been slow but steady. The main 
difficulty is with unsecured loans, mainly to SOEs. SOCBs find it difficult to 
meet their resolution targets, owing to delays in SOE reform. Although progress 
with the resolution of non-performing loans varies across the four large SOCBs, 
a first round of re-capitalization provided resources to each of them. It is not 
clear, however, that the portfolio of the banks is seeing significant improvement. 
The lack of a timely resolution process for non-performing loans hampers the 
creation of a credit culture of repayment (WORLD BANK 2002b). However, in 
some areas restructuring efforts have already begun. The government has, for 
example, already developed a detailed restructuring plan for the Vietcombank. 
During the next couple of years, a detailed restructuring plan for the VBARD, 
Incombank and the BIDV will be developed on the basis of the recently completed 
international accounting standard audits.
18 Asset management companies will be 
established for each SOCB to solve the problem of non-performing loans 
(KOVSTED et al. 2003). Despite such instances of progress, the large quantity of 
non-performing loans still threatens the whole financial system. 
Most of the credit expansion in the last years has come from the SOCBs. In 
view of their already high levels of non-performing loans and generally poor 
expertise in credit risk assessment, such rapid expansion will further weaken the 
                                           
 
 
17  Vietnam uses its own definition to classify loans as non-performing. Interest accrual on 
non-performing loans is allowed for up to 180 days for unsecured loans and 360 days for 
secured loans. Loans overdue for 90 days are not adequately classified. The classification 
system, moreover, does not reflect the credit risk based on the borrower’s repayment ca-
pacity, collateral coverage, and other factors (KOVSTED et al. 2003). 
 
18  The restructuring of the VBARD has already begun with the separation of the VBSP from 
VBARD.
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asset quality of these banks (WORLD BANK 2001).
19 In 2000 and 2001, a sub-
stantial part of the credit allocation to non-state sectors reflects the govern-
ment’s decision to ask SOCBs to extend loans for rural development purposes 
(WORLD BANK 2001; WORLD BANK 2002b).
20 These loans were usually soft 
loans. One can assume that many of these recently disbursed loans to rural 
households will end up as non-performing loans. Nevertheless, as stated above, 
the VBSP will take over all policy loans from VBARD and VBP. Therefore, the 
VBSP will start out with a huge burden of bad debts, casting great doubts on its 
financial viability and on the statement made by Prime Minister Phan Van Khai 
to the VIET NAM NEWS (2003), saying that the VBSP should not operate like a 
subsidized financial body. 
Due to the small profit margins, the VBSP will probably seek, as did the VBP 
and VBARD, to shift obligations (training, screening, monitoring, etc.) to clients 
or local authorities in order to save costs, leading to a less focused development 
of skills and knowledge within the financial institutions (DUFHUES et al. 2002; 
KOVSTED et al. 2003). One problem resulting from this practice is the lack of 
contact between professional bank staff and the borrower. Hence, many house-
holds that are not creditworthy are assessed as creditworthy, resulting in massive 
rescheduling of loans and ultimately adding to the amount of non-performing 
loans (BUCHENRIEDER et al. 2003; IZUMIDA and DUONG 2001). 
2.3.3 Legal  environment 
The transformation process includes the reshaping of the legal environment. So far, 
the changes in the legal system of Vietnam have been unable to keep up with the 
developments of the economic reforms (DIEHL 1998; DUCKETT 2001). The findings 
of a number of studies show that countries with legal systems that enforce contracts 
more effectively have more highly developed financial systems. In Vietnam, the 
                                           
 
 
19  As a source of overdue loans, SOEs and non-SOEs have shown a similar trend. The in-
crease in the proportion of overdue loans partly reflects the loss of impetus in the reform 
process. The private sector’s share of overdue credits rose to 67% in 1997 from 41% in 
1994, with the bulk concentrated in VBARD (OH 1999).
 
20  Of the SOCBs, it is mainly the Vietcombank and the VBARD that lend to private enter-
prises. The reason for this is that these two banks have an extensive branch network, and 
that their respective areas of specialization are in sectors that have seen rapid growth  
following the initiation of the Doi-Moi reforms (KOVSTED et al. 2003).
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financial system is relatively weak. This weakness becomes evident in the diffi-
culty borrowers have in giving and lenders have in enforcing pledges and mort-
gages (RIEDEL 2000; UNDP 1999). Thus, the underdeveloped legal framework 
does not prove adequate for the use of risk management tools such as collateral 
(GOTTWALD and KLUMP 1999). From a banking perspective, the focus of legal re-
forms should be on the clarification of legal concepts. These include ownership and 
transfer of land use rights, collateral registration procedures, mortgage laws and 
title deeds (OH 1999).
21 Banks are not allowed to seize land from defaulting farmers. 
It is more or less impossible to evict farmers and auction their land (WOLZ 1997). 
However, the VBARD still insists on land use rights as collateral, but only few 
cases exist where land has been liquidated in the event of a farmer’s collapse 
(DUONG and IZUMIDA 2002). The already high share of non-performing loans will 
be pushed up further if the assets of defaulters cannot be liquidated. The idea that 
almost all loans of the VBARD are in fact unsecured is quite alarming. 
The government has recognized private lending as a legal business and has 
given private lenders the legal right to sue a borrower in the event of default 
(NGUYEN 1998). The practice has shown that private lenders rarely go to the 
court for dispute settlement. Particularly in rural areas (and especially at village 
level), the Civil Code is not well understood and it is time-consuming and 
costly to go through court settlement procedures, particularly in the case of 
small loans (HUNG and GIAP 1999). The major goal in improving the legal 
framework is to clarify contractual rights and to disseminate this information to 
all necessary levels. 
A Registry Center has recently been set up under the Ministry of Justice, which 
should in principle reduce future disputes among creditors regarding claims on 
secured transactions with movable assets. The registration process has the poten-
tial to increase the transparency of lending transactions and of ownership of the 
underlying collateral. However, the Registry Center does not yet have an elec-
tronic filing system capable of tracking, recording and providing information on 
a timely basis. A Credit Information Center was also established to provide 
creditors with information on borrowers. This Center, too, is at an early stage of 
                                           
 
 
21  Foreign banks have recently been allowed to accept land use rights as collateral. This is a 
vast improvement over the situation during the 1990s, where regulations explicitly pro-
hibited foreign banks from accepting land use rights as collateral (KOVSTED et al. 2003).
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operation, but it could become a crucial tool for banks to reduce risk in their 
future lending. The related rights and duties of the parties involved should be 
clearly backed by legislation with adequate sanctions for breaches, thus pro-
tecting the data collected from unauthorized use (WORLD BANK 2002b). 
Enactment of a bank secrecy law would very positively influence the use of de-
posit accounts (RIEDEL 2000). The current law, however, does little to protect 
bank secrecy. First, it is the credit institution and not the customer that has the 
right to maintain confidentiality about the customer’s account. Therefore, the 
credit institution can give out information about the customer if the institution so 
chooses. Second, the credit institution is obliged to give out the information on 
the request of a ‘competent state authority’. Since the term ‘competent state 
authority’ is not defined, the door is open potentially to pass confidential banking 
information to hundreds of state agencies at any level (UNDP 1999). 
2.3.4 Regulatory  environment 
The degree of government involvement in banking regulation is still the sub-
ject of vigorous debate among academics. However, there is broad agreement 
that liberalization of financial markets without adequate banking regulation 
will most likely lead to macroeconomic instability. Unregulated financial mar-
kets are dangerous, as events in Russia and some Asian countries have indi-
cated (PILL and PRADHAN 1997; STIGLITZ 2002). Safeguarding financial mar-
kets and institutions from shocks that might pose a systemic risk is the prime 
objective of financial regulation. The failure of one non-bank firm often im-
proves business prospects for the remaining firms in the industry. In contrast, a 
shock that seriously damages one bank can spread to other banks (HERRING and 
SANTOMERO 2000).  
One regulatory measure often recommended by academics to encourage develop- 
ment of the banking system is the adoption of a deposit insurance scheme 
(RIEDEL 2000). In Vietnam, the Deposit Insurance Agency began operating in 
2000 (WORLD BANK 2002a). However, the implementation of a deposit insurance 
scheme is a matter of controversy among academics. BARTH  et al. (2002)   
found a strong link between the generosity of the deposit insurance system and 
bank sector fragility. This result is consistent with the view that deposit insurance Chapter 2 
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may not only substantially aggravate moral hazard but can also produce delete-
rious effects on bank fragility. The results suggest that the reverse effects from 
deposit insurance overwhelm any stabilizing effects that these safety nets may 
also have.
22 DEMIRGÜC-KUNT and KANE (2001) showed that where effective 
bank regulation is lacking (as it is in Vietnam), deposit insurance can do more 
harm than good.
23 In general, if the government is too willing to help insolvent 
banks, this will create the impression that it will continue to do likewise in the 
future (SCHRIEDER and HEIDHUES 1998). It is not clear, therefore, that imple-
mentation of a deposit insurance scheme in Vietnam will have beneficial effects 
on bank development (KOVSTED et al. 2003).  
Vietnam is still a cash economy, with cash accounting for about 50% of 
the  M3 money supply.
24 This may reflect a popular reluctance to use the   
banking system. Experience elsewhere has shown that a sound banking system 
in which business and ordinary people have confidence is an essential mechanism 
for mobilizing domestic savings for productive investment (UNDP 1999; 
WOLFF 1999). One of the major tasks ahead is to strengthen popular faith in the 
financial system. The very low degree of financial deepening, as well as the 
prevalence of US dollar holdings in Vietnam, indicate that the degree of   
information opaqueness is well below the intermediate range. The govern- 
ment therefore needs to promote regulations relating to the dissemination of 
financial information. This would include laws relating to the regular issuance, 
on the part of publicly traded companies, of financial information on a stan-
dardized basis using internationally accepted accounting and auditing practices 
(LEUNG and RIEDEL 2000). Accounting and auditing standards in Vietnam, 
which differ from international practice, are another element that undermines 
confidence in the banking system (UNDP 1999). Up to now, SBVN banking 
supervisors fail to act in line with international standards because they lack 
                                           
 
 
22  Banks do have a reason for taking on more risk than they should. The reason, paradoxi-
cally, is the safety net that governments put in place to prevent bank failures. By trying to 
make banks safer, governments give banks the means and motive to behave recklessly 
(THE ECONOMIST 2003).
 
23  The biggest problem with Vietnamese regulations is the lack of enforcement. To effec-
tively implement the banking laws and regulations, a much stricter and standardized penalty 
system must be established (TAM 2000).
 
24  M3 = Currency in circulation + Short-term deposits + Time deposits.
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the power and competence to change bank accountancy standards accordingly.
25 
Providing greater transparency and reliable information is essential to 
strengthen the faith of the population in the financial system.  
Rural finance in Vietnam basically means microfinance. So far, there is no spe-
cial law regulating microfinance activity in Vietnam. MCGUIRE et al. (1998) 
state that a number of prudential banking standards applied to normal banks may 
not be appropriate for MFIs. This was confirmed by an SBVN official, who ac-
knowledged that the existing regulations are too strict and narrow for the micro-
finance sector (NHGIA 2001). Governments should ensure that capital require-
ments for establishing financial intermediaries are realistic for small institutes 
operating at the local level, and that there are no other restrictions affecting the 
establishment of such entities (MCGUIRE et al. 1998). Like all types of regula-
tion, banking regulation can do more harm than good if it is not well designed. 
The policy of more restrictive banking regulation impedes the most promising 
initiatives in microfinance (SCHMIDT 1999). In general, the question is not so 
much whether or not MFIs should be included in formal banking regulation, but 
rather when and how (CHRISTEN and ROSENBERG 2000). There is thus room for 
improvement and, as mentioned before, particularly as regards reducing market 
entry barriers for MFIs to promote competition in the rural financial market. 
However, it is very unlikely that any viable financial intermediary will emerge 
as long as the government continues to supply highly subsidized loans to the rural 
population through the VBSP.  
2.4  Conclusions and policy recommendations 
After the slow-down in financial sector reforms in recent years, the WORLD BANK 
(2001) states that Vietnam’s banking system reform is back on schedule. The 
government has adopted a comprehensive banking reform program focusing on 
the restructuring of banks and on improvements in the regulatory and supervi-
sory framework. The past decade has witnessed rapid deepening in the level of 
                                           
 
 
25  In Vietnam, the bank accounting system is determined by the Ministry of Finance. The 
process of changing the overall accounting principles to bring them into line with interna-
tional standards has been initiated and is currently under way. It is a process that will take 
time, however, as it involves formulating a chart of accounts, developing an entire   
accounting methodology, and training staff (KOVSTED et al. 2003).
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monetization of the Vietnamese economy. The ratio of bank credit to GDP in-
creased from 13% in 1990 to 27% in 1995, with a further increase to 44% in the 
year 2000. The growth of the non-banking financial sector, and especially of the 
insurance business, has also been remarkable, even if the size of the sector  
remains small in absolute terms (WORLD BANK 2002b). The liberalization of in-
terest rates is an important step in the continuing transformation of the financial 
market in Vietnam. Nevertheless, it is not yet clear within the regulatory envi-
ronment whether this step will have positive effects, or whether it was premature 
and will thus destabilize the whole financial system. 
The government will continue to supply huge sections of the population, mainly 
rural, with subsidized credits through the VBSP. While the liberalization of in-
terest rates offers the potential for financial intermediaries to offer cost-covering 
services, it is unlikely that, except for some local non-governmental organiza-
tions, any viable services will be provided in the rural financial market that will 
serve a market not reached by the VBSP.  
Another area of progress is the recognition of rural savers, including women and 
the poor, by the government of Vietnam. The VPSC was funded to develop the 
potential of the rural deposit market. However, the network of the VPSC is still 
small in comparison to the VBARD. Moreover, the VBARD has never reached 
deep enough into the country to attract rural savings. Furthermore, the VBSP 
does not demonstrate any intention to offer savings to its customers. Despite 
this, the founding of the VPSC may be the beginning of a paradigm change, 
namely acceptance of the demand of the rural population for deposit facilities.  
The huge quantity of non-performing loans in SOCBs mostly owned by SOEs is 
not new and they threaten to destabilize the banking system. However, there are 
strong indications that this problem is spreading to the private sector, and par-
ticularly to rural households. This behavior of moral hazard is leaving behind 
burnt soil for the establishment of any viable rural financial intermediation.  
Freed from political lending, the VBARD is likely to throw overboard its peasant 
clientele and concentrate on more lucrative business with bigger and wealthier 
farmers. The VBSP will offer subsidized loans on a broad scale and will obviously 
be a drain on public resources. The question is how long the Vietnamese Govern-
ment can finance the VBSP, and who will serve the rural poor the VBSP collapse? 
Finally, the transformation of the financial institutions has clearly proceeded 
more quickly than that of its decision makers or employees. Often, actors within 
the financial system have not fully exploited the competence margin assigned to 
them by the government and continue to wait for additional approval from the Transformation of the financial system 
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government. Further training of decision makers within the financial system thus 
appears to be a key issue. Most desirable would be a reforming lobby within the 
Vietnamese financial system. However, this would require more than just training 
officials. 
   
3  Information and targeting policies and their principal-
agent relationships – The case of the Vietnam Bank for 
the Poor
26 
In the following section, the targeting policies of the VBP are discussed in the 
light of the principles of the New Institutional Economics. In this context, special 
attention is given to TCs and agency relationships. 
3.1 Introduction 
A broad access to appropriate and sustainable financial services has been pointed 
out repeatedly to be important for poverty reduction. It contributes to higher in-
come and better food security (ADB 2000; BUCHENRIEDER and THEESFELD 2000; 
SCHRIEDER 1996; ZELLER et al. 1997). Many poor households are faced with tran-
sitory food insecurity, even though their incomes seem to provide a sufficient 
livelihood base over several years. Thus, there is a potential demand for savings, 
credit, and insurance services to stabilize consumption more effectively and to 
enhance the ability to escape chronic poverty (KANBUR and SQUIRE 2001; ZELLER 
1999). 
Hunger eradication and poverty alleviation, particular in the northern uplands, is 
of enormous concern to the Vietnamese government (AHMED and GOLETTI 1997; 
VBP 1999b). The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD) pro-
poses financial services as a powerful tool for poverty reduction (SIDA-MARD 
1998). From the early 1990s onwards, the Vietnamese government has begun to 
establish and promote FFIs such as the VBARD, the VBP and the PCFs to  
                                           
 
 
26  This section is based on the following article: "Information and targeting policies and their 
principal-agent relationships – The Case of the Vietnam Bank for the Poor", written by 
Thomas Dufhues, Pham Thi My Dung, Ha Thi Hanh, and Gertrud Buchenrieder and pub-
lished 2002 in the Quarterly Journal of International Agriculture 41 (4): 335-362. I would 
like to thank Prof. Dr. Hans Dieter Seibel and Insa Theesfeld for their helpful comments on 
an earlier version of the article. 
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provide the rural poor with loans.
27 In addition, the State Treasury has imple-
mented special sector credit programs, e.g. the 120-program for promoting em-
ployment, which is headed by the Ministry of Labor, Invalids and Social Affairs 
(MOLISA). This loan policy is based on the assumption that (1) the rural popu-
lation is too poor to repay credits at market interest rates and that (2) capital is a 
scarce resource for increasing production and thus raising food security. 
The Vietnam Living Standard Survey 1997-98 shows that FFIs have been very 
successful in increasing their level of outreach; the state-owned VBARD and 
the VBP, for example, have extended credit facilities to almost 4.5 million and 
2.5 million rural households respectively (BAC 2001; HANH 2001). These figures 
represent more than 58% of all rural households in Vietnam. The majority of 
the loans to the rural poor are provided by the VBP through a group lending 
scheme, whereby the highest lending activity of the bank is found in the northern 
highlands and the lowest is observed in the southeast and central highlands  
(VBP 1999b). 
The state-owned VBARD and VBP collaborate with the local governments at 
commune level, particularly the People’s Committees, as well as mass organiza-
tions such as the Women’s Union and the Farmers’ Union. This operational ar-
rangement has proven quite successful in expanding the availability of credit to 
subsistence farm households (VBARD and DANIDA 1999). Nevertheless, there 
exist rural financial market failures because credit is made available not to those 
rural households with the most profitable investments, but to those that are best 
informed. 
                                           
 
 
27  In 1988, the VBARD emerged from the mono-bank system. At that time, it was called 
‘Agricultural Development Bank of Vietnam’. Its name was changed in 1990 into Vietnam 
Bank for Agriculture (SEIBEL 1992). The VBP was only established in 1995 as its lending 
outlet for the poor of the Vietnam Bank for Agriculture. The PCFs emerged from the co-
operative banking system that was originally part of Vietnam’s mono-banking system. 
While most of the original cooperative banks went bankrupt after the introduction of a two-
tier banking system, 80 survived. 78 out of them are today part of the more than 800 PCFs, 
which are legally based on the decree No. 390/Tg of 1993 (SEIBEL 1997).
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3.1.1 Problem  statement 
The VBP focuses on the poorer segment of the rural households. It faces particu-
larly high TCs because of the remoteness of the majority of its borrowers, the small 
credit denominations, and the extensive administrative procedure in the credit 
allocation process. Some of the operational steps within the screening and moni-
toring process are managed free of charge (e.g. by village leaders), but most are 
carried out by paid professionals (e.g. by credit officers). Currently, the average 
operational costs of the VBP, expressed as interest rate spread, are 0.45% per 
month (HANH 2001). The monthly interest rates charged by the VBP vary   
between 0.6% and 0.7%. This means that between 64% and 75% of the interest 
revenues are used to cover operational costs. 
The allocation process of VBP loans for the rural poor is in many respects top-
down. District, commune and village officials are heavily involved in this process. 
Apart from this, the commune and village authorities are involved in dissemina-
tion of credit information, screening, and monitoring of rural households and 
especially in exerting pressure on households with overdue loans. This ought to 
reduce information asymmetry (VBARD and DANIDA 1999), but this approach 
has created typical principle-agent problems at the commune and village level. 
Empirical evidence suggest that (1) the heads of the communes do not necessarily 
sufficiently inform all villages in their communes about the availability of credit, 
and that (2) village officials do not always make certain that all households in 
their village get the news. It appears that these two administrative steps contribute 
to resource misallocation, in the sense that potential borrowers with profitable in-
vestments are excluded due to a lack of information. Information deficits there-
fore undermine the access of the poor to credit (KANBUR and SQUIRE 2001). 
Furthermore, interviews with key persons have shown that (3) local authorities 
are also responsible for the poverty assessment of households and might assess 
HHs of relatives, friends, or neighbors as rather poorer than in reality in order to 
give them easier access to VBP loans. 
Based on these problems, one could claim that access to more timely and complete 
information could contribute not only to a more efficient allocation of funds, but 
also to an allocation that more effectively benefits the true target group, which is 
the rural poor. Information availability in the credit allocation process is there-
fore crucial for the empowerment of the rural poor and consequently for increasing 
their welfare. Chapter 3 
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3.1.2  Objectives and methodology  
Besides the effect of information deficiencies, the effect of information asym-
metry on the national poverty alleviation policy is evaluated. Key objectives of 
this contribution are (1) to identify crucial gatekeepers of important credit in-
formation and (2) to describe the formalized and non-formalized information 
channels and propose policy measures to improve their outreach to the target 
group. 
Methodologically, this contribution combines secondary data from the FFIs and 
empirical evidence from the commune and household levels. The qualitative and 
quantitative data were collected between March and October 2001 in the Ba Be 
district of Bac Kan province in Northern Vietnam. The analysis of information 
flows of FFIs at district and provincial level produced insights into policy objec-
tives and formalized procedures of credit fund allocation. The survey comprised 
118 households in four villages and three communes of Ba Be district. By means 
of ‘social mapping’
28, the relationships of members in credit groups was made 
transparent. Semi-structured interviews with key persons such as officials of 
mass organization, credit officers, credit group leaders (CGL) and members at 
village and commune level provided data on credit allocation. 
3.2  New Institutional Economics and the analysis of information flows 
in Vietnam’s rural credit allocation
29 
The term ‘New Institutional Economics’ (NIE) delineates a branch of economic 
theory which focuses on institutions and organizations while maintaining the 
basic principles of neo-classical economics such as the utility maximization as-
sumption, the marginal benefit principle, the efficiency assumption, the equilib-
rium thinking (SCHMIDT and TERBERGER 1996), and the rational choice model, 
or the homo economicus with bounded rationality (RICHTER 1990). Neverthe-
less, the efficiency direction of NIE modifies the protective belt of neo-
classical economics by including positive TCs and the constraints of property 
                                           
 
 
28  Villagers drew a map of their village, including all households. Then the households of the 
CGL and their relatives, credit group members, and all key persons and their relatives were 
marked.
 
29  The following section draws on (BUCHENRIEDER 2002).
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rights (PRs) (EGGERTSSON 1990).
30 The NIE defines an ‘institution’ as a com-
monly accepted set of formal rules and informal constraints that shape human 
interaction. Institutions also consist of the enforcement characteristics of the 
rules and constraints (NORTH 1989). 
If a situation does have TCs or information problems, then it does matter how 
wealth and PRs are distributed. Modern economic theory emphasizes that TCs 
depend on institutions, that institutions are endogenous, and that the distribution 
of wealth affects economic efficiency both directly and through its effect on  
institutions. Distribution of wealth, institutions, and efficiency are inseparable. 
TCs caused by information asymmetry and risk are therefore of particular im-
portance in developing countries (HOFF and STIGLITZ 2001). 
3.2.1 Transaction  costs 
TCs decrease the efficiency of exchange relationships (GRINDLE  2001). The 
regulatory framework of institutions should reduce TCs and raise the efficiency 
of exchange. Although a standard definition has yet to be agreed upon, 
EGERTSSON (1990: 14) defines TCs as: "…the costs that arise when individuals 
exchange ownership rights to economic assets and enforce their exclusive 
rights." TCs include all expenses and opportunity costs, fixed and variable, 
which arise in the exchange of PRs, except the price of the PR itself. The costli-
ness of information is the key to the costs of a transaction. Thus, reducing the 
cost of information means reducing TC (STIGLITZ 1986). In New Development 
Economics, TCs are considered to be of substantial interest for development 
finance (FIEBIG et al. 1999). 
One way to classify TCs is: (i) prior to the transaction, information costs re-
lated mainly to searching for and screening potential trading partners and ob-
taining price information; (ii) during the transaction, negotiation costs inclu-
ding costs of arranging the transactions, physically transferring the product or 
service, and drawing up contracts; and (iii) after the transaction, enforcement 
                                           
 
 
30  Three directions can be delineated within NIE, all of which contribute to the understanding 
of institutional change: (1) the efficiency direction that concentrates on minimizing TCs, 
analyzes path-dependent institutional change etc., (2) the public choice direction, and   
(3) the distribution direction that analyzes the impact of access to power and resources on 
institutional change (SCHLÜTER 2001).
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costs related to monitoring the terms of the transaction and enforcing liability 
(RANDOLPH and NDUNG'U 2000).
31 
As HOFF and STIGLITZ (2001) pointed out, the structure and the volume of TCs 
depend on the institution and on the institutional environment respectively. For 
instance, recent research in Thailand has shown that the type of lending policy 
strongly influences the level of TCs incurred by borrowers (ERHARDT 2000).  
In the case of lending, the TCs of the borrower and lender include all explicit 
and implicit expenses that occur in the process of disbursing and obtaining a 
loan, respectively. These costs, in case of the borrower, are associated with 
transportation, paperwork, lodging and meals, gifts and the opportunity cost of 
time, for example, and in the case of the lender, with wages, depreciation of 
equipment and loan arrears (HEIDHUES et al. 1997). The remoter the area and the 
more marginalized a group of people is, the higher the TCs usually are. 
3.2.2 Principal-agent  concept 
The theory of agency relationships is a branch of the economics of TCs. Infor-
mation is not always readily available or easily traded. Information may be 
communicated from one person to another, but it may be difficult to verify 
whether it is strictly true. This provides the basis for ‘opportunism’, meaning the 
incomplete or distorted disclosure of information in order to hide the true facts 
(WILLIAMSON 1985). In agency relationships, uncertainty and asymmetric in-
formation are the consequence (RICHTER and FURUBOTN 1996). Decision making 
in such circumstances is represented by the agency relationship in which two 
parties embark on a mutually beneficial hierarchical relationship, one being better 
informed than the other. The uninformed party is called the ‘principal’ while the 
other, who has all the information, is the ‘agent’. The identification of which 
party to a transaction is the principal and which is the agent depends on the  
circumstances. Each individual in a hierarchical structure, except at the ultimate 
                                           
 
 
31  In this paper credit is defined as a search good/service. On the one hand, credit can be seen as 
a search good/service from the viewpoint of the borrower. On the other hand, from the view-
point of the lender, credit is a mixture of a search and an experience good/service. Search 
goods/services can be inspected to make a quality assessment before purchase, whereas the 
quality of experience goods/services is learned after a purchase (BIJL 1995). One of the first to 
make this distinction between experience and search goods/services was (NELSON 1970).
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level, is simultaneously a principal and an agent when rights are transferred 
down the organizational ladder (EGGERTSSON 1990). 
In an agency relationship, the principal delegates PRs to an agent, who is bound 
by formal contracts and informal conventions to act in the principal’s interest in 
return for benefits of some kind. Thus, agency problems are characterized by 
the fact that an agent’s decision not only influences his own utility, but also that 
of the principal (JENSEN and MECKLING 1976). Due to the conflicting interests 
between principals and agents, and to the asymmetrical information, behavioral 
risks may emerge. Usually, the principal does not observe the agent’s actions 
but rather the result of his actions. Agents may be evaluated by measuring their 
behavior and attributes in a costly process applying proxies such as university 
degree and number of hours worked. If the proxies are limited too much, 
asymmetric information is the result, and this may give rise to opportunistic 
behavior on the part of the agent or, in other words, agents are likely to make 
sub-optimal decisions from a principal’s viewpoint unless they are effectively 
constrained. Market competition can, in various ways, reduce the agency   
costs to principals and raise the costs to agents of opportunistic behavior 
(EGGERTSSON 1990).  
JENSEN and MECKLING (1976) differentiate between categories of agency costs: 
(1) monitoring costs (costs which arise for the principal to achieve more trans-
parency with regard to the activities of the agent), (2) guarantee costs (costs 
which arise for the agent to show his reliability to the principal), and (3) residual 
costs (costs that result from a lower than agreed performance of the agent). As 
pointed out earlier, the actions of an individual are not easily observable. For 
instance, a bank entrusts resources to a borrower but cannot perfectly monitor 
his investments and initiative; a landlord entrusts land to a tenant but cannot easily 
monitor his effort and care. The task of the principal is to design an incentive 
scheme to try to align the agent’s incentives with his own. The principal-agent 
literature focuses on the design of contracts to motivate the agent to act in the 
principal’s interest. Contract provisions that can achieve this are collateral, 
bonds, and provisions that shift the risk of poor output onto the agent. The 
greater the agent’s ability to post collateral, put up a bond, pay rent in advance, 
or absorb risk, the greater the agent’s incentives to take appropriate actions 
(HOFF and STIGLITZ 2001). The problems of delegation and commitment are 
thus central in a principal-agent framework (GRINDLE 2001). 
In a typical development finance approach, credit officers (agents) possess 
vastly more detailed and accurate information about the local environment and 
the clients than does central management (principal). In the presence of such Chapter 3 
 
36
‘information asymmetries’ and high monitoring costs, managers are well ad-
vised to align the objectives of the organization (which usually include a mix of 
outreach and profitability indicators) with those of the agents (credit officers, 
head of communes) who actually make the vast majority of operational deci-
sions. But these contracts need to be handled with care, as badly designed contracts 
can have many unwanted side effects. In fact, it is better not to set incentives at 
all than to set badly adjusted ones (HOLTMANN 2001). 
3.3 Targeting  policies  of the VBP in Ba Be 
First this section describes the poverty criteria and eligibility of rural households 
for VBP loans, which will describe which types of borrowers can access the 
loans of the VBP in the research area. Then we discuss the aspects of targeting 
polices of the VBP to the rural poor in the research area.  
3.3.1  Target group definition and poverty criteria 
The majority of poverty-focused development finance programs incorporate 
client selection criteria that attempt to limit participation to poorer households. 
However, despite attempts to simplify and objectify these procedures, most 
programs fail to maintain a focus on the poor and have very little outreach to 
the extremely poor. Targeting failure occurs when non-target households are 
included and when target households are excluded. The latter is of great con-
cern to those concerned with poverty alleviation. Exclusion of target house-
holds may result from simple failure to identify them but very often is the re-
sult of deliberate efforts by program officials close to the target group to bar 
poor households, which are perceived as credit risks (HICKSON 2001). While 
this behavior reduces the TCs of the development finance program, it also re-
duces quality outreach. Another aspect that needs consideration in poverty 
lending is whether it is necessary to measure poverty or whether it is sufficient 
to rely on the self-selection mechanism of appropriately designed poverty-
oriented financial services. Such financial services are to be designed in such a 
way that the better off would not care to access them (SEIBEL 1996). Relatively 
small loan volumes and group lending schemes go in this direction. While 
these characteristics apply to the VBP’s lending conditions to the poor, it   
explicitly monitors the poverty level of its borrowers and tries to exclude the bet-
ter off and the hungry households, clearly this contributes to the operation 
costs of VBP. 
Under the VBP, poverty is determined, in accordance with the MOLISA crite-
rion, as the inability to provide for basic nutritional needs. The mandate of Information and targeting policies of the VBP 
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lending was formerly characterized as the following, first to the starving, then to 
the hungry (VBARD and DANIDA 1999). The principle that the poorest of the 
poor have priority in receiving credit has been attenuated. The households clas-
sified in Vietnam as hungry, which should have priority with the VBP, are 
nowadays generally excluded. The director of the VBP has stated that other 
national programs are supposed to take care of them (BAO 2001).
32 Obviously, a 
change of paradigm has taken place. Nevertheless, MOLISA has recently 
broadened the poverty criteria. The poverty line for rural people in the uplands 
is now less then 80,000 VND per person per month (VIR 2001).
33 This change 
implies that households that were formerly considered as medium-income 
households are now assessed as poor. For the VBP this has created a difficult 
situation, as the bank does not have sufficient funds to satisfy the credit entitle-
ments of the expanded group of potential borrowers (THU 2001).  
The Poverty Reduction Board (PRB) is responsible for the wealth ranking of 
households. It exists in each commune. The members are usually the head of 
the commune as the most senior official (in most cases he is also the chairman 
of the board) and the heads of the respective mass organization at commune 
level.
34 The village heads are so called ‘temporary consultant’ members of the 
board. The wealth ranking of the households is carried out together with the 
village heads according to nationally defined poverty criteria (Table 3-1 repre-
sents the wealth ranking in the survey communes referred to in this paper). 
This ranking is done once per year. Many households try to be ranked as poor 
to improve their chance of accessing a VBP loan. The rather large number of 
people responsible for the ranking ought to reduce the danger of nepotism, a 
typical principal-agent problem.  
                                           
 
 
32  It is assumed that hungry households are not capable of using a loan productively or of 
repaying the principal and interest. Two very important aspects are not considered in this 
way of thinking: First, a consumption loan which is used for food can also be seen as an 
investment, as it is invested in the most important production factor of the poor, namely la-
bor. Second, with this approach all hungry households would have to be assessed as not 
creditworthy. While this is probably true for many hungry households, it is not true for all. 
33 Before, the rural poverty line was 55,000 VND. One USD is equal to 15,709 VND 
 
(Sunday, October 14, 2001, <http://www.oanda.com/convert/classic>.
 
34  The most important mass organizations in rural areas are the Farmers’ Union and the Women’s Union.
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For each household in the commune, the members of the PRB roughly estimate 
income according to the given standards (see Table 3-1). The ranking is done by 
applying participatory instruments (ANH 1997). Factors other than income play a 
much greater role in determining the socio-economic standing of a household, 
such as area of paddy rice land, education, food security, off-farm activities 
(GEPPERT and DUFHUES 2003). 
The VBP has delegated responsibility to the heads of the communes (and PRB) 
to verify that only households which are classified as poor according to the na-
tional poverty criteria benefit from the VBP credit line. For his duty in the 
screening process, the head of commune apparently receives an incentive, which 
is based on the credit volume and the repayment rate in the commune.
35 He is 
also heavily involved in the reinforcement of the repayment overdue loans. This 
is of course an unpleasant additional duty, which the commune head tends to try 
to avoid. The information asymmetry between the principal (VBP) and agent 
(head of commune) combined with the adverse incentive causes opportunistic 
behavior on the agent’s side. 
He therefore has an interest in excluding those households that he assumes to 
have a low repayment capacity. Clearly, this has a positive effect for the bank 
because the repayment rate rises, and for the household as well, as it reduces the 
negative effects of being indebted beyond its repayment capacity. At the same 
time, he will more likely select households that may not be poor according to the 
national criteria and have a higher credit demand. As the head of the commune 
has a very powerful position within the local administration, he also has the 
power to influence the poverty assessment of households. Hence, a better-off 
household might be assessed as poor due to his influence and thus be eligible to 
receive a loan from the VBP instead of a more expensive one from the VBARD.
36 
                                           
 
 
35  According to BAO (2001), the head of the commune receives 80,000 VND per month for 
his collaboration, if: (1) the lending volume exceeds 100 million VND, (2) more than 50 
households receive a loan, (3) the repayment rate is over 80%, and (4) the volume of bad 
debts is less than 4% of total credit volume. If one of these conditions is not fulfilled, he 
receives only 50,000 VND, thus the incentive is 30,000 VND. The monthly salary of the 
head of the commune is 360,000 VND. The general rule is that an incentive of less than 
20% of total remuneration does not create significant stimulus to improve performance 
(HOLTMANN 2001).
 
36  The giant part of the loans of VBARD/VBP is used for few purposes, e.g. raising buffaloes 
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The national policy objective, namely that only truly poor households should 
gain access to loans from the VBP, is thus attenuated. 
Table 3-1:  Income categories of households in VND/month and person 
Commune  Dia Linh  Nghien Loan  Xuan La 
Hungry HH  < 55,000  < 60,000  < 60,000 
Poor HH  55,000 – 79,000  60,000 – 79,000  60,000 – 79,000 
Medium HH  80,000 – 169,000  80,000 – 99,000  80,000 – 99,000 
Better-off HH  170,000 – 219,000  100,000 – 119,000  100,000 – 119,000 
Rich HH  ≥ 220,000  ≥ 120,000  ≥ 120,000 
Source:   Administration book DIA LINH (2001); STATISTICS BOOK NGHIEN LOAN (2001); and 
STATISTICS BOOK XUAN LA (2001). 
Notes:   The classification of hungry and poor households is defined by MOLISA. The communes 
can vary the boundaries only slightly depending on the local situation. The band for variation 
for the definition of the boundaries for medium, better off, and rich households is more flexible 
(DUNG 2001). 
3.3.2  Effective targeting of the VBP loans in the research communes 
The outreach of the VBP differs greatly from commune to commune (see Table 3-2). 
In the Xuan La commune, 65% of the households received a credit. In the other 
two research communes, only about 20% of the households accessed a loan 
from the VBP. At first sight this is surprising because the Xuan La commune is 
the remotest of the three. But many of the credit groups in the Xuan La com-
mune are inter-village groups. The creation of inter-village groups has the ad-
vantage that farmers from villages that are not able to build their own group can 
take part in groups of other villages. This widens outreach, but it may reduce 
social coherence among the members and thus induce moral hazard among 
group members. 
                                           
 
 
or pigs or buying land. The profitability of these investments (e.g. pig raising) varies only 
little between villages in one commune. 
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Table 3-2:  Wealth status and VBP loans of HH in research communes 
  Dia Linh 
(N = 602*) 
Nghien Loan 
(N = 848) 
Xuan La 
(N = 426**) 
 N  %  N %  N  % 
HH with VBP credit  123  20  152 18  275  65 
Hungry HH  54  9  111 13  75  18 
Poor HH  73  12  300 35  118  28 
Medium HH  184  31  397 47  112  26 
Better-off HH   205  34  30 4  66 15 
Rich HH  84  14  10 1  32  8 
Source:   ADMINISTRATION BOOK DIA LINH (2001); CREDIT BOOK DIA LINH (2001); STATISTICS BOOK 
NGHIEN LOAN (2001); and STATISTICS BOOK XUAN LA (2001). 
Notes:  * Two HH are not included in the wealth ranking. ** 23 HH are not included in the wealth  
   ranking. Therefore, the sum of the HH in percent does not equal 100%. 
   N = number of households in one commune; HH = household. 
Whether or not credit groups are created in a village depends heavily on the ability of 
enough persons who are able and willing to be a CGL.
37 In two of the four research 
villages, credit group creation failed because no suitable CGLs could be found. Clearly 
there is an unsatisfied demand for CGLs. The CGL must fulfill the following features:  
- S/he must be mobile, as the person has to travel to the district branch of 
the VBP and to the commune during the application procedure of the 
group members. In many groups the CGL also has to collect the interest 
payments and often s/he must carry the money to the district branch. 
- S/he must have a minimum level of education, as the CGL has to negotiate 
with local authorities and bank staff. S/he also has to support the other 
members in completing the forms and in planning the investment. 
- S/he needs to have ‘good’ contacts with the local authority network to ob-
tain all the necessary credit information at the right time and to have the 
application approved by them. 
                                           
 
 
37  Every credit group must have a CGL. The CGL is usually the one who builds the group. S/he 
gets a one-day training course carried out either by the head of the district VBP or by the 
credit officer. S/he has the obligation to support the group members in all credit matters. As 
recompense for this task, s/he receives the difference between the interest rate charged to the 
credit group members (0.7%/month) and the interest rate to be paid to the VBP (0.6%/month). Information and targeting policies of the VBP 
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- S/he needs a certain level of wealth, because in the event of delayed re-
payment of interest by members, the CGL normally advances the money. 
The absences of persons with the required abilities can lead to the creation of 
inter-village credit groups. Less remote villages, usually inhabited by the Tay
38 
minority, normally have also a greater number of potentially suitable CGLs and 
thus, often have a higher number of credit groups than more remote villages. 
Friends or relatives from other villages may be allowed to participate in these 
credit groups. Although no empirical evidence was found, this arrangement 
leaves scope for bribery and thus may increase the TCs for the credit group 
members. As pointed out by SCHLÜTER (2001), human capacity and wealth dis-
tribution also play a significant role in institutional development, and not only 
efficiency considerations. 
Table 3-3:  Percentage of HH per village with VBP credits? 
Dia Linh 
N = 9 villages) 
  Nghien Loan 
(N = 12 villages) 
Xuan La 
(N = 10 villages) 
Name of village  %    Name of village  %    Name of village  % 
Coc Pai  (13 HH)  46    Phia Deng (111 HH)  86    Thom Meo (85 HH)  80 
Ban Vang 1 (73 HH)  38    Ban Dinh  (86 HH)  22    Khoui Khi  (40 HH)  37 
Na Duc 2  (86 HH)  36    Khuoi Tuon  (29 HH)  21    Nam Nha  n/a 
Pac Nghe 1 (76 HH)  34    Khuoi Thao (40 HH)  13    Khuoi Boc  n/a 
Na Duc 1  (101 HH)  16    Khuoi Un  (70 HH)  11    Co Luong  n/a 
Ban Vang 2 (75 HH)  13    Pac Gia  (144 HH)  7    Luong Muong  n/a 
Pac Nghe 2 (50 HH)  12    Ban Na  (129 HH)  6      
Source: Own  calculations. 
Notes:  In Dia Linh commune two villages (22%), in Nghien Loan commune five villages (42%), 
and in Xuan La commune four villages (40%) have no credit group. In the Nghien Loan 
commune, inter-village credit groups are also found. Therefore, the percentage share does  
not necessarily represent the actual number of HHs with a VBP credit in one village. 
n/a = not available, HH = household; N = number of villages in the commune. 
Table 3-3 shows which villages in three research communes have access to VBP 
loans. Is also illustrates the percentage of households per village with loans. One 
might assume that the villages with a high percentage of VBP loans are villages 
                                           
 
 
38  The Tay minority represents the majority of the population in this area. Tay villages are 
usually less remote and located in valleys. They can usually speak Vietnamese and all im-
portant local authorities are part of this ethnic group.
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with a high number of target group households, namely the poor. Primary data 
do not confirm this statement. For example, in the village Thom Meo, 33% of 
the households fall below the poverty line, but 80% of all households received a 
VBP loan (gap: 47%). The gap is even wider, namely 61%, since hungry house-
holds are considered to be too poor to invest loans efficiently. Clearly, for the 
reasons discussed above, non-target group households have gained access to 
VBP loans. This is also confirmed by Table 3-2 (see above), as this table shows 
that, in the Dia Linh and Xuan La communes, a greater share of households hold 
VBP credits than just the share of poor households in the communes. This is 
may be because the gatekeeper (credit officer) has family ties in this village. 
3.4  Decision-making process of credit allocation for the poor in the case 
of VBP 
Section 3.4 very briefly describes the credit policy of VBP before discussing the 
credit allocation process applied by the VBP to the communes. After this, a brief 
explanation is given of how farmers gain access to loans. The section concludes 
with a description of the information channels between the target group and VBP. 
3.4.1 Credit  policy 
The VBP was established in 1995 as the poor people’s lending outlet of the 
VBARD. The VBARD concentrates on the better-off market segment and pro-
vides individual loans and also offers savings services.
39 As regards the VBP, it 
is a state-owned bank, specialized in lending to poor households (see Table 3-1 
above); savings mobilization plays a very minor role in the service array of the 
VBP.
40 The purpose of the VBP is not to maximize profit but to reduce poverty 
                                           
 
 
39  Recent credit policy developments, however, show that the credit products of the VBARD 
and VBP, and thus also their market segments, are becoming increasingly similar. For in-
stance, the VBARD now tries to offer a credit product that does not require collateral for 
loans below ten million VND (VBARD 2001b). At the same time, the VBP has broadened 
its credit term to five years and raised the maximum amount to five million VND   
(VBP 2001b). It is not clear to potential customers whether this credit is a VBP product or 
a VBARD product offered by the VBP (VBARD 2001b).
  
40  There is a national consensus, which is adopted by the local staff of the VBARD/VBP, that 
poor households are not capable of saving (CAT 2001; CHAN 2001). This is despite the fact 
that many non-governmental organizations in Vietnam have proven otherwise.
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(HANH 1999; VBP 1999b). The VBP is allowed to use the operational facilities 
and staff of the VBARD and of mass organizations at commune and village 
level in extending its services to the target group. From the monthly interest rate 
charged to the clients, 0.1% is paid to the local mass organizations and 0.25% to 
the VBARD for its services (NGUYEN 1998). Currently, the average operational 
costs of the VBP, expressed as interest rate spread, are 0.45% per month 
(HANH 2001). The monthly interest rates charged by the VBP vary between 
0.6% and 0.7%. As mentioned earlier, this means that between 64% and 75% 
of the interest revenues are used to cover operational costs. This implies that  
between 25% and 36% of the interest revenues remain to cover refinancing 
costs. The repayment performance of 98% is very good (HANH 2001). But this 
is only a poor measure of good performance, as re-scheduling of loans in VBP 
is extremely high; it is reported to be as high as 70% in some provinces 
(VBARD and DANIDA 1999). 
The poverty focus of the VBP and the high operational costs do not mean that 
the bank consequently operates at a loss. Due to the highly subsidized interest 
rates, however, many international agencies consider VBP to be financially un-
sustainable.
41 Vietnamese policy makers have realized this issue and declare the 
subsidized interest rate policy to be a temporary strategy. In the long term, mar-
ket rates are to be implemented (VBP 1999b). However, this objective has not 
yet been achieved (see Table 3-4).
42 
Table 3-4:  Nominal interest rates per month of the VBP in Ba Be district  
Year  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Interest rate  1.2  1  0.8  0.6  0.6/0.5 
Source:   VBP (1997, 1998a, 1999a, 2000, 2001a). 
                                           
 
 
41  The VBP is now recognized as loss-making (VBARD and DANIDA 1999). If the govern-
ment does not have sufficient funds to finance the soft loans of the VBP, the Vietnam State 
Bank must refinance the VBP without interest on a long-term basis and without a pre-fixed 
repayment date (NHGIA 2001). 
 
42  The law on credit institutions approved by the National Assembly in 1997 stipulates that 
the state shall establish banks that operate on a non-profit basis (Article 10). This implies 
that the state will continue to provide cheap credit to rural areas and the poor (MINOT and 
GOLETTI 2001).
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The VBP uses joint-liability group lending schemes to reach out to the poor 
(VBP 2001b). But in daily practice, the group members are not kept liable for 
each other. If one group member defaults, the only consequence for the other 
members is that this particular group no longer receives a credit. On the other 
hand, individual members who have repaid on time can join a new group. 
In March 1999, the maximum loan size per group member had been set at three 
million VND (around 190 US$) with a maximum term of three years. In 2001, 
the loan size was raised to five million VND and the term to five years. The  
interest rate payments are collected every month, or every three or six months 
and the principal is usually paid at the end of the term. 
3.4.2 Credit  allocation  process 
For its credit allocation estimation, the VBP relies on information from several 
public organizations and subordinated branches at the district and provincial level. 
First, the PRB compiles a list of all poor households in their commune. This list is 
passed on to the MOLISA representative in the district. Second, the district-level 
VBP estimates the necessary credit amount for the district and delivers this figure 
to the provincial level.
43 There, the same procedure is repeated. Based on the figures 
of the provincial branches, VBP headquarters in Hanoi determines the nationwide 
credit demand. Based on the available funds provided by the government, the 
VBP in Hanoi makes a decision on how much of the fund to allocate to each dis-
trict (THEESFELD 2000). The district branch of the VBP is informed about the de-
cision. Thereafter, a body of experts decides how much of the credit fund granted 
is allocated to each commune.
44 The decision of the body is based on a recom-
mendation of the head of the VBP at district level (CHAN 2001). The recommen-
dation for the allocation at commune level depends on the number of poor (hungry) 
households and the prior repayment discipline in these communes (BAO 2001). 
                                           
 
 
43 The guidelines of the VBP for the credit estimation procedure propose that the PRB of 
each commune compiles a quarterly credit demand plan (VBP 1998b). These plans are 
handed to the VBP at district level, where the provincial demand is calculated. However, in 
the Ba Be district, the PRBs of the communes do not support the VBP in compiling such a 
demand plan (THEESFELD 2000).
 
44  The body consists of three experts from district level: (1) Vice-head of the People’s Com-
mittee, (2) head of the PRB, and (3) head of VBARD. Information and targeting policies of the VBP 
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3.4.3 Loan  application  procedure 
Figure 3-1 describes the nine-step procedure to acquire a loan from the VBP. 
While the head of the district branch of the VBP in Ba Be states that the credit 
officer has to screen and monitor each household during several visits   
(BAO  2001), the reality is that the credit officer does not normally visit the 
households. In reality, he visits the village and the CGL during the credit appli-
cation process to gather secondary information about the applicants. The credit of-
ficer relies totally on the commune and village officials to assess credit-
worthiness. After the disbursement of the credit to the group members, the 
credit officer may verify with the CGL whether the group members use the credit 
as stated in the loan application.
45 Normally he trusts in the report of the CGL 
(giving him scope for opportunistic behavior) and does not monitor the credit 
directly. Basically, it is not bank staff but persons outside the bank that are in-
volved in loan monitoring: The head of the commune and CGL (see Figure 3-1).  
During discussions with the commune heads and the CGL, however, they admit-
ted that this is not a regular activity. Officially, the loan ought to be repaid im-
mediately if it is not used as stated in the credit contract. Nevertheless, farmers 
pointed out that as long as they pay the interest and the principal in due time, the 
credit officer and the other local authorities do not bother about the actual use of 
the credit. Credit officers in Ba Be district also confirmed this. The principal-
agency relationship and the delegation of tasks have provided wide scope for 
moral hazard in terms of the fungible use of the loan. 
                                           
 
 
45  The eligible ways of using the loans are determined by the VBP. Only productive invest-
ments are financed. Loans are usually invested in livestock production. In the survey, 56% 
of all loans (including VBARD and others) were invested in livestock. DUONG  and 
IZUMIDA (2002), in a survey carried out in 1997, found that 54% of the formal loans were 
used for livestock, followed by 28% for cultivation. This finding accurately reflects the 
fact that investment in livestock has been a popular trend in the Vietnamese rural commu-
nities in recent years and still continues.
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Figure 3-1: The nine-step procedure to obtain a loan from the VBP 
1.  Build a group of at least five people (in rare exceptions four people may be sufficient). 
2.  Elect a CGL (usually the one who started the group will become the leader). 
3.  Go (CGL) to the district VBP in order to buy the application forms from the credit 
officer who is responsible for the commune. 
4.  Fill in (group members) the credit application forms. 
5.  Submit (CGL) the forms to the commune and get the approving signature and stamp of 
the head of the commune and the chairman of the PRB (part of the screening process)
1.
6.  Bring (CGL) the forms back to the bank.
2 
7.  Go (CGL) to the bank and take the loan booklets for each member (the loan booklets 
summarize the loan terms and are used by the credit officer to record the interest and 
principal payments). 
8.  Bring (CGL) the loan booklets back to the commune and receive another recognizing 
stamp and signature from the head of the commune and the chairman of the PRB 
(submits them to the monitoring process). 
9.  Bring (CGL) the booklets back to the bank and wait for disbursement of the loans 
(credit officer disburses the loans to the credit group members during a meeting in 
the commune or village). 
Source:   Own figure. 
Notes: 
1 The signature also confirms that the applicants belong to the target group. The head of the  
   commune my decide to exclude an individual household from the credit application if he  
   knows of a disagreement between married couples relating to the credit application, in cases  
   of drug abuse by the applicant, or so-called social evil in the households. 
2 The approval procedure of the application is as follows: (i) the credit officer signs the credit  
   application, which is synonymous with his approval, and (ii) the head of the VBP co-signs  
   the con-tract. Normally, the head of the VBP follows the decision of the credit officer. The  
   timeframe for this procedure varies between two weeks and nine months in the case of the  
   research villages. 
The fungibility of money has been noticed by VBARD’s headquarter and their 
policy on eligible investments has been changed to better reflect the reality. Rural 
households are now allowed to spend their loan for any purpose, even for con-
sumption. Due to the close connections between VBARD and VBP, it is very 
likely that the headquarters of VBP will soon adapt its policies, too. 
Step 5 of the loan application process (see Figure 3-1) relates to the role of the head 
of the commune in this process. If the head of the commune approves the house-
holds in the application, the credit officer will almost always follow his recommen-
dation. Since the head of the VBP complies with the credit officer’s proposal, this 
implies that the head of the commune is actually the decisive power in the applica-
tion process. The powerful position of the head of the commune in the VBP credit 
application process of households was also pointed out in earlier research on Ba Be 
district (THEESFELD 2000). According to VAESSEN (2001), since physical collateral 
is not required for VBP loans, the approval of the head of the commune can be 
considered social collateral. Local information sources in the form of key infor-
mants can be an important low-cost mechanism to reduce screening and enforcement Information and targeting policies of the VBP 
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costs. Excessive dependence of a bank on local networks as sources of information 
and recommendation, however, can have negative effects in terms of social exclusion 
of those households not included in the social and political network in the territory 
(KARLAN 2001; VAESSEN 2001). In general, important information tends to be 
segmented and to circulate within specific groups or networks (ROBINSON 2001). 
Particularly the very poor households often find themselves in this position. More-
over, they lack access to fruitful relationships with powerful allies (HICKSON 2001). 
3.4.4  Backward and forward information flows between VBP, local 
authorities and households 
Preliminary findings indicate that information on financial services is insufficient in 
rural Vietnam. The population is often not aware of the eligibility conditions for loans, 
interest rates, and other loan terms. The VIETNAM-CANADA  RURAL  FINANCE 
OUTREACH PROJECT (1999b) states that information about credit is mainly conveyed 
via credit officers and is usually inconsistent. In this study it was found that the 
credit officers play only a minor role in the dissemination of credit information. 
According to VBP staff and local authorities in the research area Ba Be, suffi-
cient credit funds are available to cover the effective demand of the poor target 
group. Therefore, knowledge of how to exploit these funds seems to be more 
important than knowledge about their availability. As discussed above, the VBP 
lends only to credit groups. Thus, the greater the awareness of the target group 
regarding how to set up and manage a credit group, the greater the probability of 
obtaining timely loan approval. However, villagers are still reporting that loans 
are not always available at the VBP. Hence, timely knowledge regarding availa-
bility of funds is still crucial for access. 
3.4.4.1  Formalized information channels  
Flows to the household. In one line of information, the head of the VBP informs 
the head of the communes and the chairman of the PRB at commune level about 
the credit terms, but not about the total amount of available funds allocated to their 
commune. Consequently, the head of the commune decides which mass organiza-
tion, or rather its members, will benefit from the allocated credit fund. The head of 
the commune conveys this information to the village leaders at a commune 
meeting, or sometimes directly to the villagers during a village meeting. Figure 3-2 
displays the structure of the formalized information flux regarding credit availabi-
lity from the VBP to the target group. The head of the village is responsible for in-
viting all villagers to this meeting. But not every household receives an invitation. 
There may be several reasons for this: (1) the village head has a personal dislike of a 
certain household, (2) the household is remote and the head is reluctant to go so far Chapter 3 
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every time, or (3) he simply forgot to inform a particular household. In one village, 
some households even complained that they were never invited. These households 
lack access to important information. Reasons (1) and (2) are clearly related to the 
principles of NIE as discussed in Section 2. Reason (1) has to do with opportunistic 
behavior on the side of a principal vis-à-vis a potential agent. Distance to a poten-
tial agent is closely related to the reduction of TCs argument. 
In the other line of information, the chairman of the PRB of the commune in-
forms the members of the board.
46 The members of the Board, who are usually 
heads of mass organizations, convey the news to the village-based heads of 
their respective mass organizations during regular meetings (see Figure 3-2).
47 
While the meetings of the local authorities at the commune level are relatively 
regular, this does not apply to the meetings at the village level.
48 Clearly, the 
irregularity of the meetings could cause a loss of information, thus increasing 
TCs. However, most farmers turn to the heads of the mass organizations at the 
village level when they are planning to apply for a loan. The quality and the 
speed of the information flow from commune to household level thus crucially 
depend on the leadership and management capabilities of the local authorities 
at the commune and village level. This human capacity could be improved 
through training. The information flow from the mass media plays only a minor 
role in the dissemination process. 
It is the credit officer’s responsibility to visit the communes two or three times 
per month on a fixed date to collect the principal and the interest of the credit 
groups. Ideally, these dates should coincide with the market days in the com-
mune (BAO 2001). The credit officer should inform the commune head and the 
PRB about his next visit. However, there is normally no direct information flow 
from the credit officer to poten-tial borrowers since, in reality, the dates of these 
visits are either not known by the population or the visits do not follow a time 
schedule. Publicity relating to financial ser-vices is not efficient. Communica-
tion is mainly via credit officers and is often inconsistent.  
                                           
 
 
46  Often, the head of the commune and the chairman of the PRB are one and the same person.
 
47  The role of the mass organizations is to exert permanent pressure on their indebted mem-
bers, i.e. the borrowers are regularly reminded to pay their debt.
 
48  It should also be borne in mind that each mass organization organizes its own meeting and 
the Farmers’ and Women’s Union exist in every village.
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The VIETNAM-CANADA RURAL FINANCE OUTREACH PROJECT (1999b) also found 
that the farmers did not know the time schedule of the credit officers’ visits. 
However, female credit officers tended to do a better job as far as this issue is 
concerned. Obviously, the VBP relies on the trickle-down effect of information 
from local authorities and CGLs to the households. This trickle-down process is 
prone to bottlenecks, or in other words gatekeepers, as described above, and 
therefore crucial information may be held up, diverted, or lost. 
After having submitted a credit application, the credit group has to wait for the 
decision. In the event of the head of the commune declining the application, he 
is not obliged to inform the applicants regarding the reasons. THEESFELD (2000), 
for instance, reports that the head of a commune uses a coded signature for the 
application form. Depending on the code, the credit officer knows whether or 
not he agrees to the application. This lack of transparency has two negative effects: 
First, there is no scope for improvement of the credit group’s application (TCs 
remain high on the side of the credit group). Second, the group members may 
become frustrated and hesitate to apply a second time, because they already in-
vested time and effort without any benefit and without knowing what went 
wrong (TCs for a transaction that did not occur on the side of the potential credit 
group, and opportunistic behavior on the side of the head of the commune). 
Figure 3-2: Formalized information flows 











































Source: Own  figure. 
Notes:  The arrows indicate the direction of information flow. Broken lines indicate irregular information 
flows. Often the head of commune and chairman of the PRB are one and the same person. Chapter 3 
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Flows to the VBP. The only direct formalized information flow from the 
household to the VBP is the submission of the credit application form. The fact 
that the bank receives the application form demonstrates that the application 
has already successfully passed through two screening levels. The first screening 
takes place when the credit group is formed and the second when the applica-
tion is signed by the head of the commune. The application forms also contain 
a section on the planned investment to evaluate its creditworthiness. The farmers 
normally know which loan-financed investments are likely to be approved. 
Only a limited range of ‘obvious’ or ‘fashionable’ purposes related to agricultural 
production (e.g. rice cultivation, pig raising) will be approved by the bank. 
There is not much room for innovative or idiosyncratic proposals (UN 1998; 
VIETNAM-CANADA RURAL FINANCE OUTREACH PROJECT 1999b). As discussed 
earlier, while the credit purpose is screened, the bank staff does not monitor this 
later on. 
Besides the information provided in the credit application form, the VBP uses 
commune authorities to assess the creditworthiness of potential clients. This ap-
proach of external screening is a reaction to the information asymmetry that exists 
between the credit officer and the local population. As the local authorities have 
more intimate contact with the local population, they are better able to judge 
their creditworthiness. This procedure ought to reduce the information gap between 
credit officers and borrowers and thus reduce TCs and improve the repayment 
rate (GRINDLE  2001; HOFF  and STIGLITZ  2001). However, this approach can 
cause principle-agent problems between the credit officer (principal) and the 
head of the commune (agent). As was discussed earlier, the head of the commune 
has a strong influence on the outcome of the screening process. Good contacts 
with the head of the commune can bias his decision in the loan screening process 
towards a particular household, even if the latter does not in fact fulfill the eligi-
bility criteria of the VBP. 
While the VBP has already incorporated several measures to reduce informa-
tion, negotiation and enforcement costs (RANDOLPH and NDUNG'U 2000) in the 
rural credit intermediation process, these measures still leave scope for oppor-
tunistic behavior by the principals involved and moral hazard on the part of the 
agents. Better rules for credit officers and more appropriate incentives for non-
staff resource persons involved in the credit allocation process could reduce TCs 
and lead to more equity in the allocation of credit. Information and targeting policies of the VBP 
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3.4.4.2  Non-formalized information channels 
Flows to the household. Local authorities, such as the commune head, that pos-
sess insider information regarding when one of the credit funds is made available 
by VBP, function as so called ‘gatekeepers’. Households that have information 
regarding when, where and how the loan funds are made available have a major 
advantage in exploiting this source by appropriate signaling. Clearly, this infor-
mation tends to be given to households that belong to the social and political 
network of one of these gatekeepers (BAO 2001). 
The village heads confirmed that one could always find households that cannot 
translate their demand into effective access to credit. These households may not 
be creditworthy and/or are excluded from the intra-village information-networks 
(THEESFELD 2000). Nevertheless, the 15 CGLs involved in this research claim 
that all villagers are able to participate in their credit groups. They point out that 
they informed the whole village about their intention to set up a credit group. 
This would imply that the groups are heterogeneous in their membership. Never-
theless, in thirteen of the 15 credit groups in the research area, the members 
were neighbors or relatives of the CGL. As stated by HOFF and STIGLITZ (2001) 
social ties are crucial for credit access. 
Flows to the VBP. The head of the commune does not know all households in 
his commune personally. He makes enquiries of the CGLs, the village heads, 
heads of mass organizations, the security chiefs and other villagers regarding the 
individual households of a potential credit group. The credit officer interviews 
the same key persons. Again, this may cause agency problems. In this case, the 
head of the commune and the credit officer are the principals and the village key 
persons are the agents. Households that maintain good relations with these key 
persons have a better reputation than those who do not. One result of this may be 
that some households gain access to two loans from the VBP (e.g. father and 
son), which is not allowed. This, of course, only works if the village authorities 
tolerate it (BAO 2001). 
3.5  Conclusions and policy recommendations 
The analysis has shown that the financial information flows of the VBP are 
fuzzy (in the sense of a credit application having different outcomes depending 
on the intermediaries of information involved), despite extensive formalization 
of the channels. In principle, the use of the aforementioned local authorities in 
client screening and in the monitoring process is a good strategy for reducing 
information asymmetry and thus TCs. Nevertheless, the involvement of these 
crucial information gatekeepers at different administrative levels, namely the Chapter 3 
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credit officer, head of the commune, members of the PRB, the village head, and 
the CGL, may impede, divert, and attenuate the dissemination of information. 
These gatekeepers normally belong to the same or related social and political 
networks. The information collected during group discussions in the research 
communes confirms that the key informants of a FFI in a certain region should 
not all belong to the same network. VAESSEN (2001) points out that, this way, 
the formal lender can avoid falling into the trap of lending solely to a certain 
network of people, while the households outside this network are excluded. Key 
informants from other networks could be from non-governmental organizations 
or self-help groups. To date, however, these groups are not found in the research 
area. One attempt to open up new networks might be to employ credit officers 
from different ethnic minorities. So far, 95% of the credit officers in Ba Be belong 
to the Tay minority. The remaining 5% are Kinh (Vietnamese). Increasing eth-
nic diversity of employees could also diversify the networks of information. 
However, as stated by HUNG and GIAP (1999), the efforts of formal lenders are 
hampered by the difficulty in recruiting staff from ethnic minorities, especially 
in remote and mountainous districts. 
According to the principal-agent concept, the VBP should design incentives 
schemes for its gatekeepers to improve the information flow to marginalized 
groups. Another way to make the available information more transparent to 
potential borrowers could be the establishment of local information centers. This 
could be the communal post office, where the VBP could arrange an information 
corner with leaflets. This could be combined with the introduction of a fixed day 
every week (or bi-weekly), which all commune members should be made aware 
of, when the credit officer is available for questions and discussions. This would 
allow farmers to seek information and advice directly from a professional. Offi-
cially, the credit officers already follow such a fixed visiting schedule. However, 
they do not stick to it, as discussed above. If the VBP succeeded in asserting this 
policy, it would improve the service without increasing the TCs. 
The passive information flow from the VBP to the households could be im-
proved by using the mass media, particularly radio. Today, 95% of the country’s 
population and 98% of the national territory have access to the radio station 
Voice of Vietnam (VOV). In the past, most of the radio programs were broad-
cast in Vietnamese, which excluded many of the ethnic minorities from the in-
formation. As a result of recent efforts, however, the VOV has bolstered its 
broadcasting network to include eight ethnic minority languages, e.g. Thai, Mong 
(VIET NAM NEWS 2002b). Information and targeting policies of the VBP 
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As the above analysis has shown, the use of a complicated poverty measurement 
system that (1) involves the same local authorities that decide on credit access 
for the poor and (2) sets out the framework for eligibility of households to VBP 
loans, creates agency problems and is open to nepotism. Instead of using the 
current system to measure poverty, one could use the land register as a much 
more objective set of criteria for target group identification. Households that 
possess documented land-use rights should automatically be excluded from the 
target group of the VBP, as they can get loans from the VBARD too. Of course 
this should go hand in hand with equalizing the interest rate of both banks,  
otherwise it could provide an incentive not to register the land in order to main-
tain the opportunity to apply for VBP loans.  
By way of summary, improving the top-down and bottom-up information flow 
in the credit market for the rural poor might not only significantly reduce the 
operating costs of the FFIs concerned, but also increase market access for the 
poor target group with profitable investments. 
   
4  Outreach of credit institutes and households' access 
constraints to formal credit in Northern Vietnam
49
 
In the following section, the outreach of formal credit institutes and the access of 
rural households to them are discussed. A principal component analysis (PCA) is 
applied to measure the poverty outreach of the institutes and a binary logit  
regression to assess access constraints of rural households to formal credits.  
4.1 Introduction 
Most policy and research interest regarding rural credit markets revolves around 
the perception that poor households in developing countries lack adequate access 
to credit, which is believed to have significant negative consequences for various 
household-level outcomes. During the past 40 years, most developing countries 
and donors have set up credit programs aiming at improving rural households’ 
access to credit. The vast majority of these programs, especially the so-called 
‘agricultural development banks’, have failed both to achieve their objectives to 
serve the poor and to be financially sustainable institutions. An important feature 
of the rural credit market is that access to credit is far easier for some groups 
than for others. Meanwhile, most rural households in developing countries con-
tinue to rely on the informal market for their inter-temporal transfer of resources. 
Therefore, outreach of the financial institution and access to financial services 
have become a major issue in microfinance, and particularly in rural finance 
(DIAGNE et al. 2000; SARAP 1990).
50 
                                           
 
 
49  This section is based on the following article: "Outreach of credit institutes and households' 
access constraints to formal credit in Northern Vietnam", written by Thomas Dufhues and 
Gertrud Buchenrieder and published 2005 in Research in Development Economics and 
Policy Discussion Paper, No1/2005 Stuttgart: Grauer Verlag.  
50  The performance of financial intermediaries in terms of breadth and depth of poverty out-
reach is partly a function of a range of internal factors such as the type of services provided, 
the use of screening methods to identify the poor, the financial scope of the program, and the 
marketing strategy of the program (ZELLER et al. 2003). Although there are more dimensions 
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Formal rural credit is considered by Vietnamese government agencies to be a 
powerful tool for poverty reduction (SIDA-MARD 1998). During the early 
1990s, informal credit accounted for almost 80% of total outstanding loans in 
Vietnam (GSO 1995). The Vietnamese government tried to break the dominance 
of the informal sector and push development by supplying credit on preferential 
terms, particularly to rural households. The preferential credit was delivered 
mainly by state-owned financial intermediaries such as the VBARD, the VBP) 
and the PCFs.
51 In addition, the State Treasury implemented special sector credit 
programs, e.g. the 120 Program to promote employment (DUFHUES et al. 2004a). 
Initial signs of success of formal credit outreach were reported by the Vietnamese 
Living Standard Surveys, which stated that the share of the informal sector had 
been considerably reduced from 78% (1992/93) of all outstanding loans to 54% 
(1997/98) in favor to the formal sector (GSO 1995; GSO 2000). There is evi-
dence from other developing countries that credit constraints persist despite the 
expansion of microfinance. For instance, AMIN et al. (2003) find that microfi-
nance institutes (MFIs) in Bangladesh do not really reach those who are credit-
constrained. Recent research suggest that, in Vietnam, the success of pro-poor 
policies will depend on easing structural constraints such as access to credit 
(GLEWWE et al. 2002; LIVINGSTONE 2000). However, deeper outreach usually 
increases not only social value but also social cost. As income and wealth   
decrease, it becomes more costly to a lender to judge the risk of a loan. This 
happens because, compared with the rich, the poor are more heterogeneous and 
less able to signal their ability and willingness to repay (CONNING 1999). More-
over, the provision of income-generating credit leads to a bias in favor of the 
less poor, because they have better opportunities to use the loan profitably 
(HULME and MOSLEY 1996). While modern microcredit programs are definitely 
more successful at reaching the poor than their predecessors, they are less   
                                           
 
 
than depth and breadth of outreach (for a detailed overview see NAVAJAS et al. 2000; and 
SCHREINER 2002), this research will focus mainly on depth and breadth of outreach. Since 
society places more weight on the poor than on the rich, poverty is a good proxy for depth 
(NAVAJAS et al. 2000). The poorer the clients reached by the financial institute, the deeper 
the outreach (ZELLER et al. 2003).
 
51  On March 11, 2003, the VBP and the PCFs were replaced by the Vietnam Bank for Social 
Policies (VBSP) (VIETNAM ECONOMY 2003; WORLD BANK 2003).
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successful at reaching the vulnerable poor.
52 HULME and MOSLEY (1996) state 
that there is increasing evidence that the poorest 20% of the population are ef-
fectively excluded from microcredit programs.  
While the Vietnamese government has so far failed to create sustainable rural 
financial institutions, it has succeeded in providing a huge share of the popula-
tion with formal credit. However, despite the immense formal outreach, the dis-
tribution of formal credit in the northern provinces of Vietnam is very heteroge-
neous. In some villages, over 90% of households are served by formal credit, 
while in others just a few or none at all (DUFHUES et al. 2002). The question thus 
remains: Did the Vietnamese Government succeed in reaching the poor, or do 
groups of people still exist who are access-constrained? 
The second section describes the conceptual framework, the analytical methods 
used and the sample composition. Section two starts with a discussion of collateral 
use in Vietnam and then continues with a description of the effective credit de-
mand of the sample households. The last two chapters of this section discuss the 
outreach of rural lenders and access to formal loans by the households in this 
sample. The paper concludes with policy recommendations for improving out-
reach to access-constrained households. 
4.2  Methodology and data 
The following section describes the conceptual framework, followed by a description 
of the methodology used for the data analysis. Finally, the sample composition 
is presented.  
4.2.1  Access constraints to formal rural credit – The conceptual  
        framework 
While the term outreach refers to the perspective of the financial intermediary 
and access refers to the point of view of the household, they both relate to the 
same thing: Who is getting the credit (VAESSEN 2001). Access constraints at the 
household level are mostly related to a lack of collateral (physical, human and/or 
                                           
 
 
52  Even with the use of group lending schemes, which are believed to have a good poverty 
outreach, the evidence suggests that the poorest people are excluded (MONTGOMERY 1996).




53 The capital endowment of a household is of enormous impor-
tance for the household’s access to formal credit and to the outreach of rural 
lenders. Capital can be classified into three different categories, physical, hu-
man and social capital. The term physical capital refers to any non-human, in-
frastructural, financial, or natural asset needed to support livelihoods. Human 
capital represents the skills, knowledge, ability to labor and good health of in-
dividuals or households. Social capital is defined here according to COLEMAN 
(1999), who states that social capital is not a single entity but a variety of dif-
ferent entities, with two elements in common: They all consist of some aspect 
of social structures, and they facilitate certain actions of individuals who are 
within the structure. The characteristics of human and social capital are identi-
fied as ‘capital’ in order to underline the need for continuous investment and to 
emphasize the importance of these factors in generating future income, particu-
larly for the poor.  
Figure 4-1 shows the different kinds of capital/collateral. Different kinds of 
capital/collateral can substitute each other, but only to a certain degree. Never-
theless, the capital endowment of a household represents the basis for the collateral 
used by the lender. Informal lenders, for instance, in the absence of physical col-
lateral, have always used human and social collateral. Formal lenders usually 
rely on physical collateral that can be easily sold, are not moveable, are of sizeable 
value, and ideally carry a legal title, such as land and buildings.
54  
                                           
 
 
53  Access constraints can also be intermediary-based, in other words influenced for example 
by business policies or staff attitudes, hard and soft skills. A conceptual framework of client-
related barriers versus program-related barriers is presented in EVANS et al. (1999) and 
VAESSEN (2001). However, this analysis focuses on the household level and rather neglects 
intermediary-based issues as they are reflected in the households’ access constraints.
 
54  Physical collateral has several functions, e.g. signaling credit worthiness. However its two 
main functions are: First, it insures the lenders’ loan portfolio in case of default by borrowers. 
Second, it represents an incentive, enhancing the borrower’s willingness to repay his loan  
(BESTER 1987; STIGLITZ and WEISS 1981). 
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Source:   Own figure. 
Physical capital and collateral: Collateral in the form of physical capital plays a 
key role in lending practices. It shifts a portion of the potential capital loss from 
the lender to the borrower (BINSWANGER and SILLERS 1983). Lending institutions 
typically resort to legal options, such as seizing the property of the borrower or 
garnishing wages directly from the employer to enforce contracts. Regardless of 
the actual value of the asset owned by the borrower, the act of pledging assets and 
the consequent realization that they can be lost causes the client to repay the loan 
if possible (LEDGERWOOD 1999). Even if the collateral is almost never collected, 
this does not signal its lack of importance as an incentive device. If the threat is 
believable, there should be few instances when collateral is actually collected 
(MORDUCH 1999). Nevertheless, in most poor communities, such punishment 
fails for one of the two reasons: Either the legal infrastructure does not support 
such action, or the borrower has no sizeable assets or wages (KARLAN 2001).
55 
This is a particular problem of MFIs, which systematically lend to low-income 
clients who usually have very few marketable assets. Traditional collateral such 
as property, land/land use certificates, or other capital assets is often not available. 
Therefore, the absence of physical capital, and thus collateral, has for a long time 
been seen as the major access constraint of lower-income households. 
                                           
 
 
55  For instance, in socialist economies like China, land is collectively owned, preventing its 
use as collateral (PARK and REN 2001).
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Human capital and collateral: At the household level, human capital is a factor 
of the amount and quality of available labor, which usually is defined in terms of 
the health and education levels of individuals. Lack of human capital is seen as an 
access constraint from the household side, as there is often a need to fill in appli-
cation forms or draw up small business plans, and this requires a certain amount 
of human capital (see for instance PANJAITAN-DRIOADISURYO and CLOUD 1999). 
Human capital can compensate for a lack of physical collateral. Then, the deci-
sion of whether or not to grant the credit is based mainly on the profitability of the 
investment. However, this practice is still very uncommon among rural lenders. 
Usually staff lacks the appropriate skills to assess an investment reliably.  
Social capital and collateral: The poor seldom have physical collateral to offer. 
The most common way to deal with this problem is by using social collateral. 
Here, the borrowers’ reputation, or the social (and political) networks to which 
they belong, replace traditional physical collateral (BASTELAER VAN 2003; 
PANJAITAN-DRIOADISURYO and CLOUD 1999). Usually this results in applying 
credit group schemes with joint liability.
56 Under an individual lending contract, 
if the borrower defaults, all he has to fear is the penalties the bank can impose, 
which, in the absence of collateral, simply means the denial of future loans. In 
group lending, he may also be exposed to the wrath of other group members 
(BESLEY and COATE 1995).  
Infrastructure: The rural infrastructure influences both access to and outreach 
of credit equally, and is therefore not depicted in Figure 4-1. Infrastructure not 
only refers to the ‘hard’ infrastructure, like roads, but also to ‘soft’ infrastruc-
ture, such as legal frameworks. For instance, FABBRI and PADULA (2003) found 
in a recent paper that lax legal enforcement increases the probability of poor 
people being access-constrained to formal credit in Italy.  
                                           
 
 
56  Despite its popularity, group lending-oriented microfinance is not a panacea for solving all 
problems of access to financial services for the poor in developing countries. Not only spe-
cialized agricultural development banks are prone to the difficulties due to information 
asymmetries and moral hazard pointed out by institution economics; these problems can 
also occur in group lending. For a critical view of group lending see, e.g., HEIDHUES et al. 
(1997) and SCHMIDT and ZEITINGER (1994).
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4.2.2  Measuring outreach and access: Econometric models 
Principal Component Analysis:
57 The breadth of outreach of a microfinance insti-
tution is easy to measure (one simply counts the clients), but other dimensions of 
outreach, particularly poverty outreach, are more difficult to measure (WOLLER et al. 
1999). A poverty assessment tool was developed in the late 1990s by the Interna-
tional Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), which uses the PCA as econometric 
instrument. The objective was to design a tool to assess the poverty level of the  
clients of a microfinance institution in relation to their non-clients (who represent 
the general population in its area of operation) to give a reliable assessment of the 
poverty outreach of the institution (ZELLER et al. 2001; ZELLER et al. 2005). 
The PCA is a multivariate technique and its main objective is to reduce the  
dimension of the observations (HÄRDLE and SIMAR 2003). Different correlated 
variables are aggregated into fewer uncorrelated principal components, which 
can be seen as indices. With this technique, most of the information contained in 
the data is represented in the new indices. The analysis can be viewed as a ‘data 
reduction technique’, since the set of original m variables is reduced to n principal 
components (PC), with n«m. This smaller number of components can then be 
used for interpretation purposes or for further data analysis. The procedure carried 
out by the analysis is to calculate new uncorrelated principal components by 
linear combinations of the original, correlated variables. This is done by deriving 
(standardized) weights for each indicator. In algebraic terms this means that  
PC1 =  w11 v 1 + w12   v2 +  … + w1m v m 
PC2 =  w21 v 1 + w22   v2 +  … + w2m v m 
PCm =  wm1 v 1 + wm2 v 2 +  … + wmm v m 
(4.1)
 
with w is the calculated weight and v is the variable. Applied to poverty assess-
ment, the PCA determines a subset of indicators that measure the relative poverty 
level of a household. In the end, a single indicator for each household is created 
that reflects the household’s poverty status in relation to all other households of 
the sample (ZELLER et al. 2005). With the weights of the PC1 and the respective 
indicators, the poverty index is calculated for each household. Relative compari-
sons can then be drawn by ordering the households according to their poverty 
                                           
 
 
57  The next section is based on a review by HÄUSER et al. (2005).
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index. In this way, it is possible to identify which households are better or worse 
off than others. By creating terciles, quartiles or quintiles using the index, different 
wealth groups can be derived. The most important advantage of the PCA is that 
on the one hand it creates a single indicator that is easy to use for analysis, while 
at the same time this single indicator is not limited to the monetary aspect  
addressed by household expenditures as the conventional method of (income) 
poverty. The PCA technique allows to take the multiple dimensions of poverty 
into account and to integrate qualitative with quantitative variables. Therefore, 
indicators capturing different dimensions are included that measure changing 
conditions at different levels of welfare. These indicators can be categorized into 
three groups (HENRY et al. 2003): 
1   Means to achieve welfare 
This category includes indicators that reflect the earning capacities of  
a household. They are subdivided into human capital, social capital and 
ownership of assets. 
2   Basic needs 
These indicators show the fulfillment of basic needs, such as health 
status, food, shelter and clothing, partly obtained by questions asking  
the respondent about his or her self-assessment of the situation. 
3   Other aspects of welfare 
Security, self-assessment of (subjective) poverty, social status and the  
environment are captured in this group.
58 
Binary logit analysis: This research collects household-level credit market in-
formation to determine whether or not households are constrained as regards 
access to formal credit. Whether or not a household is access-constrained is de-
picted in the decision tree of effective credit demand (see Figure A-1 in the Annex). 
Households that had access to formal credit were considered not to be access-
constrained regardless of whether or not they originally wanted to borrow more 
than they were lent. In particular, non-borrowing households were asked their 
reasons for not borrowing or for having been rejected. DIAGNE et al. (2000) and 
ZELLER and SHARMA (2000) state that households may have chosen not to borrow 
even when they had access to credit, while others may have wanted to borrow, but 
                                           
 
 
58  The adapted list of poverty indicators used in this research work can be found in Figure A-2 
the Annex. 
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had no access. For these reasons, one cannot equate observed demand with ac-
cess. Finally, the sample households were classified into households with and 
without access to formal credit.  
Regression models describe the relationship between a dependent variable and 
independent explanatory variables (BACKHAUS  et al. 1996). Ordinary least 
square regression models consider the dependent variable to be continuous in 
nature, while the explanatory variables can be either continuous or categorical. 
But it is not uncommon that a dependent variable is binary in nature, i.e., that it 
can only have two possible values, one for the occurrence of an event, zero other 
wise. In this case, the dependent (binary) variable is one for all households with 
access to formal credit and zero otherwise. A mixture of continuous and cate-
gorical variables may explain this dependent binary variable. Therefore, the 
econometric model used in this research work is a binary logit regression. In the 
binary logit regression model, the predicted probabilities for the dependent variable 
will never be less than (or equal to) zero, or greater than (or equal to) one, re-
gardless of the values of the independent variables.  
The explanatory variables for the binary logit model and the hypotheses behind 
the choice of the explanatory variables are presented in Table 4-1. Descriptive 
statistics of these variables can be found in Table A-1 in the Annex. As the 
variables have different units of measurement, the independent variables were 
standardized using z-transformation to make them comparable. In accordance 
with the theoretical framework, the variables have been sorted according to 
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Table 4-1:  Variables for the binary logistic regression model on credit access 
Physical capital-related variables 
1.  Red or Green 
Books* 
(yes = 1; no = 0) 
Red Books or Green Books, certifying a person’s use rights to farm-
land and forests, are often demanded as collateral by rural lenders in 
Vietnam (DUFHUES et al. 2004a). It is assumed that possession of a 
Red or Green Book will positively influence access to formal credit. 
2. Agricultural  land 
(m2) 
Land is an important form of collateral. However, most property 
rights relating to land have an informal character in developing coun-
tries. In the absence of Red Books, Vietnamese farmers can apply to 
the local People’s Committees for special land use certificates. Only 
8% of the loans were used wholly or partly for buying land. Hence, 
the endogeneity of the variable is negligible. 
3.  Value of houses  
(VND) 
Houses can be used as formal collateral with a max. value of five mil-
lion VND. Thus, this variable is assumed to positively influence access 
to credit. Only 4% of the loans were invested complete or partly into 
constructing houses. Hence, the endogeneity of the variable is negligible. 
4. Government 
salary 
(yes = 1; no = 0) 
Government salaries can serve as collateral (DUFHUES et al. 2004a) 
and may therefore improve access to credit. Furthermore, govern-
ment work in particular allows individuals to enhance their social 
network, helping them to stay informed about economic developments 
and new laws or policies (ALTHER et al. 2002; DUFHUES et al. 2002), 
which may also facilitate access to credit. 
5. Cash  savings 
(VND) 
In theory, savings can be used as collateral, too. However, nearly 
100% of the savings in this survey are informal and cannot therefore 
easily be seized by a formal lender. Nevertheless, savings are the 
basis for accumulating physical capital and are therefore a good indi-
cator of possession of physical capital. In addition, they are a good 
indicator for the repayment capacity of households and are therefore 
assumed to have a positive influence on access to credit. 
Human capital-related variables 
6.  School years of 
HH head 
(years) 
Better education is assumed to improve access to credit as loan appli-
cation procedures demand a certain degree of formal education. 
Moreover, it is reasonable to expect that better educated households 
perform better in their investment activities. This was also shown in a 
recent paper by VAN DE W ALLE  (2003), who found that marginal 
benefit of irrigation increased strongly with the education of the 
household. Thus, better educated households are usually perceived as 
more creditworthy.  
7. Vietnamese 
communication 
skills of the  
married couple 
(yes = 1; no = 0) 
Vietnamese is the official language and used for the credit applica-
tion procedure. The household head and his wife have to sign the 
credit contract. Therefore, it is assumed that households in which one 
of the two lacks the necessary language skills are more often access-
constrained (in the event of only husband or wife existing in the 
household, his/her language capability is taken into account).  
8. Receiving  agri-
cultural exten-
sion service 
(yes = 1; no = 0) 
Households who receive agricultural extension services are likely to 
gain better access to improved knowledge and are thus able to increase 
their human capital. But at the same time, households who do not re-
ceive agricultural extension are likely to have fallen through the village 
information network and are assumed to have a low social capital base. Outreach and access 
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9.  Active HH  
members  
(number) 
Household members between 15 and 60 years for male members and 
15 and 55 for female persons were counted as one workforce. These 
age lines represent the official retirement age in Vietnam. This indi-
cator evaluates the labor capacity of the household and indicates human 
capital in the sense of labor force. Each investment activity demands 
additional labor. Households with a lower labor supply are assumed 
to have less access to formal credit.  
10. Share of non-
farm activities  
in total yearly  
income  
(%) 
A high share of non-farm activity in total income may indicate a shift 
from traditional farm activities towards more innovative non-farm 
investments. It also includes households with employment at govern-
ment agencies, which demands a certain level of education and entre-
preneurial skill. Therefore, it is assumed that households with a 
higher share of non-farm income also have a higher level of human 
capital. Income from day labor is excluded, as this does not require 
any human capital except for the labor itself.  
11. Lost working 
days due to  
illness 
(days/year/HH) 
The number of lost working days per year within a household due to 
illness is a good indicator of the quality of human capital. The larger 
the number, the lower the human capital. It is assumed that house-
holds with a weaker human capital base are more often access-
constrained. 
Social capital-related variables 
12. Giving help 
(days/year/HH) 
13. Receiving help 
(days/year/HH) 
Receiving and giving help to friends and relatives is seen as an im-
portant indicator of social activity and of being a member of a social 
network, and thus of social capital, and this will positively influence 
the probability of having access to credit as households are better 
protected against income shocks. 
14. Interest-free  
informal credit 
(VND) 
Small interest-free informal loans are not a substitute for formal 
loans (Section 3.2). Thus, borrowing from informal sources is usually 
not the result of an access constraint to the formal financial market. 
Possession of an informal interest-free loan is a good indicator of a 
functioning informal social network. However, it is also seen as a 
mechanism for coping with sudden shocks and it suggests that the 
household may have a lower repaying capacity and a low physical 
capital endowment. Thus, the a priori sign of the coefficient is am-
biguous.  
15. Thai/Tay village 
(yes = 1; no = 0) 
Considered them from a national point of view, the Thai and Tay 
ethnic groups are ethnic minorities. However, in the two research 
regions, Ba Be and Yen Chau district, the Tay and Thai are the ethnic 
majority. For instance, official positions in Ba Be are usually occu-
pied by members of Tay ethnicity (DUFHUES et al. 2002). Belonging 
to one of these ethnicities is seen as important social capital. Besides, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that there exists a constraining hierarchy 
among the ethnic groups in Northern Vietnam. For example in Ba Be, 
Tay and Kinh are the leading ethnic groups, followed by the Nung, Dao, 
or Hmong (ALTHER et al. 2002; CASTELLA et al. 2002). Villages in 
the research region are of high ethnic homogeneity (see Table 5-3). 
Ethnic Thai or Tay usually dwell in valley positions or at medium-
high altitudes with very similar agricultural production systems. 
Households not belonging to the regional ethnic majority but dwel-
ling in a village mainly populated by them are also assumed to profit Chapter 4  
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from this location. Therefore, household observations within a 
Tay/Thai village are not necessarily independent. However, signifi-
cant differences can be expected between Tay/Thai villages and vil-
lages of other ethnic groups that are not captured by our data (e.g. 
different production systems). Therefore, households are grouped by 
Tay/Thai village to account for those differences. It is assumed that 
households dwelling in a Thai or Tay village are more privileged and 
therefore have better access to credit. Village fixed effects which are 
related to natural conditions (e.g. climate) are not viewed as relevant 
for access to credit in Northern Vietnam. An attempt is made to con-
trol for socio-economic village fixed effects, e.g. market access, by 
different variables, such as number of market visits.  
16. Only female HH 
members going 
to the market 
(yes = 1; no = 0) 
Who goes to the market is regarded as important factor for gaining 
access to certain social networks and for gathering essential credit 
information. Particularly when only women go to the market, the 
household as a whole may be excluded from important information. 
But this might also be an indicator of a weak human capital base, as 
the male household head could be dead, have left the family, or be 
physically or mentally incapable of going to the market. Hence, it is 
assumed that when only female household members go to the market, 
the chance of being access-constrained is higher. 
17. Age of the 
household  
(years) 
This variable can go in two directions. On the one hand, it may be 
that the older the household, the wider and stronger the social net-
work of the household members and thus, the greater its political 
influence and its ability to gather credit-relevant information. On the 
other hand, however, younger households may be better educated or 




This variable measures the distance in kilometers of rural households 
from the district center where formal bank branches are located. 
HUNG and GIAP (1999) state that the distance to the nearest bank 
branch strongly influences access. 
19. Market visits  
per month 
(numbers) 
The frequency of market visits by household members is assumed to 
be an indicator of high social activity. Frequent market visits may 
also increase the chance of receiving essential credit information, e.g. 
on the availability of loans (DUFHUES et al. 2002). The frequency of 
market visits of course also depends on the infrastructure connection 
and the remoteness of the household’s dwelling. 
20. Different markets 
visited 
(numbers)  
The number of different markets visited is an indicator of the breadth 
of a household’s information networks. It is assumed that the broader 
the network, the more relevant information is available to the house-
hold for receiving a credit. The number of markets visited also de-
pends on the infrastructure connection and the remoteness of the 
household’s dwelling. 
Poverty-related variables** 
21. Poverty index   Anecdotal evidence suggests that even credits that are targeted at the 
poor seem to be bypassing the poorest groups (NEEFJES  2001; 
WORLD  BANK  and DFID 1999). Thus, poorer households are as-




22. Supply of day 
labor 
(yes = 1; no = 0) 
Poor agricultural laborers and other day-laborer (for instance in road 
construction) are assumed to be more often access-constrained due to 
their low social standing (FALLAVIER 1994). Nevertheless, this may be 
also an indicator of lack of agricultural land and thus of physical capital. 
23. Receiving aid 
from govern-
ment 
(yes = 1; no = 0) 
Only very poor or very vulnerable households receive food/equipment 
aid from the government. It is thus assumed that these households have 
less access to formal credit. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that 
it is not always the people with the greatest need who receive the help, 
but those who also have good contacts with village authorities, pointing 
to a certain degree of social capital, so the a priori sign of the coeffi-
cient is ambiguous. 
Source:   Own figure. 
Notes:  *   Land is owned by the state in Vietnam. Nevertheless, the government allocates land use  
     certificates to farm households, the so-called ‘Red Books’ for agricultural land (valid for 20  
     years) and, ‘Green Books’ (valid for 30-50 years) for forest land. Farmers are allowed to sell  
     or rent land use certificates, or pass them on to children (LUIBRAND 2002). 
** Poverty usually refers to a lack of human, social, and physical capital. Therefore, some variables  
     that indicate a lack of a mixture of the different forms of capital partly capture the influence  
     of poverty on access to formal credit. 
     HH = household. 
4.2.3  Regional focus and sampling procedures 
Data collection took place from March 2001 to March 2002. Detailed financial 
market data were collected at the household level, including information on 
household, farm, and business activities, assets, savings and borrowing transac-
tions with both formal and informal sources, and households’ perceptions of 
their formal sector borrowing opportunities. The survey also documented house-
hold consumption and labor market participation. 
Two research sites were selected, namely Bac Kan province (Ba Be district) and 
Son La province (Yen Chau district). Both provinces are located in the moun-
tainous regions of Northern Vietnam and are among the poorest provinces of the 
country (WORLD BANK 1999). Ba Be district is a very remote area and has only 
recently (in 1999/2000) gained access to regional and interregional markets. 
Farmers produce mainly for subsistence and a large proportion of them may be 
considered poor. Due to the creation of the Ba Be National Park (close to Ba Be 
town), huge resettlements took place, aggravating the socio-economic problems 
in the region. The Yen Chau district has a much better connection to regional 
markets (Son La town) and even to greater Hanoi, and therefore offers a good 
contrast to the situation in Ba Be district.  
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Number  % 
Dia Linh  Pac Nghe 1 Tay  (97%) 76    36  47 
Nghien Loan  Khau Nen  Nung  (89%) 36    19  53 
Province 
Ba Kan,  
district 
Ba Be 


























Son La,  
district 
Yen Chau  Chieng Hac  Bo Kieng  Hmong  (100%) 20    13  65 










Interviewed households in total:    260   
Source:   Own figure. 
The communes and villages were stratified in accordance with pre-defined se-
lection criteria to ensure a good degree of variance in the sample. These criteria 
are:  
- Being located at different altitudes (valley, middle slope and top position), 
to obtain different stages of market access, ecological zones and ethnic 
minorities;  
- Being engaged in different phases of the land allocation process (land al-
location completed or not completed, percentage of households with land 
use certificates), and  
- Having different shares of households with non-farm activities. 
An overview of the sample in both regions is given in Table 5-3. Half of all 
households in each village were randomly selected after being stratified according 
to their living standard into five categories using official poverty data from the 
village headmen.
59 
                                           
 
 
59  The Vietnamese government classifies every household once a year according to its  
living standard into one of five categories: Hungry, poor, medium, better-off, and rich 
(DUFHUES et al. 2002; and GEPPERT and DUFHUES 2003).
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4.3  Outreach of and access to formal rural lenders in Vietnam  
The following section first discusses the general use of collateral by formal 
lenders in Northern Vietnam. The situation as regards effective credit demand 
is then presented in Section 4.3.2, followed by the outreach of rural lenders 
(Section  4.3.3) and econometric analysis of access-constrained households 
(Section 4.3.4). 
4.3.1 Collateral  use 
The main collateral demanded by lenders in Vietnam is physical collateral in the 
form of land use certificates (Red and Green Books). Social collateral in the 
form of references is also a widespread requirement, particularly in Northern 
Vietnam, and both forms are often intermingled.
60  
In Vietnam, lenders face enormous difficulty in enforcing pledges and mort-
gages (RIEDEL 2000; UNDP 1999). Banks are not usually allowed to seize land 
from defaulting farmers, even if the use rights have been pledged. It is more or 
less impossible to evict farmers and auction their land because of the lack of legal 
infrastructure and resistance from local authorities (WOLZ 1997). Only a few 
cases exist where land has been liquidated in the event of a farmer’s collapse 
(DUONG and IZUMIDA 2002). It appears that the underdeveloped legal frame-
work does not prove effective for the use of physical collateral as a risk manage-
ment tool (GOTTWALD and KLUMP 1999). Nevertheless, the VBARD still insists 
on land use certificates as collateral and relies mainly on the psychological pres-
sure related to the possibility of losing land.
61 As the liquidation of collateral is 
almost impossible in practice (although this may not be known to the farmers), 
rescheduling of the loan is often the only possibility for the credit officer to 
avoid designating a loan as overdue, not performing, or lost. Therefore, resche-
duling of loans in VBARD/VBP is extremely high (IZUMIDA and DUONG 2001; 
VBARD and DANIDA 1999). According to BINSWANGER and SILLERS (1983), 
farmers, and particularly poor farmers, in developing countries are almost   
                                           
 
 
60  A detailed description of the use of different kinds of physical collateral in the credit pro-
cedures of rural lenders in Vietnam can be found in DUFHUES et al. (2004a).
 
61  In contrast to VBARD practice, the government and VBARD headquarters state that 
households can take out loans of less than ten million VND without any collateral (see 
VBARD 2001b). Chapter 4  
 
70
universally risk-averse and often reluctant to put their assets at stake as collateral 
for a loan. However, as DUFHUES et al. (2004a) found, even poor farmers in 
Northern Vietnam are not afraid to pledge their land use certificates as collateral. 
They may be convinced that their investment will not fail or, more likely, they 
believe that the bank will not seize the land even if they have difficulty repaying 
their loan. 
Officially, the VBP uses solely group lending schemes with joint liability for 
delivering its loans (VBP 1999b).
62 Anecdotal evidence, however, revealed that 
in some cases of so-called ‘hungry’ households, which are officially excluded 
from access to VBP loans as they are considered too poor, the credit officers in-
sist on collateral in the form of land use certificates, too. In this sample, over 
25% of all VBP credits (N=94) were secured by physical collateral in various 
forms. The so-called joint liability credit groups are not working effectively, as 
some of the regulations enforced by the VBP seem to neutralize the peer pres-
sure that is important for good credit repayment records. In everyday practice, 
the group members are not held liable for each other; the person who fails to 
repay the loan is simply expelled from the group and no negative consequences 
are imposed on the other group members. As joint liability does not work in the 
case of VBP, and physical collateral fails to achieve its intended purpose in the 
case of VBARD, both require guarantees from local authorities in the form of 
‘certificates of good conduct’ and they rely on an extensive network of non-bank 
local officials, who support the banks in screening, monitoring, and enforcing 
the loans (DUFHUES et al. 2002). However, supervision of these structures can 
be difficult. For instance, TODD (1996) reported that when a loan officer who 
was at the same time president of the local political committee resigned, 100 
borrowers defaulted as a result. Thus, the delegated task of putting pressure on 
borrowers does not always work, as the substitution of physical collateral by social 
collateral leads to a delegation problem in which the lender must concern itself 
with whether or not the third party charged with imposing social sanctions will 
actually carry out this task (BOND and RAI 2002). 
                                           
 
 
62  The VBSP, the successor of the VBP, will continue to provide physical collateral-free 
loans to certain target groups (VIETNAM ECONOMY 2003).
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In summary, physical collateral works solely through the psychological pressure 
it exerts. The social collateral of joint liability groups does not work at all.  
The only form of collateral that seems to work is social collateral in the form of 
pressure exerted by local authorities and in the form of denial of future credit in 
the event of default. However, it remains questionable how long this pressure 
can be maintained. Anecdotal evidence from the WORLD BANK (2003, 2004b) 
suggests that in poor communes 70% of households default in their installment 
payments to VBSP, while around 30% default in their payments to VBARD.  
4.3.2  Effective formal credit demand 
63 
In total, 56% of all households in the sample (total N=251) have had an effective 
demand for formal credit (Figure 4-2). This clearly demonstrates the enormous 
breadth of outreach of the formal financial sector in Vietnam. Only a mere 16% of 
households are involved in the informal market and 23% of the total loans in this 
sample are borrowed in the informal sector. DUONG and IZUMIDA (2002) found 
that in their survey an even lower number, namely 17% of all loans, were extended 
by informal sources, and the WORLD  BANK (2003) states that the majority of 
households have access to formal credit in one way or another. These figures stand 
in contrast to the observations made in many other developing countries, where the 
informal sector is still the biggest supplier of financial services. As one important 
factor for the reduction of the informal sector from about 80% in the early 1990s 
to around 20% today, MCCARTY (2001) mentioned ‘crowding out’ by the VBARD 
and VBP, both of which have extended their outreach enormously in recent years. 
Nevertheless, the VBP has done this at the cost of financial sustainability. On the 
one hand, crowding out moneylenders who charge usury interest rates is a very 
welcome effect. However, not all moneylenders charge usury interest rates. So, 
crowding out the informal sector can have very negative effects by destroying in-
formal financial networks without replacing them with a sustainable formal alter-
native. In Vietnam these informal structures have been replaced by formal ones, but 
the questions remains: Are they sustainable in the long run? The VBP was recently 
replaced by the VBSP, which will continue the policy of the VBP. It is just a matter 
                                           
 
 
63  Formal credit is defined as credit from the formal and semi-formal financial institutes, 
VBARD, VBP, and the State Treasury. However, as the State Treasury disbursed only few 
credits, it is excluded from the later analysis.
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of time when the VBSP will become unsustainable, as its interest policy cannot 
cover its costs. DIAGNE et al. (2000) state that policies and financial institutions 
should be designed to complement the informal market rather then to replace it. 
Over 40% of households are not engaged in the formal financial sector. ZELLER 
and SHARMA (1998) state that some rural households simply do not apply for a 
loan because of the expectation that they will be turned down. This statement 
was supported by the work of BUCHENRIEDER and THEESFELD (2000) in a simi-
lar research setting in Northern Vietnam. The empirical results of their research 
showed that a lack of bankability from the perspective of the clients exists. This 
may foster the assumption that there is still a need to extend the credit outreach 
of the formal financial sector still further. Looking at Figure 4-3, it becomes 
evident that this figure must be reassessed. A mere 16% of the households in the 
sample are access-constrained. When farmers were asked directly why they do 
not borrow in the formal sector, three answers were given most frequently:   
1. afraid of debt; 2. have no collateral; 3. lack of knowledge. While ‘lack of 
knowledge’ clearly refers to a lack of human capital and ‘no collateral’ to a lack 
of physical capital, ‘afraid of debts’ refers to a mixture of human, physical, and 
social capital, namely a deficit in the risk-bearing capacity of a household. 
Figure 4-2: Percentage of house- 
                    holds using different  
                    credit sectors 
Figure 4-3: Access-constrained house-
                      holds (formal financial  






































Source: Own  figure. 
Note: N=251. 
 
Source: Own  figure. 
Note: N=251. 
* Households with no credit demand but 
   access to the formal financial sector.  
The great success of formal credit outreach in Vietnam is clearly due to credit-
delivering technologies that reach out far into the rural area, e.g. offering group 
loans at the local level, but also due to the strong promotion of credit by the 
government. Finally, the very low interest rates, which are highly subsidized, are 
increasing effective demand and thus outreach.  
Figure 4-4, Figure 4-5, and Figure 4-6 show that the market segments of the Outreach and access 
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informal and formal credit markets are clearly separated in terms of interest 
rate, loan term, and loan amount. The informal market is separated into two 
different segments, first a ‘no interest rate’ segment and second a ‘high interest 
rate’ segment.
64 Within the first segment, small amounts of money are lent out 
to family members or friends at zero interest. These credits are usually used for 
consumption and are one method of coping with emergencies or an unexpected 
shortage of cash. The second segment is served by traditional moneylenders. 
They charge interest rates clearly above the rates of the formal sector (about 
three to four times as much). While loans from the moneylender are usually 
very short-term, loans from family members or friends are either short-term or 
open-ended. Households using moneylenders have either fallen through the 
informal safety net or they have to borrow more than their social network can 
provide, e.g. in the event of expensive surgery needed by a family member. 
The biggest share of formal loans is usually used for investment or productive 
purposes.
65 
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Source:   Own figure. 
                                           
 
 
64  However, some households are paying an interest rate in the informal sector that exactly 
matches the formal rate. Usually these households have a close friend or a relative who 
borrowed in the formal sector and passed on part of the loan to a friend, who is then 
charged the formal interest rate.  
65  After financial reforms at the beginning of the nineties, the real interest rate became posi-
tive in 1992 (SENANAYAKE and HO 2001). Since then, however, the real interest rates have 
been gradually fallen (DUFHUES et al. 2004a).
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Source: Own  figure. 
Formal and informal credits are imperfect substitutes for each other. In particular, 
formal credit reduces, but does not completely eliminate, informal borrowing   
(DIAGNE 1999). Neither of the informal segments, the ‘no interest’ or the ‘high 
interest’ segment, can be reached by traditional credit products, and it would be 
probably a drain of public recourses if the Vietnamese government tried to do so. 
But the two segments could probably be reached by financial products other than 
credit. For instance, the lower segment could be served by client-adapted savings 
products, and the moneylender segment by a functioning social security system. 
Figure 4-6: Loan size of formal and informal credits in VND millions 















Source:   Own figure. 
Notes:   1 million VND = 70 US$ at time of survey (average conversion rate). Outreach and access 
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4.3.3 Credit  outreach 
The poverty outreach of the formal lenders is analyzed using a poverty index 
calculated with the PCA. Households that have no effective credit demand in the 
formal financial sector are the reference group. These households were first 
ranked according to their poverty index and then sorted into five groups of equal 
size. The lowest quintile incorporates the poorest households and the upper 
quintile embraces the better-off families. When assessing the poverty outreach 
of microfinance institutes at the household level, only new clients should be in-
cluded in the analysis in order to rule out any impact that could have occurred 
due to the financial services obtained from the lender and that could have led to 
a change in the poverty status of the client (MATIN et al. 1999).
66  
When looking at new clients of the formal financial sector, it is clear that better-
off households are over-represented and that the poor and poorest households 
are under-represented (Table 4-3). Nevertheless, clients are considered, only the 
poorest group is under-represented. This might indicate a shift by formal lenders 
towards the better-off households.
67 Of course this is a rather naïve comparison, 
as any impact of the program is neglected. But assuming that there is no impact, 
the comparison would hold, and if a positive impact is assumed, the gap would 
in fact widen. Only in the case of a negative impact would the gap decrease. 
Discussions with farmers did not reveal any wide-scale negative credit impacts. 
Thus, the last option is unlikely to be realistic. Hence, it is likely that there is a 
shift towards the better-off clientele. Whether this shift is actively influenced by 
formal lenders, or rather passively, as all creditworthy poor households are al-
ready clients, remains unanswered.  
                                           
 
 
66  HENRY et al. (2003) suggest using only clients who received a loan within the past three 
months. However, most of the loans in this sample are invested in livestock production – 
mainly pigs, cattle or buffaloes (DUFHUES et al. 2004b). Initial profits are not expected 
within the first six to seven months. Thus, it is safe to consider clients who received a loan 
within the last seven months as unbiased by poverty impacts of the loan. These households 
are grouped in Table 4-3 as ‘new clients’.
 
67  Almost three-quarters of the new loans were made by the VBP. Thus, a targeting bias 
through VBARD, which focuses more on the better-off clientele, can be excluded.
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Table 4-3:  Depth of outreach of formal lender clients 
  ← increasingly poor/increasingly rich → 
  Group 1  Group 2 Group 3 Group 4  Group 5
No clients, reference group 
(N=111) 
20% 20% 20% 20%  21%** 
Effective access (new clients) 
(N=40) 
0%  13% 28% 40% 20% 
Effective access (all)* (N=140)  5%  24%  22%  26%  23% 
VBP  clients  (N=94)  4%  30% 23% 27% 16% 
VBARD clients (N=35)  6%  9%  26%  23%  37% 
Source: Own  calculations. 
Notes: * 
   Including VBP, VBARD, and State Treasury clients. 
**
 Because of rounding, the figures may not add up to 100%. 
When looking at Table 4-4, it is clear that the poorest group (namely group 1) is 
clearly less often served by formal credit than the other groups. Only 24% of the 
households belonging to the poorest group have a formal loan. Surprisingly, the 
other poverty groups are more or less equally served. The VBP uses a targeting 
system which focuses on the poor but excludes the poorest, and the VBARD 
focuses on non-poor households (DUFHUES et al. 2002). However, if the poorest 
have collateral in the form of land use certificates they can usually access credits 
from the VBP and VBARD (see Section  4.3.1). Nevertheless, the poorest 
households in this survey seem to have difficulty accessing formal bank loans in 
comparison to wealthier households, which corresponds to international experience 
(see Section 4.1). On the one hand, as stated by MOLISA and UNDP (2004), 
bank staff and local authorities fear that the poorest will fail to pay back their 
loans. On the other hand, many of the poorest households may simply not demand 
the credit products on offer. The most realistic scenario is probably a mixture of 
low creditworthiness and low demand, a scenario also supported by research in 
other developing countries. For instance, NAVAJAS et al. (2000) state that in Bo-
livia the poorest households are less likely to be assessed as creditworthy and/or 
to demand loans of the type offered by the industry. 
Table 4-4:  Outreach of formal credit by poverty group 
  ← increasingly poor/increasingly rich → 










Households with access per group  24%  61%  58%  62%  58% 
Source: Own  calculations. 
The two banks, the VBP and VBARD, serve clearly under-proportionately the 
poorest group of the sample population (Table 4-3). This finding is also confirmed 
by IZUMIDA (2003), who states that the so-called ‘hungry’ households have Outreach and access 
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rarely been reached by the VBP. However, in line with their different target 
groups, both have a different depth of poverty outreach. If one considers the two 
lower quintiles as fairly poor and the three upper quintiles as fairly rich, then 
almost 40% of all poor households in the sample were reached with credit by the 
VPB. This is also confirmed by the WORLD BANK (2004a), which states that the 
VBP has been fairly successful in reaching the poor. Fairly may be interpreted 
as a noticeable outreach to the poor, although it is still an under-proportionate 
outreach. However, the aim of being a ‘Bank for the Poor’ is obviously not being 
achieved, as two-thirds of the VBP’s clients in this sample are not considered 
poor.
68 Another way of measuring depth of outreach is the loan amount and loan 
term. Smaller amounts or shorter loan terms usually mean greater depth   
(CHARITONENKO et al. 2004; SCHREINER 2002). Considering only the loan term, 
one might think that the VBARD has deeper outreach, with an average loan term 
of 2.5 years compared to 2.9 years in the case of the VBP. Nevertheless, there 
are two facts that contradict this. First, the interest rate is higher in the case of 
VBARD loans. As a result, farmers probably try to keep the loan term as short 
as possible, and second, the loan terms are more negotiable in the case of 
VBARD loans (Figure 4-7 and Figure 4-8). The VBP loans are ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
loans. Furthermore, VBP loans are clearly smaller than VBARD loans, sug 
gesting that VBP has a higher depth of outreach than VBARD. The average loan 
amount of a VBP loan is 2.8 million VND (177 US$) per credit group member 
compared to 6.6  million VND (420 US$) from VBARD. Nevertheless, 
CHRISTEN et al. (1995) point out that scale determines whether significant out-
reach to the poor can be achieved. The VBP not only has greater depth of out-
reach, but also greater breadth. Two-thirds of all loans in this sample are dis-
bursed by the VBP and only one-quarter by the VBARD.
69 Thus, considering 
only Northern Vietnam, the VBP reaches deeper into the poorer part of the 
population than the VBARD. 
                                           
 
 
68  Official data on this issue are much more optimistic. For instance MOLISA and UNDP (2004) 
state that three-quarters of the subsidized loans are delivered to poor households.
 
69  However, when considering national data the VBARD has a much bigger breadth of out-
reach then the VBP.
































Source: Own  figure 












































Source: Own  figure 
4.3.4 Credit-constrained  households 
Of the 260 households interviewed, nine households were dropped prior to the 
analysis and eleven were excluded during the analysis due to missing values. 
Thus, the parameters are estimated on the basis of 240 households. A binary 
logit model is used, where the dependent variable is one for all households with 
access to formal credit and zero otherwise. The dependent variable is derived 
following the decision tree in the annex Figure A-1. The list of regressors is pre-
sented in the earlier section (see Table 4-1 in section 4.2.2). From 23 potentially 
influential parameters, eight variables have a significant influence in the model 
presented. These variables are displayed in Table 4-5.  Outreach and access 
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Table 4-5:  Parameters influencing households’ access to formal credit –   







Physical capital-related variables 
1.  Red or Green Books  (yes = 1 no = 0)  0.229  0.049  1.570 
2. Agricultural  land  (m
2) 0.506  0.247  1.798 
3.  Value of houses  (VND)  1.119  0.051  8.919 
4.  Government salary  (yes = 1 no = 0)  0.390  0.438  0.739 
5. Cash  savings  (VND)  1.720  0.686  2.005 
Human capital-related variables 
6.  School years of HH head  (years)  0.415  0.419  1.399 
7. Vietnamese  communica-
tion skills of the married 
couple 
(yes = 1 no = 0) 0.824  0.954  1.048 
8. Receiving  agricultural 
extension 
(yes = 1 no = 0) 0.284  0.230  1.407 
9.  Active household  
members 
(numbers) 0.310  0.321  0.735 
10. Share of non-farm activi-
ties in total yearly income 
(yes = 1 no = 0) 0.354  0.623  0.840 
11. Lost working days  (days/year/HH)  0.482  0.823  0.898 
Social capital-related variables 
12. Giving help  (days/year/HH)  0.348  0.703  1.142 
13. Receiving help  (days/year/HH)  0.261  0.023  0.553 
14. Interest-free informal 
credit 
(VND) 0.597  0.100  0.374 
15. Thai/Tay village  (yes = 1 no = 0) 0.770  0.004  9.007 
16. Market visits only by  
females 
(yes = 1 no = 0) 0.304  0.018  0.488 
17. Age of the household  (years)  0.287  0.622  0.868 
Infrastructure-related variables 
18. Remoteness  (km)  0.393  0.006  2.916 
19. Market visits per month  (numbers)  0.868  0.041  5.897 
20. Different market visited  (numbers)  0.416  0.233  1.642 
Poverty-related variables 
21. Poverty index  (index)  0.462  0.553  1.315 
22. Day labor  (yes = 1 no = 0) 0.331  0.353  0.735 
23. Receiving aid form  
government 
(yes = 1 no = 0) 0.239  0.858  0.958 
Chi-square 107.309 
Nagelkerke R Square  0.619 
Observations in model  240 
Source: Own  calculations. 
Notes:   Variables over a significance level of 0.1 are considered to be not significant. 
The model predicted 92% of all observations correctly (Table 4-6). In the group 
of access-constrained households, the percentage of correctly predicted cases Chapter 4  
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was good, at 71%; it was very good, at 96%, in the group of households with 
access to the formal financial market. The overall fit of the model is satisfactory, 
with a Nagelkerke R
2 of 0.619. The correlation tables showed no problems due 
to multicollinearity between independent variables.  
Table 4-6:  Classification of correctly predicted access to formal  
credit-constrained households 
  Predicted Percent  correct 
Observed 0  1   
0 27  11  71.1 
1 8  194  96.0 
Overall percent correctly predicted      92.1 
Source: Own  calculations. 
Notes:  The categories of the dependent variable are: 0 = No access to formal credit; 1 = Access to 
formal credit. 
Physical capital: In contrast to other countries, lack of physical capital in the 
form of farmland is not a significant access constraint.
70 However, the posses-
sion of land use certificates is significant, but the influence is the lowest of all 
significant variables. In the 1990s, one of the most important access constraints 
to formal rural credit in Vietnam was the lack of physical collateral in form of 
land use certificates (HUNG and GIAP 1999). Today, land use certificates seem to 
have lost most of this influence. The ongoing dissemination of ‘Red/Green 
Books’ in recent years has brought an increasing number of households into 
possession of assets that are useable as collateral, and this has broadened the pos-
sible outreach dramatically (DUFHUES et al. 2004a; MCCARTY 2001).
71 Moreover, 
the main supplier of formal loans in the research area is the VBP, which tries to 
rely totally on social collateral (section 4.3.1 and 4.3.3). This explains the fact that 
possession of land use certificates appears to have little influence on access to 
formal credit. Nevertheless, households without certificates may still have diffi-
culties in accessing formal loans, particularly from the VBARD.
72 
                                           
 
 
70  For instance, SARAP (1990) found that the smaller size of land holdings in India has an 
adverse effect on the access of small farmers to formal credit institutions.
 
71  In this sample, 89% of the households have a Red Book and/or a Green Book.
 
72  Lack of collateral was also mentioned by access-constrained households as a reason for 
self-exclusion.
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A high-value home has much greater influence on the likelihood of obtaining 
access to formal credit than land use certificates. Housing is probably used as a 
visible indicator of the general wealth of the household and can easily be assessed 
by local officials or credit officers. Furthermore, houses can be used as formal 
collateral.
73 This may explain the considerable influence of the value of housing 
on the likelihood of obtaining access to formal credit. The visible wealth of a 
household seems to be very important for its access to credit.
74  
Human capital: None of the human capital-related variables is significant. Par-
ticularly surprising is the fact that the variable ‘school years of HH-head’ is not 
significant, as research from other developing countries, e.g. EVANS et al. (1999), 
SARAP  (1990), and VAESSEN  (2001), support the opposite notion. Moreover,   
illiteracy levels in Vietnam remain high among the poor ethnic minorities, and 
in more remote parts of the country, especially in the northern mountains   
(BHUSHAN  et al. 2001). This may indicate that the formal credit application 
process is not in itself a market entry barrier any more to poorly educated 
customers. Group credits from the VBP have probably eradicated this access 
constraint. Within the group credit scheme, only the credit group leader who sub-
mits the credit proposal needs a certain degree of literacy (DUFHUES et al. 2002).  
Furthermore, investments are not usually very innovative and revolve mostly 
around conventional enterprises in animal production. Thus, a high amount of 
human capital does not seem necessary to carry out those investments. 
Social capital: Dwelling in a Thai/Tay village has the highest influence on the 
likelihood of having access to formal credit. As mentioned above, from a national 
point of view Tay and Thai are ethnic minorities. However, in the two research 
areas these minorities represent the majority and occupy many key positions in 
the local administration, including the district bank branches. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that inhabitants of non-Thai/Tay villages have a significantly higher 
chance of being access-constrained then the ethnic majority in Ba Be and Yen Chau 
respectively. However, privileged access to credit may be related not only to 
                                           
 
 
73  However, in this sample only one case was found where the house was used as collateral 
for a VBARD loan. 
74  The housing status of a household must not be equated with its poverty status. GEPPERT 
and DUFHUES (2003) and SIMANOWITZ (2000) stated that the appearance of housing is an 
insufficient indicator for poverty, for instance housing could be completely debt-financed. Chapter 4  
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ethnicity, but also to the fact that the predominant farming system in these villages 
is paddy rice production. Paddy rice production was for long time seen by local 
officials and bank staff as a farming system with a high developmental priority.  
Thus, inhabitants of these villages were likely to obtain easier access to formal 
credit. Moreover, these villages usually have a better market connection and are 
thus more easily accessed by bank staff, which also promotes access to loans. 
The numbers of days of informal help and the amount of interest-free informal 
loans that a household receives from its social network may both be indicators of a 
functioning social network, but they may also lower the chance of gaining access 
to formal credit. A functioning informal social network has apparently no positive 
influence on the likelihood of obtaining access to formal credit. But high use of the 
social network is obviously a strong indicator of an income shock or a shock that 
negatively influences the repaying capacity of the household.
75 The incidence of 
shocks either raises the chance of being assessed by local authorities as not credit-
worthy or adds to the self-exclusion tendency of households.  
In households where only female persons go to the market (i.e. the wife of the 
household head or a female household head), the chance of being access-
constrained is higher then in other households. On the one hand, this may be 
caused by a lack of human capital, as the male household head is mentally or 
physically unable to go to the market. While the number of missed working 
days due to illness is not significant, the permanent absence of an important 
member of the workforce such as the male household head may be more im-
portant. Moreover, the absence of the male household head can be easily ob-
served by local authorities or bank staff and may indicate a problem inside the 
household, which may lower its creditworthiness. On the other hand, women 
probably have less access to official information networks than men.
76 House-
holds of low social standing are often excluded from information networks and 
thus lack important information. VAESSEN (2001) draws similar conclusions 
from a research study in Nicaragua. One reason mentioned by households that 
are access-constrained to formal credit is lack of information. 
                                           
 
 
75  The use of informal borrowing may also be seen as an indicator of poverty. However, other 
research, e.g. by RUTHVEN (2001), has shown that reciprocal lending is not necessarily re-
lated to poverty. 
 
76 M CCARTY (2001) points out that the vast majority of rural loans are given to men.
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Infrastructure: Surprisingly, the variable ‘distance to the district capital with the 
nearest bank branch’ is positive. Former research in Vietnam, e.g. by HUNG and 
GIAP (1999), has shown that remoteness is an access constraint to formal credit. 
Nevertheless, many programs around the world are set up specifically to serve the 
under-served. They locate where financial services have long been weak 
(MORDUCH 1999). In the case of Vietnam, those areas are/were certainly the more 
remote areas. Through the VBP and special credit programs, the Vietnamese 
government has pushed credit outreach for poverty reduction in favor of remote 
communes. MINOT (2000) states that poverty is more pronounced in places that 
are more remote from markets and cities. Obviously program placement is not 
random, and remoter villages or communes with a higher share of poverty are 
preferred. However, ALTHER et al. (2002) state that the poorest villages may not 
necessarily be located inside the poorest communes. Poor villages in wealthier 
areas may have less access to government services.  
The variable with the third highest influence is ‘frequency of market visits’. The 
high influence in this case may be explained by the lack of information about 
credit application procedures and availability in the village, as described in 
DUFHUES et al. (2002). Farmers use market days not only for buying and selling, 
but also for exchanging information and keeping relations and networks alive. 
DUFHUES et al. (2002) also showed that good relations with commune officials 
or the credit officer are essential for receiving credit. These contacts are most 
likely to be established and maintained on market days. This finding is sup-
ported by VAESSEN (2001), who found that access to certain information and 
networks in Nicaragua is essential for receiving credit. The more often a house-
hold goes to the market, the more investment ideas the household may develop. 
Consequently, the bigger its demand for credit and the lower its self-exclusion 
tendency is likely to be.  
Poverty:
77 A very surprising result is that the poverty variable does not have a 
                                           
 
 
77  Better access to credit potentially reduces the incidence of rural poverty via a positive im-
pact of the credit itself and, in the case of not borrowing, via access to consumption loans 
at times of income shocks. Therefore, poverty is endogenous to credit access and the inclu-
sion of a poverty index would result in biased coefficients. However, in this case study, 
endogenity of poverty is expected to be negligible for two reasons: First, in the past, formal 
Vietnamese lenders did not disburse consumption loans. Second, QUACH et al. (2003, 2004) 
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significant influence on the chance of a household being access-constrained.  
For instance, former research by DUONG and IZUMIDA (2002) concluded that the 
poor have great difficulty in accessing formal credits. Furthermore, the descrip-
tive statistics in section 4.2.2 indicate that particularly the poorest households 
tend be excluded. On the one hand, this may be explained by the fact that the 
Vietnamese government has made major efforts to increase the supply of formal 
credits to the rural poor, and clearly these efforts have been successful. On the 
other hand, the poorest households may potentially be able to obtain access to 
formal credit, but they do not demand it as their investment possibilities are very 
limited, their debt-taking capacity is low and their risk-aversion is high.
78 
4.4  Conclusions and policy recommendations 
This research paper has contributed to enhance our understanding of the broad 
outreach of formal rural lenders in Northern Vietnam. Compared to a decade 
ago, the informal market now plays only a minor role. The poverty outreach of 
the formal rural lenders is satisfactory (e.g. about 50% of the households be-
longing to the two lower poverty quintiles have effective credit demand). How-
ever, the outreach analysis has shown that the poorest households are seldom 
clients of formal lenders. Only slightly more than 20% of the poorest households 
are served by formal lenders, while among the wealthiest quintile this proportion 
                                           
 
 
found in their studies only a very small impact of formal credit on household welfare in 
Vietnam. As mentioned in Section 3.3, households who received a formal loan within the 
last seven months are likely to be unbiased by poverty impacts of the loan. Therefore, a 
new model was calculated with a sub-sample of households. In this sub-sample, house-
holds that had a formal loan with duration of more than seven months were excluded. The 
results from this model also indicate that poverty status had no influence on the likelihood 
of a household being access-constrained to formal credit. 
 
78  First the poverty index variable was squared and then multiplied by its original value, 
which can also be negative, to give a higher weight to the extreme cases. Second a dummy 
variable for the lowest quintile of the poverty index was incorporated in the regression in-
stead of the poverty index itself to give a higher weight to the poorest households. But, in 
both cases the poverty variable turned out to be not significant. However, when dropping 
all variables except the poverty index as explanatory variable, this variable becomes signifi-
cant. This indicates that poverty does play a role but its single dimensions or characteristics 
which are already reflected by other variables in the model turn out to be more important. 
As mentioned above the correlation table did not reveal any problematic correlations between 
the independent variables. 
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is around 60%. When considering access to formal credit, this figure must be 
re-evaluated. As the logit analysis revealed, general poverty (as captured with 
the poverty index) does not significantly influence access to formal credit. The 
results indicate that only certain aspects of poverty, e.g. low quality of housing, 
have an important influence on access to formal credit in Vietnam. Thus, the 
poorest households use formal credit less often, but are not significantly more 
often access-constrained. This means that the poorest households simply have 
much less demand for the types of formal credit products on offer. Improving 
credit products or offering new credit lines would only slightly improve the 
credit coverage of poorer households. A more promising approach would be to 
introduce a specialized pro-poor extension service to widen the scope of their 
investment ideas and opportunities, combined with a general improvement in the 
infrastructure. One factor that very positively influenced access to formal credit 
was the connection to the market. A good market connection serves credit out-
reach in a twofold manner: First, households have better access to credit-relevant 
information; and second, through better market access they may find new invest-
ment opportunities. The most appropriate tool to incorporate poorer households 
into the formal financial system would the mobilization of savings. As stated by 
several scholars, all people can save, even the poorest of the poor, and therefore 
deposit services have deeper outreach than credit (CHARITONENKO  et al. 2004;   
SCHREINER 2002; ZELLER and SHARMA 2000). Moreover, DUFHUES et al. (2004a) 
revealed an enormous and unmet demand for formal savings among the rural 
population in Northern Vietnam.  
Nevertheless, the number of access-constrained households is surprisingly low. 
One reason for the low number is the weakening or eradication of former access 
constraints. A major access constraint in the last decade was lack of collateral. 
Land use certificates are nowadays widespread and they have only limited in-
fluence on access to formal credit. If the process of issuing land use certificates is 
finally completed and/or if the VBARD and the VBSP enforce their national 
policy of granting collateral-free loans, the number of households without access 
to the formal financial market due to lack of land use certificates will dwindle, 
and the importance of land use certificates as physical collateral will become 
even less important. Other access constraints, namely remoteness (distance to 
the nearest bank branch) and literacy requirements of the household head, have 
been eradicated through locally disbursed group credits. However, considering 
the anecdotal reports of very low repayment rates, the price of eradicating these 
access constraints has likely been a decrease in sustainability of the formal lenders. 
As VON PISCHKE (1991:83) points out: "Binding financial constraints to the for-
mal sector are not necessarily anti-developmental. If they stand in the way of Chapter 4  
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bad investment, they are socially beneficial. For the financial system to make 
good loans and allocate funds for high-return investments, it must reject poor 
proposals, unfit applicants, and low-return investments. To generate good loans 
requires a highly selective screening of applicants."  
Nevertheless, some barriers to access continue to exist. To reduce these access 
barriers, locally-oriented rather than general actions should be taken, catering to the 
needs and the circumstances of those households which lack access, particularly  
ethnic minorities and female-led households. Such measures will be particu-
larly useful within the organizational structure of the lenders themselves. 
DUFHUES et al. (2002), for example, suggested employing ethnic minority credit 
officers, which would create more awareness of those groups inside the institu-
tion. Furthermore, special female credit officers for female-headed households 
could work in the same direction. However, the recent efforts of the Vietnamese 
government, for instance the establishment of the VBSP, represent an attempt to 
broaden access in general. But this increase in outreach will go hand in hand 
with an increase in access to credit for non-creditworthy households, thus resulting 
in decreased repayment rates. Moreover, it is questionable whether households 
that do not have access today, or do not demand the existing products, will de-
mand credits from the VBSP. If rural lenders in Vietnam were one day forced to 
work in a competitive environment according to market principles, there would 
be a great chance that large parts of the population would be access-constrained 
as a result of previous loan defaults.  
Whether the breadth and depth of formal credit outreach that was financed by 
enormous government subsidies contributes to poverty reduction, however, re-
mains a subject for future research. Finally, it should be borne in mind that the 
conclusions drawn in this paper are based on a rather small and regionally limited 
sample. Therefore, further confirmation of the results by a larger and more rep-
resentative study would be desirable.  
  
5  Participatory product design by using Conjoint Analysis 
in the rural financial market of Northern Vietnam
79 
The following sections discussed the development of client adapted financial 
products by measuring customer preferences in a participatory way. In this sense 
credit and saving products are discussed separately.  
5.1 Introduction 
Vietnam has been engaged in a process of enhancing the role of market forces in 
the economy since 1986-87. This transition process, known in Vietnamese as 
‘Doi Moi’ (‘renewal’), is aimed at restructuring Vietnam’s legal, regulatory, ad-
ministrative, investment and foreign trade apparatus and policies to transform its 
centrally planned economic system into a market economy with ‘socialist charac-
teristics’ (BRYANT 1998). In some sectors the reforms have achieved impressive 
results, bringing economic growth rates up to an annual average of 7.5% for the 
years 1995-99. Nevertheless, Vietnam is still an extremely poor country 
(WORLD BANK 1999). Three-quarters of Vietnam’s population are engaged in 
subsistence farming and the majority of them lives in rural communities (BA 1997). 
In the transition process, the reform of the national financial system plays a key 
role (SCHRIEDER and HEIDHUES 2000). The tasks ahead include: Strengthening 
popular faith in the financial system, moving the banking sector to financial 
self-sustainability, and expanding its outreach to include the newly emerging 
private sector not only in urban but also in rural areas. A financial system that 
enjoys the confidence of the population will be able to boost the domestic financial 
                                           
 
 
79  This section is based on the following article: "Participatory product design by using con-
joint analysis in the rural financial market of Northern Vietnam", written by Thomas Dufhues, 
Franz Heidhues, and Gertrud Buchenrieder and published 2004 in the Asian Economic 
Journal 18 (1): 81-114. I would like to thank Prof. Dr. Manfred Zeller for his helpful 
comments to an earlier Version of this artikel. Chapter 5  
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savings rate, now hovering at around 20%, up to rates of 30-40%, as attained in 
other East Asian countries (WORLD BANK 1995; WORLD BANK 1998). Vietnam 
is still largely a cash economy, with cash accounting for about 50% of the M3 
money supply (WOLFF 1999). There is consensus that in transition countries 
such as Vietnam, for the financial system to develop a comprehensive service port-
folio to all market segments, the regulatory and supervisory framework for 
banking needs strengthening. In this context, the paper refers to the development 
of demand-driven financial services in a participatory way. 
Broad access to appropriate and sustainable financial services has been pointed out 
repeatedly as being important for poverty reduction. It contributes to higher incomes 
and better food security (ADB 2000; BUCHENRIEDER  and THEESFELD  2000; 
HEIDHUES 1995; SCHRIEDER 1996; ZELLER et al. 1997). In Vietnam many poor 
households are confronted with transitory food insecurity, even though their in-
comes seem to provide an adequate livelihood base over several years. Thus, 
there is a potential demand for savings, credit, and insurance services to more 
effectively stabilize consumption and to increase the ability to escape chronic 
poverty (KANBUR and SQUIRE 2001; SHARMA 2001; ZELLER  1999). Hunger 
eradication and poverty alleviation, particular in the northern Uplands, is of 
enormous concern to the Vietnamese government (VBP 1999b). MARD pro-
poses financial services as a powerful tool for poverty reduction (SIDA-MARD 
1998). From the early 1990s onwards, the Vietnamese government has begun to 
establish and promote FFIs such as the VBARD, the VBP and the PCFs to pro-
vide the rural poor with cheap loans. This policy is based on the assumption that  
(1) the rural population is too poor to repay credits at market interest rates and 
that (2) capital is the factor constraining production and thus limiting food  
security. 
The Vietnamese FFIs have been very successful in increasing their level of out-
reach. The state-owned VBARD and VBP have reached almost 4.5 million and 
2.5 million rural households with credit, respectively (BAC 2001; HANH 2001). 
These are more than 58% of all rural households in Vietnam. Despite this suc-
cess in terms of outreach, many rural households demanding credit still lack access. 
Even those credits that are targeted towards the poor seem to be bypassing the 
poorest groups, which often are identical to ethnic minorities (NEEFJES 2001; 
WORLD BANK and DFID 1999). The supply of formal savings schemes is insuf-
ficient in Vietnam. Formal savings schemes have not been in the focus of   
development efforts. Rural households are widely assumed to be too poor to 
save, and therefore the VBP, for example, does not offer any saving schemes. 
However, theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that even poor people Participatory product design 
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want to, need to, and indeed do save for various purposes (KANBUR and SQUIRE 
2001; RUTHERFORD  2000; SHARMA  2000; WRIGHT  and MUTESASIRA  2001; 
ZELLER 2001). 
The development of adapted financial products has been the orphan of research 
on financial markets in developing countries and is only now coming into its 
own (RUTHERFORD 2000). Thus, there is a pressing need to examine ways of 
designing and introducing new financial service products into MFIs to improve 
their outreach, depth, and access to them (WRIGHT 1999). 
This research work aims at developing innovative client-oriented financial ser-
vices in a participatory way to improve access to financial services. The objec-
tives can be formulated as: 1. analysis of the supply of formal financial ser-
vices, and 2. design of client-oriented financial services by means of participa-
tory research. 
5.2  Material and methods 
The complexity of the rural financial market system requires a whole set of dif-
ferent research methods and tools. Data from three different levels, the house-
hold level (demand side), the level of financial institutes (supply side), and the 
community level need to be collected and analyzed.
80 However, this research 
sets a special focus on the demand side, i.e. the household level. Primary data 
collection took place in the period from Mach 2001 to March 2002. 
Secondary data were collected at all administrative levels. Semi-structured and 
unstructured interviews with key persons such as officials of mass organizations 
or political cadres at the commune and district level provided general information 
on the research region and on the financial landscape in general.
81 Furthermore, 
primary data were collected at the commune level. Secondary data from the FFIs 
                                           
 
 
80  Community level is defined as all institutions, policies, and infrastructure above village 
level.
 
81  Due to Vietnam’s socialist history, the so-called ‘mass organizations’ are found every-
where in Vietnam. They are hierarchically structured according to the administrative levels, 
e.g. Farmers’ Union, Women’s Union, Youth Union, and Veterans’ Union. Some of these 
organizations offer small loans or organize training courses or saving groups at village 
level. The Fatherland Front is the holding organization of all other mass organizations and 
also has political influence on the local people’s committees (GEPPERT et al. 2002). Chapter 5  
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and non-formal financial institutes, like non-governmental organizations and 
special credit programs carried out by the state, were collected. Semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with bank staff from all hierarchical levels (credit 
officer to bank manager and district branch to head-quarters). These data were 
analyzed from the point of view of performance indicators and information 
economics. 
The main part of this analysis is based on the household/village database, com-
prising households of different ethnicity. Cross-sectional household-level data 
from the Yen Chau and Ba Be districts in Northern Vietnam were collected, 
whereby the sample contains agricultural households with and without access to 
services from the formal financial sector (see Section 5.2.2). 
The perception of the target group, namely the rural population, is the most 
important part of this research work, particularly while designing the conjoint 
survey. Their view of reality permeates the whole research study to supplement 
and to validate all other data. Therefore, different participatory rural appraisal 
(PRA) tools were applied and had their influence on all parts of the research 
and its analysis. Depending on the purpose, different stakeholders were con-
tacted with the PRA-tools: Women – men, poor – rich, old – young, individu-
als – groups. PRA-tools applied included: Cash-flow diagrams, mobility maps, 
wealth rankings, unstructured interviews (partly supported by photographs), 
different rankings, visualization workshops and role-plays with an external 
moderator, social mappings, and Venn diagrams. 
5.2.1 Conjoint  survey
82  
Conjoint Analysis (CA) is commonly used in commercial marketing studies 
and analysis of consumers’ preferences and has its origin in psychological re-
search (WITTINK and CATTIN 1989).
83 Assuming that a product can be defined 
as a vector in a multidimensional attribute space, and that the evaluation of the 
                                           
 
 
82  A comprehensive description of the methodology of CA can be found in GREEN  and 
SRINIVASAN (1978, 1990).
 
83  Preference is a one-dimensional psychological variable. It reflects the perceived advantage 
between two or more alternatives. The given preference to an alternative does not mean 
that this alternative is assessed as positive or good. A preference shows merely a relative 
assessment of alternatives (HAMMANN and ERICHSON 1994).
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product is based on its attribute levels, it becomes theoretically possible to  
relate preference to attributes (JANSSEN et al. 1991).
84 
Table 5-1:  Credit attributes and their levels 
Attributes Levels 
1. Interest rate 
(percent/month) 
1) High (1.2%/month)  
2) Low (0.5%/month) 
2. Insurance of 
investment in  
livestock  
1) Insurance of livestock investment  
(livestock that died due to accident or disease (buffaloes and pigs) will 
be replaced by their value at time of death; premium 5,000/month per 
animal) 
2) No livestock insurance 
3. Disbursal time 
of the loan 
 
Disbursal time of loan in days from the first day of action to receiving 
the loan (e.g. in the case of VBARD getting the application form; in 
the case of VBP creating the group) 
1) Quick (7 days) 
2) Slow (60 days) 
4. Lending scheme  1) Group lending scheme 
During a group lending scheme, all negotiations with the bank and 
commune authorities will be conducted by the CGL. The application 
form will be filled in by the group leader, the interest will be collected 
by him, etc. 
2) Individual lending scheme 
5. Collateral  1) Land use certificates (Green and Red Books) 
2) Durable consumer goods 
3) No collateral required 
6. Place of credit 
negotiations and 
information 
All necessary negotiations, credit disbursal, collecting of interest,  




Source:   Own figure. 
Each product has an almost infinite number of attributes. Many of these attributes 
do not have a measurable influence on the purchasing decision of a potential 
consumer or are considered as important only by a very small market segment. 
Therefore, it is neither possible nor useful to grasp all existing attributes and 
their levels in market research. It is necessary to reduce the attributes and their 
levels to a manageable size and to those, which are most relevant to consumers 
                                           
 
 
84  A possible attribute of a credit product is the interest rate, with the possible level of 20% 
interest rate per year. Chapter 5  
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in forming their preferences. Such a reduction requires interaction with the po-
tential consumers to determine the most relevant attributes and their levels. 
From the perspective of the target population, the attributes and their levels have 
to be determined in a participatory process because this is pre-eminent for ob-
taining true-to-life results in the statistical analysis. Engineers and/or economists 
assigned with developing new products or services may have other priorities 
than the potential customer. 
The rural population, and particularly the farmers, were encouraged during open 
discussions to describe their financial background and economic conditions with 
the help of several participatory research tools. The qualitative data gathered 
allowed to specify possible attributes of financial services that are microcredit 
and microsavings services. Then relevant microfinance attributes and corre-
sponding levels were pre-selected. These pre-selected attributes were again pre-
sented to the rural target group during group discussions and rankings. Here the 
importance of each attribute was verified or the attribute was dropped (Table 5-1 
and Table 5-2). 
Table 5-2:  Deposit attributes and their levels 
Attributes Levels 
1. Savings term  1) Interest-bearing (0.5% per month), three-month time deposit  
If money is not withdrawn after this time, automatic extension for  
another 3 months. 
2) Interest-bearing (0.3% per month), one-month time deposit 
If money is not withdrawn after this time, automatic extension for  
another month. 
3) No interest-bearing checking account 
Withdrawal and deposit at any time. 
2. Incentive  1) With a lottery scheme 
Clients receive a free ticket for the monthly lottery for each 10,000 
VND deposit. After withdrawals, clients have to skip three months of 
lottery unless they deposit at least 10,000 VND more than they have 
withdrawn. For every 50,000 VND on the account they receive one 
ticket.  
2) No lottery scheme 
3. Place of  
transaction 




4. Minimum  
deposit at opening 
1) 20,000 VND 
2) No minimum deposit necessary 
Source: Own  figure. Participatory product design 
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Orthogonal design: Even if the number of attributes and levels is reduced to the 
most relevant and important ones, the number of possible concepts which have to 
be assessed is usually too large to be managed effectively.
85 For instance, in this 
research, in the case of the credit product, four attributes with two levels and two 
attributes with three levels have been identified as most relevant. This would result 
in 144 possible concepts. According to BACKHAUS et al. (1996), the CA design 
should not exceed 20 concepts. Therefore, a reduced design was applied. The basic 
idea behind a reduced design is to create a manageable number of concepts that 
represents the full design as closely as possible. The number of concepts is se-
lected in such a way as to permit the statistical decomposition and quantification of 
each attribute level’s contribution to the consumers’ choice (RANDOLPH and 
NDUNG'U 2000). The Orthogonal Main Effect Design for asymmetrical factorial 
experiments has been applied to reduce the number of concepts (ADDELMAN 1962).
86 
An Orthogonal Main Effect Design was created with SPSS 9.0. Hence, the full 
design for the credit CA was reduced from 144 concepts to 16, and in the case of 
the savings CA, from 36 to nine without losing important information. 
Stimuli: Typically, a CA is carried out using hypothetical descriptions of the 
service, or so-called stimuli. In this context, a stimulus is defined as the presen-
tation of the attributes’ levels to the respondent. Data for CA experiments may 
be collected by three types of stimulus presentation: (1) verbal, (2) paragraph 
(descriptive cards), and (3) pictorial or in-kind presentation (GREEN and 
SRINIVASAN 1978). These stimuli describe distinct concepts and will be assed by 
the respondents (BACKHAUS et al. 1996). This research study follows the re-
commendation of SCHRIEDER and HEIDHUES (1991) for presentation of financial 
services, which constitutes a mixture between verbal, paragraph, and pictorial 
design for the creation of stimuli in developing countries.  
Ideas for the visualization of the levels were gained through the whole research 
process and later on discussed during village workshops, which were moderated 
by a PRA specialist. The visualization ideas were finally discussed with a 
painter of the Tay ethnic minority. He converted the ideas, images, and figures 
into pictograms (BARISCH and DUFHUES 2001; GEPPERT and DUFHUES 2003).  
                                           
 
 
85  Different compositions of attributes’ levels create hypothetical product concepts. 
86  An asymmetrical design is defined as a set of attributes with different numbers of levels 
(BACKHAUS et al. 1996). Chapter 5  
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The pictograms were arranged on DIN-A4 cards according to the orthogonal design 
and titled with an explanatory headline in Vietnamese. A detailed description of 
the participatory creation of stimuli can be found in (DUFHUES et al. 2003).  
The traditional CA involves asking consumers to rank or rate in order of preference 
different product alternatives. However, this research uses the so-called ‘Choice 
Based Conjoint Analysis’ (CBC) approach. CBC does not involve any ranking 
or rating, but simply asks customers which option they would choose or pur-
chase. This approach is more realistic. Another advantage of the CBC method is 
the ‘none’ option. As in the real world, respondents can decline to purchase in a 
CBC interview by choosing the ‘none’ option (ORME 1996).  
One representative of each household was invited to participate in the CA survey. 
The respondent was asked to choose the three best alternatives represented by 
the stimuli-cards, or none. Furthermore, a short interview was conducted to col-
lect data for market segmentation (e.g. sex, age, etc.) and complementary ques-
tions on the ideal savings/credit product (e.g. amount of savings). 
5.2.2  Regional focus and sampling procedures 
Two research sites were selected, namely Bac Kan (Ba Be district) and Son La 
province (Yen Chau and Mai Son district). Both provinces are located in the 
mountainous regions of Northern Vietnam and belong to the poorest provinces 
of the country (WORLD BANK 1999).
87 Ba Be district is a very remote area and 
has only recently (in 1999/2000) gained access to regional and interregional 
markets. Farmers produce mainly at subsistence level and a large proportion are 
to be considered poor. Therefore, the area is suitable for developing client-
adapted financial products that can be used as a mechanism to prevent, mitigate, 
and cope with poverty. Due to the creation of the Ba Be National Park, huge re-
settlements took place and these have aggravated the problems in the region. 
Hence, the main focus of this research was set on the Ba Be district.  
The communes and villages were selected in accordance with pre-defined selec-
tion criteria. These criteria are:  
                                           
 
 
87  The average GDP per capita for Son La province is 206 US$ and for Bac Kan province 
149 US$. These figures lie clearly under the national average of 370 US$ per capital (1998) 
(STATISTICAL PUBLISHING HOUSE 1999). Participatory product design 
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- Along the slope, to get different stages of market access, ecological zones 
and ethnic minorities;  
- Different phases of the land allocation process, and  
- One village with a high proportion of non-farm activities. 
Research in rural regions involving foreigners is sometimes perceived by the 
local authorities as being troublesome for the village society. To keep the intru-
sion to a minimum, the research was arranged together with the local authorities 
and local research partners. For example, three communes were selected together 
with the Thai Nguyen University of Agriculture and Forestry and the local autho-
rities in Ba Be town according to the criteria presented above. Then the leaders 
of the communes identified three villages in each commune in line with the 
selection criteria. From these nine villages, four were chosen for the sample. An 
overview of the research sample in both regions is given in Table 5-3. The 
households in Ba Be and Yen Chau district were selected using a stratified sample 
according to the living standard of the population. Different wealth groups are of 
particular interest for this research in order to take into account the diverse 
preferences of people. 












Number  % 
Dia Linh  Pac Nghe 1 Tay  (97%) 76    36  47 
Nghien Loan  Khau Nen  Nung  (89%) 36    19  53 
Province 
Ba Kan,  
district 
Ba Be 


























Son La,  
district 
Yen Chau  Chieng Hac  Bo Kieng  Hmong  (100%) 20    13  65 










Interviewed households in total:    260   
Source: Own  figure. 
5.2.3 Econometric  analysis 
Consumers make their consumption decisions based on a joint comparison of 
different attributes. The CA assumes that a consumer assigns a utility value to 
each level of each attribute and makes his or her final decision based on the total 
utility values across attributes for a given product (RANDOLPH and NDUNG'U 2000).  
Applied consumer research focuses on determining the contributed portion Chapter 5  
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(part-worth utility) of each attribute level to the dependent variable (MOORE 1980). 
The part-worth utility is defined as the contributed portion of various attribute 
levels to the overall acceptance perceived (GREEN and SRINIVASAN 1978). The 
respondent of a CA interview shows his preferences for different concepts. By 
using an estimation procedure, the value of each attribute level can be calculated 
from the overall preference (ALBRECHT 1997). An advantage of the technique is 
that it can be used to assess hypothetical as well as existing products, and so it is 
often used to evaluate new commercial products before they are put on the mar-
ket, or even before they are developed (RANDOLPH and NDUNG'U 2000). Thus, 
one of the main objectives of the CA is to develop a new product/service ac-
cording to the true multi-attribute preferences for the product/service of a certain 
target group (market segment). In addition, it quantifies the impact on consumer 
acceptance if the demanded attribute concepts are not met (KÖCHER 1990). 
The analysis of main effects regarding financial service attributes can lead to 
valuable insights for designing financial products (SCHRIEDER 1996). The main 
effects are investigated by using part-worth and total utilities, and the relative 
importance of single attributes. A utility is a measure of relative desirability or 
worth. When computing utilities using logit, every attribute level is assigned a 
utility (also referred to as part-worth). The higher the utility, the more desirable 
is the attribute level. Attribute levels with high utilities have a large positive im-
pact on influencing respondents to choose products. Just because a level receives 
a negative utility value does not mean that this level is unattractive. But rela-
tively speaking, other levels are better. Utilities are zero-centered within the at-
tribute and therefore sum to zero in each attribute. The relative attractiveness of 
a concept can be assessed by adding up the utilities for its component attribute 
levels (total utility). Utilities cannot be compared between different attributes. 
Therefore, the relative importance of each attribute is calculated to enable com-
parisons between attributes.  
The CBC 2.6 software was used for data analysis. The CBC 2.6 software applies 
a multinomial logit analysis. Logit analysis is an iterative procedure to find the 
maximum solution for fitting a multinomial logit model to the data. Within logit, 
a multinomial framework is advocated over a binary one. In a binary model of 
choice, the dependent variable has just two states, to choose one product or not. 
A multinomial model estimates the probabilities of choosing a product from a 
number of competing alternatives (HUBER 2000). 
The logit analysis is evaluated by the chi-square statistics. Both the credit and 
savings models have seven degrees of freedom. With seven degrees of freedom, a 
chi-square of about 25 would be significant at the 0.001% level. The chi-squares Participatory product design 
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obtained from the logit analysis, which are recorded in the Tables 5-7, A-2, and 
A-3, are safely larger than this. Therefore, it is safe to say that respondent choices 
are significantly affected by the attribute composition of the concepts.  
5.3 Results  and  discussion 
The following section is based on the analysis of primary data, secondary data, 
and an extensive literature review. In the first part, the supply side of the rural 
financial market will be examined and in the second the demand side will be the 
in focus of the analysis. 
5.3.1 Institutional  assessment
88 
Vietnam’s financial system is still in a formative stage with some legislative is-
sues still in process. Nevertheless, after a decade of financial sector reforms, 
Vietnam expects the emergence of an effective and efficient banking system 
(NGUYEN-KHAC and VON GURETZKY-CORNITZ 1996; TEUFEL 1997). By 1997, 
the former mono-bank system had been changed into a two-tier banking system 
consisting of the SBVN as central bank and supervisory institution (tier 1), and 
an operating system (tier 2) consisting of four SOCBs (one of them is the 
VBARD), one non-profit, state-owned bank (the VBP)
89, about 150 commercial 
banks in the form of private banks, joint-stock banks, joint venture banks and 
foreign banks (foreign bank branch or representative office), 947 PCFs (com-
mune level savings and credit cooperatives, which are supervised by the State 
Bank), and one Vietnam Postal Savings Service Company (VPSC) (QUE 1997; 
WORLD BANK 1999).
90 
                                           
 
 
88  The institutional assessment is based on the data collected in Ba Be district. 
89  As mentioned before, the VBP was replaced by the VBSP. The reasons for the establish-
ment of the bank are the separating of policy and commercial credits. This aims at enhancing 
financial transparency in the country’s banking system (SGT DAILY 2003). 
 
90  The VPSC was established in 1999 and operates under the authority of Vietnam Post and 
Telecom. Its main functions are to provide a savings product for the underserved (rural, 
women, and poor) populations of Vietnam and to mobilize savings for government develop-
ment investments. VPSC offers a time savings and a collection savings (demand deposits) 
and a limited money transfer system for clients. The operating cost of VSPC is de facto 
subsidized by the Vietnam Post and Telecom through the use of its staff, as the VSPC itself 
has only 100 staff on board. The postal savings system offers the use of a structure that is 
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The formal financial institutes of the rural financial system are the VBARD, 
VBP, and PCFs.
91 The semi-formal sector consists of special credit programs 
administered by the State Treasury and by mass organizations. The informal sector 
(non-governmental organizations, moneylenders, and family or friends) covers 
the demand not served by the formal and semi-formal sector. Nevertheless, the 
share of the informal sector has been heavily reduced during the last ten years in 
favor of the formal sector from 78% (1992/93) of all outstanding loans to 54%  
(1997/98) (GSO 1995, GSO 2000).
92 It is quite safe to say that this development 
will continue as the interest rates of the formal sector are constantly lowered 
(see below Table 5-5). The main players in the rural financial system are the 
VBARD and VBP. Therefore, in the following sections the structure and per-
formance of these two will be discussed. 
5.3.1.1 Structure  of  VBARD/VBP 
Before the financial reform (1988-1990), the VBARD was a department of the 
SBVN. Its former objective was to provide credit to state farms and coopera-
tives. The share of credits to SOEs has decreased drastically in the last years and 
the new objective of the VBARD is to offer financial services, and in particular 
credit, to all rural households and SMEs (BAC 2001). However, the VBARD 
concentrates on the better-off market segment. The branch system is split into 
four levels: 1. Headquarters (Hanoi) and two representative offices (Da Nang 
and Ho Chi Minh City), 2. provincial, 3. district, and 4. sub-district banks.
93 
The VBP was established in 1995 as the poor people’s lending outlet of the VBARD. 
The VBP is a so-called policy bank, specialized in lending to poor households. 
                                           
 
 
obligated to have equal geographic distribution, not access driven by profitability. Up to 
now, the VPSC is offering its services only in Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City, and Quang Ninh 
Province with 710 postal savings services (WORLD BANK 2002a).
 
91  PCFs are not the object of this research report, as they are of minor importance due to their 
little outreach (only 5% of the rural population and the fact, that they are not active in either 
of the two research provinces (Bac Kan and Son La) (WOLZ 1999).
 
92  DUONG and IZUMIDA (2002) found that, in their survey, only 17% of the loans were bor-
rowed from informal sources. MCCARTY (2001) mentioned as one important factor for the 
reduction of the informal sector the ‘crowding out’ by the VBARD and VBP, by which 
both extended their outreach in the last years.
 
93  The sub-district level includes the so-called ‘mobile car branches’. At the moment, 240 mobile 
branches are active (BAC 2001). 
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The VBP uses what is called ex-ante targeting. Only a certain part of the popula-
tion is eligible for a loan, namely the rural poor.
94 The Vietnamese government 
classifies once a year every household according to its living standard into one 
of five classes: Hungry, poor, medium, better-off, and rich (for details see 
DUFHUES et al. (2002) and GEPPERT and DUFHUES (2003). The target group of 
the VBP is the rural poor. Households from other wealth classes are officially 
excluded. The purpose of the VBP is not to maximize profit but to reduce poverty 
(HANH 1999; VBP 1999b).
95  
The VBP basically consists of a head office and it has no own structures below 
this level. For example, the vice-head of the VBARD branch is at the same time 
the head of the VBP branch. The VBP uses the operational facilities and staff of 
the VBARD and of mass organizations at commune and village level in exten- 
ding its services to the target group. From the monthly interest rate charged to 
the clients, 0.1% is paid to the local mass organizations and 0.25% to the 
VBARD for its services.
96 Currently, the average operational costs of the VBP, 
expressed as interest rate spread, is 0.45% per month (HANH 2001). In 2000, the 
monthly interest rate charged by the VBP was 0.6%. This means that 75% of the 
interest revenues are used to cover operational costs.
97  
The poverty focus of the VBP and its high operational costs do not mean that the 
bank consequently operates at a loss. Due to the highly subsidized interest rates, 
however, many international agencies consider VBP not to be financially sus-
tainable.
98 Vietnamese policy-makers have recognized this statement and declare 
the subsidized interest rate policy as a temporary strategy. In the long term, 
market rates should be implemented (VBP 1999b). However, this objective has 
                                           
 
 
94  The successor of the VBP, the VBSP, has broadened its targeting criteria. Now, not only 
‘the poor’ are eligible for a loan, but also other disadvantaged groups, e.g. pupils, students, 
unemployed persons seeking jobs (even abroad), individuals and organizations in remote 
areas (VIETNAM ECONOMY 2003). 
95  The VBSP continues the policy of non-profit making. It is explicitly responsible for granting 
the preferential loans to underprivileged groups (VIETNAM ECONOMY 2003).
 
96  The head of the district branch stated that the payment from the VBP for the VBARD ser-
vices does not cover the costs (CHAN 2001).
 
97  The VBSP will establish its own branch network independently from the VBARD with 80 
district branches across the country (SGT DAILY 2003).
 
98  The VBP now is recognized as loss-making (VBARD and DANIDA 1999).
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not yet been achieved (see below Table 5-5). It looks rather like a fictitious  
statement to satisfy the international donor community with their requirements 
for financial sustainability and thus attracting more funds.
99  
Outreach: The VBARD is the biggest supplier of rural credit. In 2001, 4.5 million 
households were given credit. This figure represents 38% of all rural households. 
However, the share of VBARD’s outstanding credit to mountainous provinces is 
significantly lower than to rural areas (CECARDE 1999).
100 As the VBARD 
targets the better-off clientele in the rural population, the bank has been able to 
meet only a small proportion of the funds demanded by very poor households in 
rural areas, particular in Northern Vietnam (DUONG  and IZUMIDA  2002; 
VIETNAM-CANADA RURAL FINANCE OUTREACH PROJECT 1999a). In South Viet-
nam, the share of poor people with loans from the VBARD is higher, as the 
VBP is less active there (IZUMIDA and DUONG 2001). In Northern Vietnam the 
VBP is covering this market segment. In total, the VBP reaches 21% of all rural 
households (HANH 2001). Both VBP and VBARD have enormous outreach. 
This enormous outreach is reflected by the research sample in Ba Be district. In 
total, 57% of all households have had an effective demand for formal credit. 
About 30% of the households were not interested in taking a formal credit. Only 
15% of the households in the sample were access-constrained. Keeping in mind 
that this figure also includes non-creditworthy households the number of con-
strained but creditworthy households would be even smaller.  
Staff: The efficiency of the VBARD has been increased over the last decade. In 
1990, 30,000 people worked for the VBARD. From then, the number of staff 
was steadily reduced to 24,000 people in 2000 (VBARD 2000a). At the same 
time, the branch system was extended from fewer that 1,300 branches at the end 
of 1993 to 1,568 branches in 2000 (BAC 2001; SCHENK 1998; VBARD 2000a). 
Along with the increase in efficiency, however, an overload of work due to  
                                           
 
 
99  The law on credit institutions approved by the National Assembly in 1997 stipulates that 
the state should establish banks that operate on a non-profit basis (Article 10). This implies 
that the state will continue to provide cheap credit to rural areas and the poor (MINOT and 
GOLETTI 2001). Besides, the newly established VBSP continues to provide soft-loans to 
special target groups (VIET NAM NEWS 2003).
 
100  For instance, in 1998 the mountainous provinces received on average 150 billion VND  
 compared to Hanoi, which received 1,200 billion VND.
 Participatory product design 
 
101
numerous/transactions was observed in most of the district branches (VIETNAM-
CANADA RURAL FINANCE OUTREACH PROJECT 1999a). This was confirmed by 
the research undertaken in Ba Be district. For instance, it was found that some 
credit officers had to administer more than 1,000 households (CAT 2001). It has 
been realized that one credit officer, if he exercises all his duties including re-
ceiving clients, checking project proposals, disbursing money, checking loan 
usage, collecting principal and interest, can take care of 500 families as a maxi-
mum (CECARDE 1999). Certainly, if the credit officer serves more than this, he 
cannot fulfill all his duties. Nevertheless, it is vital that the credit officers visit 
all clients in their home to check their creditworthiness and to prevent heavy 
debts. This is not possible in case of VBARD/VBP. The VBARD/VBP has 
therefore delegated many responsibilities to local authorities (heads of the com-
munes). In fact, the credit officer relies totally on the commune and village offi-
cials to assess the creditworthiness of the potential borrower.  
Both banks apply a group lending scheme to shift responsibilities of screening 
and monitoring to the clients themselves. However, the principle of peer pres-
sure does not work in the applied group lending scheme (see Credits below). 
After the disbursement of the credit to the group members, the credit officer may 
verify with the CGL whether the group members use the credit as stated in the 
loan application. Normally he trusts the report of the CGL (giving him room for 
opportunistic behavior) and does not monitor the credit directly. Basically, no 
bank staff, but persons outside the bank are involved in the monitoring: The 
head of the commune and CGL. During discussions with the commune heads 
and the CGL, however, they admitted that this is not a regular activity. Offi-
cially, the loan ought to be repaid immediately if it is not used as stated in the 
credit contract. Nevertheless, farmers pointed out that as long as they pay the 
interest and the principal in time, the credit officer and the other local authorities 
do not bother about the actual use of the credit (DUFHUES et al. 2002). 
Local information sources in the form of key informants can be an important 
low-cost mechanism to reduce screening and enforcement costs. Too much de-
pendence by a bank on local networks as sources of information and recom-
mendation, however, can have negative effects in terms of social exclusion of 
those households not included in the social and political network of the terri-
tory (VAESSEN 2001). In general, important information tends to be segmented 
and to circulate within specific groups or networks to the exclusion of others 
(ROBINSON 2001). Particularly the very poor households often find themselves 
in this position, as they are socially excluded and lack access to fruitful relation-
ships with powerful allies (HICKSON 2001). Chapter 5  
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Mobilization of funds: The financial sources of the VBARD consist mainly of hot 
money.
101 For instance, in the year 2000 over 95% of the sources were mobilized 
through savings. The insufficiency of deposit mobilization by formal institutions at 
the grass-roots level stands in contrast to the successful development of deposit 
mobilization at national level. The majority funds are mobilized in urban areas. In 
Vietnam, money is flowing from urban to rural areas (HUNG  and GIAP  1999; 
IZUMIDA and DUONG 2001). The VBARD offers the only formal savings scheme 
available to households in rural areas in Northern Vietnam. However, even 
VBARD deposits are overwhelmingly urban, with only a small portion coming 
from rural households (MCCARTY 2001). Therefore, most branches in rural and 
mountainous areas have to borrow from the head office. Regulations from the 
head office do not motivate district branches to mobilize funds (for details see 
HUNG and GIAP 1999; and VIETNAM-CANADA RURAL FINANCE OUTREACH PROJECT 
1999a). Moreover, these regulations make branches become used to depending 
on head office funds rather than competing for funds and improving efficiency 
in fund mobilization. However, the VBARD branch in Ba Be district seems to 
rely totally on hot money (BAO 2001). But only one-quarter of this money is 
based on savings from the population. The rest of the money originates from 
savings from other institutes, mainly the State Treasury (60%). 
The sources of the VBP consist purely of cold money. One of the major reasons 
for establishing the VBP was to attract international donor funds (VBP 1999b). 
However, the VBP failed to attain this objective, and international donors pro-
vide only small amounts. The government is the main supplier of funds to the 
VBP. If the government does not have sufficient funds to finance the soft loans 
of the VBP, the SBVN must refinance the VBP without charging interest on a 
long-term basis and without a pre-fixed repayment date (NHGIA 2001). The pro-
cedure for distributing the funds from the national to the lower levels is rather 
cumbersome. For its credit allocation process, the VBP relies on information 
from several public organizations and subordinated branches at the district and 
provincial levels, and then distributes the funds on that basis (for a detailed de-
scription see DUFHUES et al. (2002) and Theesfeld (THEESFELD 2000).  
                                           
 
 
101 Hot money is defined as savings. Cold money is defined as grants and subsidies. Participatory product design 
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Credits: Lending scheme: Most of the VBARD loans follow an individual lending 
scheme and only on a very limited scale group lending schemes. In contrast, 
the VBP uses only group lending schemes (so-called ‘joint liability groups’)  
(VBP 2001b).
102 However, in day-to-day practice, the group members are not 
held liable for each other. If one group member defaults, the only consequence 
for the other members is that this particular group does not receive credit any 
more. But individual members who repaid on time can join a new group. This 
means that it is enough to expel only the defaulter from the group in order to 
obtain a new credit, as this is officially a new group. Therefore, joint liability 
does not exist and the concept of peer pressure does not work. Each group has a 
group leader. He has an obligation to support his group members in all matters 
related to the loan (a detailed description about the obligations of a CGL can be 
found in DUFHUES et al. 2002). The VBARD/VBP regulations points out that the 
CGL is also liable (VBP 2001b). He has to repay the loan in the event of default 
by a single borrower. However, this regulation is also not practiced in day-to-
day business. 
Loan Terms: Most loans from the VBARD were short-term production loans 
until around 1996. Recently, however, the situation, has changed quite signifi-
cantly, with a larger proportion of long-term loans (IZUMIDA and DUONG 2001). 
Table 5-4 shows the development of the loan structure in the Ba Be district. The 
demand for short-term loans is decreasing, while demand for long-term loans is 
increasing year by year. This might be by explained by the fact that the VBARD 
has eased the criteria for long-term credits and that very popular investments are 
e.g. husbandry of large ruminants or tree cultivation. For an investment such as 
these, one year is too short to gain any profit. The government of Vietnam recog-
nized this development and recently gave permission to the VBARD to use 30% 
of its short-term deposits as medium and long-term loans for farmers to provide 
more funds for long-term investments. 
The VBP uses predefined loan products for all households. In March 1999, the 
maximum loan size for a loan from the VBP had been set at three million VND 
and a maximum term of three years. In 2001, the loan size was raised to five 
                                           
 
 
102 The group lending scheme of VBARD/VBP was supposed to be a copy of the Grameen 
 Bank group lending scheme. Chapter 5  
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million VND and the term to five years.
103 In comparison to the VBP, the   
VBARD determines the loan amount by the value of the collateral. Short-term 
loans are usually not requested (see Table 5-4).  
Table 5-4:  Loan structure of VBARD/VBP in Ba Be district 
  1998 1999 2000  2001 
  Amount % Amount % Amount % Amount  % 
VBARD  
short-term 
826 19 722 16 779 10 698 6 
VBARD  
long-term 
3,562 81 3,801 84 7,240 90  10,316  94 
VBP  short-term 121  8  50  2 0 0 0  0 
Long-term  1,313 92 2,291 98 3,471  100  3,326  100
Source:  VBARD (1998, 1999, 2000b, 2001a) and VBP (1998a, 1999a, 2000, 2001a). 
Notes:  Figures are in VND millions. Classification of loan term: Short-term: ≤ one year; long-term: 
> one year (BAC 2001). 
Interest rates: The Vietnamese Government sets an interest rate ceiling through 
the SBVN to provide the population with soft loans. After financial reforms at 
the beginning of the nineties, the real interest rate became positive in 1992 
(SENANAYAKE and HO 2001). Since then, however, the nominal interest rates, parti-
cularly those of VBARD and VBP, have been gradually reduced (see Table 5-5). 
Interestingly, apart from the nominal price, the credit conditions have remained 
more or less the same over the years. Over this period, the effective demand in-
creased continuously. The demand was satisfied through the Vietnamese govern-
ment by supplying additional funds to VBARD and VBP for lending on. Apart 
from two years, 2000 and 2001, when Vietnam experienced deflation, the real 
credit interest rate also declined (see Figure 5-1). The increasing credit demand 
is certainly positively correlated with the declining price, but also with the im-
provement of the transport infrastructure, which allowed the credit officers to 
reach more remote villages that were formerly not serviced. 
Nevertheless, commercial banks such as VBRAD are allowed to adjust their 
credit interest rates within a range of 0.25% for short-term and 0.3% for me-
dium- and long-term loans (NGUYEN 2001). However, the VBARD has to give a 
                                           
 
 
103 The VBSP will provide short- and medium-term loans only. Long-term loans will be con 
 sidered later (VIETNAM ECONOMIC TIMES 2002). A single borrower will be entitled to get a  
 maximum loan of ten to fifteen million (SGT DAILY 2003). Participatory product design 
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discount of 15% on the interest rate for farmers who are living in a poor commune 
and 30% for those living in a very poor commune. The interest rate payments are 
collected on a monthly basis, or every three or six months (depending on negotia-
tions with the credit officer) and the principal is usually paid at the end of the term. 











1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Inflation rate*
Nominal interest rate p.a.
Real interest rate p.a.
 
Source:   *ADB (2001), CIA (2002), and EIU (2002). 
Notes:   The monthly interest rate was lowered in 2001 from 0.6% to 0.5%. Therefore, the average 
interest rate of 0.55% was used for the calculation of the real interest rate. It was assumed 
that the monthly interest rate of 2001 (0.5%) will stay the same in 2002 and 2003. The estimated 
inflation rate for the years 2002 and 2003 is based on EIU (2002). 
Table 5-5:  Nominal interest rates per month of VBARD/VBP in Ba Be district 
   June  1997  1998 1999 2000 2001 
VBARD  Short-term  1.25%  1.2% 1.2% 1.1% 1.0% 
  Long-term  1.05%  1.0% 1.0% 0.9% 0.8% 
VBP   1.20% 1.0% 0.8% 0.6%  0.6/0.5% 
Source:  VBARD (1997, 1998, 1999, 2000b, 2001a) and VBP (1997, 1998a, 1999a, 2000, 2001a). 
Notes:  Classification of VBARD, short-term: ≤ one year; long-term: > one year (BAC 2001). 
Loan use: Households desire to use funds for various purposes while formal finan-
cial institutions only finance a number of specific purposes. In former times the 
VBARD provided only financing for agricultural production, but little or none to 
other production activities or services (VIETNAM-CANADA  RURAL  FINANCE 
OUTREACH PROJECT 1999a). The fungibility of money has been noticed by the 
VBARD’s headquarters and the formerly strict rule has been attenuated recently so 
that nowadays trading and small-scale processing will also be financed (VBARD 
2001b). Rural households are now allowed to spend their loan for any purpose, 
even for consumption (IZUMIDA and DUONG 2001). Due to the close connections 
between VBARD and VBP, it is very likely that the headquarters of the VBP will Chapter 5  
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soon adapt its policies, too. However, this new development has not yet reached the 
Ba Be district. The VBP still finances only a limited range of ‘obvious’ or ‘fashion-
able’ purposes related to agricultural production (e.g. rice cultivation, pig raising). 
There is not much room for innovative or idiosyncratic proposals (UN 1998). 
Collateral: The VBARD requires collateral for its loan. Usually land use certifi-
cates, ‘Green Books’ or ‘Red Books’ are taken as collateral.
104 The collateral often 
does not reflect the real value as no differentiation is made in the assessment of the 
land. Different qualities of land are given the same value (e.g. paddy rice or forest). 
During the loan term, the land use certificates are kept in the bank, until the prin-
ciple has been repaid (BAC 2001, CAT 2001). The land use certificate can bear only 
one loan, even if the loan amount is less than the value of the certificate. 
Other accepted forms of collateral are government wages and houses.
105 The col-
lateral, except land use certificates, must be notarized at the certification office in 
Ba Be town if the value exceeds ten million. Below ten million an approval from the 
commune is sufficient (CAT 2001). If the loan exceeds 50 million, the collateral must 
be notarized in the province capital (BAO 2001). Only part of the value of the collateral 
will be granted as a loan. For instance, in the Dia Linh commune 70% of the value of 
the collateral will be granted, while in the other communes it is only 60% (DOAN 2001). 
Although, the government states that farm households can take out loans of less 
than ten million without any collateral, the VBARD still requires certificates of land 
use certificates and guarantees from local authorities as loan security. Therefore, 
these households without certificates have difficulties in accessing formal loans from 
the VBARD (MCCARTY 2001). However, the ongoing dissemination of ‘Red Books’ 
in recent years brought an increasing number of households into possession of assets 
that are useable as collateral, which broadened the possible outreach dramatically. 
Nevertheless, the land market is still underdeveloped. Only few households in fact 
sell or buy land and usually it is traded within the village. Therefore it is difficult 
                                           
 
 
104  and is owned by the state in Vietnam. Nevertheless, in 1993 the renewal of the law was  
  completed and since then, the government allocates land use certificates to farm   
 households, the so-called ‘Red Books’ for agricultural land (valid for 20 years) and, since  
 1999, ‘Green Books’ (valid for 30-50 years) for forest land. Farmers are allowed to sell,  
 rent, or pass land on to children (LUIBRAND 2002).
  
105 The VBARD recently announced that it will also accept assets other than land use certifi- 
 cates, houses, and wages to improve their outreach to SMEs.
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for the banks to liquidate land. Often, the only possibility would be the expulsion 
of the farmers from the land before liquidation (BAC 2001). At the moment the 
VBARD uses only psychological pressure to the farmers relating to the possibility 
of losing their land. None of the villagers or key persons interviewed knows of 
any case of land liquidation in this area. Therefore, there might be the danger of a 
moral hazard. If farmers find out that the VBARD is not going to liquidate their 
land in the event of default, the bank might end up in a landslide of bad debts. 
The VBP does not require any physical collateral for its loans. However, the ap-
proval of the head of the commune can be considered as social collateral according 
to DUFHUES et al. (2002). Besides, anecdotal evidence from the village survey 
showed that in some cases of ‘hungry’ households, which are officially ex-
cluded as they are assessed as too poor, the credit officers insist on collateral in 
the form of a ‘Red Book’ for a VBP loan too. However, this is in contrast to the 
national policy of the VBP, namely to provide collateral-free loans.
106  
Repayment rate: The official repayment rate is quite impressive. In the year 2000, 
only 1.1% of the loans were not performing (VBARD 2001b). Nevertheless, in 
this case the repayment rate is an inadequate indicator of good performance, as 
the VBARD has so-called ‘frozen debts’, which are not counted as ‘not per-
forming’ or ‘overdue’ as the principal is guaranteed by the SBVN. These debts 
will not bear any further interest.
107 The loan recovery is generally overesti-
mated. Besides, the arrears of the VBARD do not contain rescheduled loans. 
The details of rescheduling loans are not clear in annual reports or in interviews 
with VBARD staff. A loan can be rescheduled several times but not beyond one 
production cycle for short-term loans or 36 months for medium/long-term loans 
(IZUMIDA and DUONG 2001). As the liquidation of collateral is not possible, 
rescheduling of the loan is often the only possibility for the credit officer to 
avoid designating a loan as overdue or not performing.
108  
                                           
 
 
106 The VBSP will continue to provide collateral free loans to certain target groups (VIETNAM  
 ECONOMY 2003).
 
107 In the event of a natural calamity or something unavoidable, the SBVN admit some loans  
 from VBARD as frozen debts.
 
108 The new VBSP will take over most of the non-performing loans made by the VBARD to  
 poor households. This of course will serve the VBARD very well but the VBSP has to  
 carry a heavy burden right from the start (VIR 2003).
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The VBP too has a very high repayment performance of 98% (HANH 2001). But 
again this is only a poor measurement of good performance, as rescheduling of loans 
in VBP too is extremely high; it is reported to be as high as 70% in some provinces 
(VBARD and DANIDA 1999). As the staff of VBARD and VBP is identical, it is not 
surprising that the instrument of rescheduling is also heavily used within the VBP. 
Procedure: The procedure for obtaining an individual loan from the VBARD is 
described in Figure 5-2. The credit officer supplies the farmer with the applica-
tion form. But it is not uncommon that the credit officer does not have the form 
with him. This means that the farmer has to go to the district or wait until the 
next visit of the credit officer to get the form. 
In general, TCs such as credit fees, cost for forms, opportunity cost of time, etc., 
were not seen as an access barrier by the farmers themselves. Nevertheless, the 
striking disadvantage of this credit product is the high transportation costs due to 
the frequent journeys required (at least three) to the district capital. For the more 
remote households, this is a very strong market entry barrier. Particularly, the 
first two visits were mentioned by farmers as representing access barriers, as the 
farmers do not know at that time whether the loan will be granted or not. This 
problem could be solved by implementing so-called profit centers and through a 
real decentralization of the decision-making structures. 
The directors authorize all small loans as recommended by the credit officers. In 
essence, credit officers, though not authorized to impose any limit, are authorizing 
small loans. This impression was confirmed by research work done within the 
VIETNAM-CANADA RURAL FINANCE OUTREACH PROJECT (1999a). However, this 
practice is still far from being a decentralized profit center as implemented for 
example by the Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) (SEIBEL and SCHMIDT 2000).
109 This 
form of decentralization is called ‘deconcentration’, and is predominant in Vietnam 
(GEPPERT  et al. 2002; HIEN 1999). Within the deconcentration process, the  
authority remains with the central agency. 
The procedure of the VBP is very similar to the procedure for VBARD loans, but 
most of the steps are carried out by the CGL. Therefore, the TCs for the single borrower 
are much lower. Nevertheless, as it is a group lending scheme, the whole procedure is 
                                           
 
 
109 Profit center is defined as a semi-autonomous, independently accounting corporate unit  
 responsible for its own operations, profits, and losses (TOFFLER 1990).
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much more time-consuming (for details see DUFHUES et al. 2002). Recent credit policy 
developments, however, show that the credit products of the VBARD and VBP are 
becoming more and more similar, and so their market segments are converging. For 
instance, the VBARD now tries to offer a credit product that does not require collateral 
for loans of less than ten million VND (VBARD 2001b). At the same time, the VBP 
has broadened its credit term to five years and raised the maximum amount to five 
million VND (VBP 2001b).
110 It is not clear to potential customers whether this credit 
is a VBP product or whether it is a VBARD product, offered by the VBP. Some 
farmers even switched from the VBARD to the VBP because of its lower interest rate, 
despite having collateral and not belonging to the eligible target group of the VBP. 
This marketing strategy can affect the sustainability of both institutions.  
Figure 5-2: The six-step procedure to obtain an individual loan from the  
VBARD in Ba Be district 
1.  The farmer contacts the credit officer in the district or in the commune to discuss with 
the credit officer the purpose of the loan, the amount, the profitability of the investment, 
and further steps (if farmers can not calculate the profitability of the investment, the 
credit officer helps to do so); then the farmer receives the application form. 
2.  The farmer fills in the form at home, because the wife and any children over 18 in 
the household have to sign as well. 
3.  The farmer has to take the form to the commune to get a signature and a stamp from 
the head of the commune. 
4.  The farmer brings the form and the land use certificate to the bank. (The credit officer 
visits the household to check if everything is correct and arrange an appointment at the 
bank (usually Tuesdays and Wednesdays). He mainly checks the collateral. Many farm-
ers stated that the credit officer never visited their households, as they have to give him 
the land use certificate to keep it in the bank, he has no need to visit the household.) 
Internal steps of application: a)  The credit officer signs the application. 
    b)  The  head  of  credit office signs the application. 
        c)  The director signs the application. 
5.  The farmer has to come to the bank to ask whether his application was approved or 
not; if yes, he agrees a date with the credit officer for the disbursal of the money. 
6.  The farmer comes on the arranged date and receives the money disbursed. 
Source: Own  figure. 
Notes:  
1 The signature also confirms that the applicant lives in the area. The head of the commune  
  may refuse the signature if he knows of a disagreement between the married couple as it relates  
  to the credit application, in cases of drug abuse of the applicant, or so-called social evil in the  
  households. 
                                           
 
 
110 The new VBSP adjusted its credit scheme even further to the credit scheme of the VBARD  
 (see Footnote 103).
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5.3.1.2  Supply of savings products 
The VBARD’s head office offers different savings schemes: A demand deposit 
scheme, which is mainly used by companies and term deposit accounts with 
three, nine, twelve, and more than twelve-month terms. Bonds are available for 
two, three or five years. However, long-term deposits are not popular and are 
rarely demanded (BAC 2001).  
Savings accounts at VBARD’s branches are traditional, simple and not attractive 
enough to customers. Branches offer only a very limited choice of savings 
products, for instance the branch in Ba Be district offers only demand deposits 
(0.15% per month) and three month (0.25% per month), six month (0.4% per 
month), and twelve/thirteen month (0.45% per month) deposits, while customers’ 
need a more diverse supply. There is no linkage between credit and savings in 
branches’ and credit officers’ operations. For example, loans are disbursed directly 
in the communes (as in the case of VBP) and credit officers also visit the vil-
lages, but to save money, customers have to go personally to the branch offices. 
For remote households this is an invincible market entry barrier, as transport 
costs to the branch office are often much higher than the amount saved 
(VIETNAM-CANADA RURAL FINANCE OUTREACH PROJECT 1999a). Another barrier, 
particularly for poorer households, is the minimum deposit of 50,000 VND. 
Many poor households are not able to save this amount at one time. Despite the 
fact that the interest rate on deposits has been sinking year on year, the numbers 
of savers and the amount saved have increased in the last four years (Table 5-6). 
Nevertheless, as discussed above, almost 100% of the savings are of urban origin. 
Savings mobilization plays no role in the range of services of the VBP.  
As a reason for the lack of formal savings schemes in rural areas, the high cost 
of deposit collection is often mentioned. Rural households are scattered geo-
graphically and their potential deposits are very small. In developing countries 
the bad infrastructure aggravates the situation. Nevertheless, it is now widely 
agreed that microsavings can be collected in a profitable and sustainable way 
(for discussion see ROBINSON 2001). However, in Vietnam the cost argument 
did, if at all, influence only slightly the decision of not implementing a rural saving 
scheme. It is the national consensus, adopted by the staff of the VBARD/VBP, Participatory product design 
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that poor households are not capable of saving (CAT 2001; CHAN 2001; HANH 
2001; HUNG and GIAP 1999).
111 Many non-governmental organizations and re-
search projects in Vietnam found evidence to the contrary. The negative attitude 
towards savings is one of the main obstacles for improving savings products in 
order to achieve wider outreach to the rural population.  
Table 5-6:  Savings products at VBARD in Ba Be district 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 
  Amount Saver Amount Saver Amount Saver Amount Saver 
Demand 
deposit 
/  /  336 171 206 146 278 152 
3-month 
deposit 
148  23 94 19  189  21 57 16 
6-month 
deposits 
1,374 116 2,732 215 2,962 247 4,599 379 
13-month 
deposit 
1,978  133  / / / / / / 
Source:  VBARD (1998, 1999, 2000b, 2001a). 
Notes:   Amount in VND millions. This table includes only savings of the population and SMEs, 
excluding public agencies. 
5.3.2 Potential  demand 
This section empirically applies CA to identify the specific demand for financial 
services and to formulate market and client-oriented financial policies. First the 
potential demand for credit services then saving services will be discussed. In 
the following the households are segmented by wealth (three classes) and by 
gender. 
5.3.2.1  Potential demand for credit 
Without any market segmentation, the credit attributes are assessed with similar 
relative importance. However, within the wealth segmentation the relative im-
portance of attributes differs greatly. The indigent and medium households valued 
the attribute ‘disbursement time’ as most important (see Table A-2 in the Annex). 
Both groups have a high preference for quick disbursal of loans. This finding is 
supported by KANBUR and SQUIRE (2001), who state that poor households often 
                                           
 
 
111 In all interviews with VBARD/VBP staff, the costs of saving collection were never mentioned  
 as an obstacle for the implementation of a rural saving scheme.
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use quickly accessible credits as a tool for income and consumption-smoothing 
and to cope with external shocks. This explains why poorer households have a 
stronger preference for quick loans than rich households.  
All groups value the livestock insurance positively. However, it plays a minor 
role in the decision process relating to taking a credit, except for indigent house-
holds. The existence of livestock insurance is the second important parameter in 
their decision process relating to taking a credit. Yet, the differences between the 
attributes in this class are rather small. Nevertheless, poor households are well 
known for their risk-averse behavior.
112  
Surprisingly, medium households prefer the district to the commune (the district 
is more remote from the rural household’s perspective), and indigent households 
value commune and district almost equally as the place for the credit transac-
tions. This might be explained by the fact that the regional market also takes 
place in the district, which gives the district an additional attraction, especially 
for the poor who seldom leave the village. However, for indigent and particu-
larly for medium households it seems quite important (second highest relative 
importance) to conduct all credit transactions in the village. In comparison, rich 
households prefer the commune as the transaction place. This result is not sig-
nificant, but it is supported by qualitative research. Members of rich households 
are often working at the commune or have family members or close friends who 
do so, and therefore have close contacts with commune officials and especially 
to the head of the commune. The head of the commune has a prominent position 
in the local rural credit market of Northern Vietnam (DUFHUES et al. 2002). 
Therefore, it may be that those households expect to take advantage of this re-
lationship. 
Rich households assess the attribute ‘collateral’ as most important, and within 
this attribute, the level ‘no collateral required’. This is surprising, as rich house-
holds are considered to be in possession of sufficient collateral. Although this is not 
significant, one explanation for this outcome might be that rich households are 
more afraid of losing their collateral in the event of default than other households. 
                                           
 
 
112 Over 80% of all households would take out livestock insurance even without a credit.  
 Particularly the poorer households demanded this service. Therefore, the implementing of  
 such a livestock insurance scheme would probably directly benefit the poor.
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This seems to be particularly true for ‘durable consumer goods’. These goods 
might be assessed by local authorities and bank staff as luxury goods and are 
probably easier to seize than land use certificates.
113 Therefore, the rich value 
‘durable consumer goods’ very negatively. In comparison, poorer households do 
not seem to care much about collateral. The relative importance of the attribute 
is only 17%. It is striking here that they place land use certificates on the same 
level as ‘no collateral’.
114 Indigent farmers are not afraid to give their land use 
certificates as collateral. They may be convinced that their investment will not 
fail or, more likely, they believe that the bank will not seize the land. In the 
event of loan default, they expect to be helped by the bank or the government. 
Usually this means that the credit officer will extend the loan, or in the event of 
a natural disaster, the government will step in and freeze any debt obligations. 
The finding is confirmed by DUONG and IZUMIDA (2002), who state that in rural 
Vietnam only few cases are known where land has been sold because of a farmer’s 
default. 
Men and women did not show great differences in their preference for credit 
products. Therefore, we refrained from showing the detailed table here with all 
utility figures and t-values. Only a slight difference was found within the attribute 
‘lending scheme’. Both sexes favored the individual lending scheme. However, 
male respondents preferred the individual lending scheme to a greater extent 
than women (15% to 11% relative importance). This might be explained by the 
fact that women are usually less educated and more reluctant to deal directly 
with local officials or bank staff. Therefore on average they are more loath to the 
individual lending scheme than men. 
The share of households who chose the ‘none’ option (indicating no credit demand) 
was highest in the case of the rich and second in the case of the indigent. Rich 
households do possess a certain self-financing capacity and indigent households 
often lack investment ideas due to a low educational level. Yet, when the indigent 
                                           
 
 
113 Land markets are still in a rudimentary stage in Vietnam.
 
114 88% of the surveyed households in Ba Be district have Green Books or Red books. The  
 average in the three research communes is slightly lower, at 70%, but still high. However,  
  not every household possesses a land use certificate. The share of households with cer- 
 tificates varies greatly between the villages. In some villages, not a single household has a  
  certificate and in others all of them do. Villages with better access to the infrastructure   
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group is separated into poor and hungry households, it shows that only 5% of 
the hungry households chose the ‘none option’. The poorer the households, the 
greater the share of households who want to use a credit. It is likely that some of 
these households are so pressed for funds that they would take any credit, no 
matter what the credit terms or features are. The numbers of male respondents 
who picked the ‘none option’ was almost double compared to the number of 
females. Therefore, it seems that women do have a much greater demand for 
credit than men. MCCARTY (2001) points out that the vast majority of rural loans 
are given to men. Therefore women seem to have an unsatisfied demand for 
credit products. Nevertheless, in general the demand for credit is still enormous 
due to the low interest rates set by the government. 
The assumption that certain attributes of a credit product could compensate for a 
higher interest rate is not confirmed in this research. Almost 100% of the re-
spondents choose the cheaper credit. This strong focus on interest rates might be 
explained by the fact that rural Vietnam has gone through a decade of continuous 
reduction of interest rates and a history of public pronouncements on how im-
portant low interests are for rural development and the improvement of rural living. 
Besides, farmers often have the impression that the VBP particularly is not a 
bank but an institution to help the poor. Nevertheless, farmers are willing to pay 
extra fees for special services, as the insurance attribute has proven. 
5.3.2.2  Potential demand for savings 
With regard to developing savings products for the rural poor, emphasis ought 
to be placed on liquidity and low TCs (ZELLER 1999). Nevertheless, a mone-
tary incentive to save is also important. The results from the logit modeling 
show that households in all wealth groups give special emphasis to a high in-
terest rate for savings (Table A-3 in the Annex). Corresponding to economic 
theory (time preference rate), this tendency is more distinct in poor and hungry 
households. Men clearly put a high interest rate above everything else. Women 
too are in favor of a high interest rate, but they rate a sight deposit account 
without any interest more highly than a one-month time deposit with a 0.3% 
interest rate. A possible interpretation for this outcome is that women are more 
often confronted directly with family emergencies and therefore prefer an   
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always-accessible sight deposit account providing access to the deposit imme- 
diately in case of sudden need. 
As saving is a much more regular activity than obtaining a credit, it is not sur-
prising that the level ‘saving in the village’ is valued highly by the indigent 
households. Poor households seldom leave the village and the small amounts they 
intend to save are easily eaten up by travel costs. OWENS and WISNIWSKI (1999) 
pointed out that close physical contact is essential to reach the poor with savings 
products. Rich and medium households favor the commune as the place to save, 
but this result is not significant. Nevertheless, some farmers mentioned that they 
prefer saving in the commune or in the district because they would not trust 
people collecting savings in the village, even if this were a bank employee. 
Farmers mentioned a case where the credit officer collected the interest rate 
payments in the village and gambled it away on the way back to the bank. It was 
not clear whether farmers had to bear the loss or the bank. Although cases like 
this are very rare, they create an environment of distrust. Trust in the bank is es-
sential for attracting savings. LEDGERWOOD (1999) states that MFIs providing 
credit services must select borrowers whom they trust to repay the loan. When 
collecting savings, however, it is the customer who must trust the MFI. 
Lottery linked deposit accounts have proved to be successful to attract savings in 
many countries (GUILLEN and TSCHOEGL 2002). The lottery scheme was also 
analyzed for different wealth groups. In comparison to indigent households, me-
dium and rich households accept the lottery as an incentive to save. However, 
these results are not significant. Indigent households are very indifferent about 
the lottery incentive. The lottery itself is assessed as positive but the attribute 
plays almost no role in the decision process whether to save or not. All farmers 
understood the lottery, but some had difficulties to comprehend that this is a 
kind of incentive. This idea was very unfamiliar to them. However, the risk-
averse behavior of poor households might deliver another explanation, namely 
that winning a prize in a lottery is not secure, but interest rates are. Some poor 
farmers mentioned that they would never win the prize. It is surprising that 
women favor the existence of a lottery more than men. Usually women are more 
risk-averse than men. However, when considering only indigent women, the 
utility of the lottery became negative. But this result is not significant. 
From rich to indigent households, an increase in choosing the ‘none’ option 
(indicating no interest in savings schemes) was observed. Rich households have 
more money to save in the bank. Besides, members of rich households are used 
to dealing with local officials and therefore can better assess their trustworthi-
ness. Chapter 5  
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Women strongly prefer to save in the village as compared to men (Table 5-7). 
RANDOLPH and NDUNG'U (2000) state that TCs may vary by gender, e.g., a 
woman farmer with reproductive responsibilities may face higher opportunity 
costs of time when leaving the village to seek any kind of services than a male 
farmer. Women are responsible for many tasks in the household and on the 
farm. It is much more difficult for them than for men to reallocate time towards 
other activities. Therefore, WORLD BANK and DFID (1999) concluded in a study 
about poverty among ethnic minorities in Northern Vietnam, that any kind of 
policy intervention must consider women’s high opportunity costs of time and 
their tight time schedules. 






  Utilities t-values Utilities t-values 
Interest rate and term      
No interest rate / demand deposit  -2.247  -3.130***  -0.217  -0.360 
0.3% Per month for a one-month deposit  0.110  0.225  -1.167  -1.745* 
0.5% Per month for a three-month  
deposit 
2.137 5.791*** 1.384 4.502*** 
Relative importance in %  50%  24% 
Incentive scheme      
No lottery   -0.446  -1.110  -0.944  -2.119** 
Lottery  0.446 1.110 0.944  2.119** 
Relative importance in %  10%  18% 
Location of depositing and withdrawing     
Village  1.447 6.026*** 1.947 3.966*** 
Commune -0.517  -1.270  0.430  0.817 
District  -0.929 -3.265*** -2.377 -2.963*** 
Relative importance in %  27%  41% 
Minimum requirement for account 
opening 
    
No  minimum  requirement  0.518 2.114** 0.933 2.248** 
20,000  VND  -0.518 -2.114** -0.933 -2.248** 
Relative importance in %  12%  18% 
None option  2.138 5.086*** 1.937 3.088*** 
Percentage of households choosing none 
option 
13% 11% 
Chi-square 350.894  117.704 
Source: Own  calculations. 
Notes:   *
 Significant at 10% level. ** Significant at 5% level. *** Significant at 1% level. Participatory product design 
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5.4  Conclusions and policy recommendations 
The CA provided some valuable insights into how to improve the financial ser-
vices of FFIs to the population by adapting the existing services. The results of 
this research show that the VBP particularly can improve its credit services by 
offering individual loans, as this kind of lending scheme was strongly preferred 
by the sample population. This approach would also reduce the administration 
time of the credit procedure, i.e. TCs.
115 It could also go hand in hand with the 
increasing introduction of physical collateral instead of group liability, as farmers 
showed that they are able and willing to use their land use certificates (Red Books) 
as collateral. However, without an effective land market for trading Red Books, 
it will probably be risky for the credit institutes to rely more on land use certifi-
cates as collateral. Nevertheless, VBP and VBARD together already have enor-
mous outreach. At this stage, implementing a consolidation policy and establishing 
financially sustainable structures would deserve priority over boosting credit 
outreach further by implementing new structures. An important element for in-
ducing innovation in the microfinance industry is to nurture conditions for 
greater competition between different suppliers. As long as no effective compe-
tition exists in the rural financial market in Northern Vietnam, there is little in-
centive for the institutes to improve their products. The only competition exists 
between the VBP and the VBARD.  
This research has shown that poor households are able and willing to save. Over 
80% of the households demand a formal savings scheme. The supply of savings 
services offers firstly the possibility to create financially sustainable structures 
within the existing institutes, and secondly to boost the outreach of the formal 
financial sector. When offering savings services to the rural population, espe-
cially to the poor, close physical proximity to customers is seen as a key factor. 
This proximity could be achieved by creating decentralized profit centers. Credit 
officers would collect and pay out savings as well as performing all credit activi-
ties. Thus, the deposit collection could be done within the village. The local savings 
collection by the credit officer would also influence very positively the credit 
business. The credit officer has access to a much broader range of information to 
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assess the client’s creditworthiness. These profit centers also guarantee a good 
internal monitoring of most operational costs involved in financial intermedia-
tion. A good example is offered by the BRI. Besides, savings instruments need 
to be promoted much more than credit. Therefore, a marketing and advertise-
ment strategy is essential to absorb substantial amount of rural savings.  
Nevertheless, the main challenge will be to implement a safe, attractive and 
cost-covering deposit collection system at the village level. Simple savings 
products can coexist with more complex market-segment-oriented saving products. 
Therefore, a range of products should be implemented and promoted. The im-
plementation of the Vietnam Postal Saving Company (VPSC) is a right step in 
this direction. Although the VPSC potentially offers a very deep outreach down 
to the commune and village level, the 710 postal savings services are far away 
from having a significant outreach to the rural population and particularly to the 
rural poor. As WORLD BANK (2002a:46) states: "In a country where 80% of the 
population lives in rural areas, even the 2000 branches of VBARD cannot reach 
wide, nor deep enough to the population at large." Nevertheless, the politics of 
VBARD and VBP respectively VBSP have not changed so far regarding the 
implementation of a savings scheme to reach the rural population. Before this 
can happen a paradigm change is called for. The rural financial intermediaries in 




6 Final  conclusion 
The rural financial market in Vietnam is, and in the near future will continue to 
be, strongly dominated by state-owned financial intermediaries. The liberalization 
of interest rates is an important step towards full transformation of the financial 
system and offers the potential for financial intermediaries to supply cost-
covering services. However, as long as the Government continues to supply sub-
sidized credits to major parts of the population, it is unlikely that any viable ser-
vices (private or state-owned) can be provided in the rural financial market. The 
VBSP and the VBARD continue to crowd out competition, inhibiting the deep-
ening of the financial system and impeding innovations. 
A promising development is the attempt to integrate the savings of the rural 
population into the financial system. This attempt has resulted in the creation of 
the VPSC and might indicate a paradigm change, namely recognition of the rural 
population’s ability to save financially, and consequently recognition of their 
demand for deposit instruments. Finally, this paradigm change may bring to an end 
the tradition of considering credits as the only financial tool for development. 
The VBARD, however, despite its immense network, has never reached deep 
enough into the country to attract rural savings. Furthermore, the VBSP does not 
show any intention to offer savings instruments to its customers. Therefore, dis-
continuing the Vietnamese soft loan policy will likely take more time. 
Though the creation of the VBSP, the Vietnamese government has at least formally 
separated political lending from commercial lending. Earlier evidence from agricul-
tural development banks in other countries, e.g. by ADAMS and VON PISCHKE (1992) 
and HEIDHUES and SCHRIEDER (1999), to name but a few, suggests that VBARD, 
now freed from political lending, is likely to dismiss its peasant clientele and con-
centrate on more lucrative rural business with bigger and wealthier farmers. The 
VBSP will offer subsidized loans on a broad scale and will obviously be a drain on 
public resources. The question is, how long can the Vietnamese Government   Chapter 6 
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finance the VBSP, and who will serve the rural poor after the collapse of the 
VBSP, should the government discontinue subsidizing the VBSP?
116
 
Despite all the progress achieved in the transformation of the financial system, 
its sustainability is also still threatened by an accumulation of non-performing 
loans amassed by SOEs over the years. In addition, the problem of non-
performing loans is spreading to the private sector and particularly to rural 
households. Apart from macro-economic threats to the financial system, this 
moral hazard behavior is hindering the establishment of any viable rural finan-
cial intermediation. 
Compared to a decade ago, the informal market now plays only a minor role. 
The breadth of outreach of the major formal rural lenders (VBARD and VBP, 
now VBSP) is immense and their poverty outreach is satisfactory since about 
50% of all predominantly poor rural households have access to formal credit. 
However, the outreach analysis has shown that the poorest households are   
seldom clients of formal lenders. Only slightly more than 20% of the poorest 
households are served by formal lenders. When considering access to formal 
credit, this figure must be re-evaluated. As the logit analysis (see Section 4)  
revealed, general poverty (as captured with the poverty index) does not signifi-
cantly influence access to formal credit. The results indicate that only certain 
aspects of poverty, e.g. low quality of housing, have an important influence on 
access to formal credit in Vietnam. Thus, the poorest households use formal 
credit less often, but are not significantly more often access-constrained. This 
means that the poorest households simply have much less demand for the types 
of formal credit products on offer. Improving credit products or offering new 
credit lines would only slightly improve the credit coverage of poorer house-
holds. A more promising approach would be to introduce a specialized pro-poor 
extension service to widen the scope of their investment ideas and opportunities, 
combined with a general improvement in the infrastructure. One factor that very 
positively influenced access to and demand for formal credit was the connection 
to the market. A good market connection serves credit outreach in a twofold 
manner: First, households have better access to credit-relevant information; and 
second, through better market access they may find new investment opportunities.  
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Nevertheless, the share of access-constrained households is surprisingly low 
(only 16%). One reason for the low figure is the weakening or eradication of 
former access constraints (e.g. lack of physical collateral, literacy requirements, 
remoteness) through locally disbursed group credits. Considering the anecdotal 
reports of very low repayment rates, the price of eradicating these access con-
straints has likely been a decrease in financial sustainability of the formal lenders. 
However, some barriers to access continue to exist, particularly for ethnic   
minorities or female-headed households. To reduce these access barriers, locally-
oriented rather than general actions should be taken, catering to the needs and 
the circumstances of those households which lack access.  
Nevertheless, the recent efforts of the Vietnamese government, for instance the 
establishment of the VBSP, represent an attempt to broaden access in general. 
But this increase in outreach will go hand in hand with an increase in access to 
credit for non-creditworthy households, thus resulting in decreased repayment 
rates. The situation will possibly be aggravated by the fact that the VBSP will 
supply subsidized loans for higher education. Without the creation of appropriate 
jobs, however, newly graduated young debtors will face difficulties in paying 
back the loan, as has recently been the case in China (THE ECONOMIST 2004). 
Furthermore, many people consider political lending to be a gift from the   
government, one that they are not required to repay. There is a very real possibi-
lity that expanding accessible policy credit could create a mountain of bad debt  
(IZUMIDA 2003). If rural lenders in Vietnam were one day forced to work in a 
competitive environment according to market principles, there would be a great 
chance that large parts of the population would be access-constrained as a result 
of previous loan defaults. Moreover, it is questionable whether households that 
do not demand the existing products today will demand credits from the VBSP 
in the future.  
A more sustainable way to promote outreach would be to improve the rural 
population’s knowledge in general, and in particular that of fringe groups such 
as ethnic minorities or female-headed households, of credit application proce-
dures, as access (especially by fringe groups) is often hampered simply by a lack 
of information. The information supply to rural households as regards essential 
credit information is impeded by the supply-oriented flow of information and by 
relying on local authorities for the dissemination of credit relevant information. 
Ethnic diversification of bank employees could broaden the information networks 
available and could create more awareness of those groups inside the institution. 
Furthermore, special female credit officers for female-headed households could 
work in the same direction. Local information centers, in combination with the Chapter 6 
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introduction of regular information days (preferably market days), when bank 
staff is locally available for questions and discussion, would further improve the 
availability of information. Designing employees’ contracts to include incentives 
to pass on information to different social networks would round off a transparent 
credit policy. 
As mentioned above, however, state-owned rural lenders have already an enor-
mous outreach. At this stage, implementing a consolidation policy and establishing 
financially sustainable structures would deserve to take priority over boosting 
credit outreach further by introducing new structures, which are unlikely to im-
prove credit outreach significantly – particularly as the poorest households 
would profit the least from broadening credit outreach on a large scale. The most 
appropriate tool to incorporate poorer households into the formal financial sys-
tem would the mobilization of savings. As stated by several scholars, all people 
can save, even the poorest of the poor, and therefore deposit services have 
deeper outreach than credit (CHARITONENKO  et al. 2004; SCHREINER  2002; 
ZELLER  and SHARMA  2000). In contrast to the enormous credit outreach in 
Northern Vietnam, formal savings are used by rural households only on an in-
significant scale. However, this low effective demand for savings instruments is 
caused by inappropriate savings products and not by the inability or unwilling-
ness of the rural population to save. This research has proved again that even the 
poorest households in Northern Vietnam are able and willing to save. Over 80% 
of all households in this sample demand a formal savings scheme. The supply of 
client-adapted savings services not only boosts the outreach of the formal finan-
cial system, but also offers the possibility to create financially sustainable struc-
tures within the existing institutes. However, savings products need to be tailored 
closely to the needs of the rural population. Otherwise they will not be adopted 
by the local people. When offering savings services to the rural population, es-
pecially to the poor, close physical proximity to customers is seen as a key factor 
for success. This proximity could be achieved by creating decentralized profit 
centers. Credit officers would collect and pay out savings locally as well as per-
forming all credit activities. Thus, deposit collection could be done within the 
village. Local savings collection by the credit officer would also influence the 
credit business very positively. The credit officer has access to a much broader 
range of information to assess the client’s creditworthiness. These profit centers 
also guarantee good internal monitoring of most operational costs involved in 
financial intermediation. 
Whether the enormous government subsidies channeled into rural credit contribute 
to poverty reduction, however, remains a subject for future research. But it is clear Final conclusion 
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that these subsides bypass households that have no demand for credit, and 
these households are often identical to the poorest. Finally, the low credit in-
terest rates imply low saving rates, which again affect the poor most, as stated 
by ADAMS (1984: 72): "The low rates on deposits hurt poor households the most 
because they cannot assemble enough savings to buy lumpy, non-financial assets 
such as land and cattle. The poor are forced to accept a tax on their savings if 
they bother to open accounts or to consume their surplus. The backlash of cheap 
credit is that the poor take a beating on their financial savings." This statement 
of Adams reflects the situation in Vietnam. The transformation polices of the 
Vietnamese government concerning the rural financial system are biased towards 
the supply of preferential credits and this policy discriminates the poorest 
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Annex 
Table A-1:  Descriptive statistics of the independent variables for the binary  
logistic regression model on credit access 
Variable name  Unit  Minimum Maxi-
mum 
Mean Std.  de-
viation 
Red or Green Books  (yes/no)  0.00  1.00  0.89  0.32 
Agricultural land  (1000 m2) 0.00  65.00  9.51  7.82 
Value of houses   (Mill. 
VND) 
0.00 130.00  10.11 12.92 
Government  salary  (yes/no)  0.0.0 1.00 0.13 0.33 
Cash savings  (Mill. 
VND) 
0.0.0 55.00 1.48  5.57 
School years of HH head  (years)  0.0.0  14.00  5.20  3.02 
Vietnamese communication 
skills of the married couple 
(yes/no)  0.0.0 1.00 0.83 0.38 
Receiving agricultural exten-
sion service 
(yes/no)  0.00 1.00 0.82 0.39 
Active HH members   (numbers)  0.50*  7.00  2.83  1.26 
Share of non-farm activities 
in total yearly income  
(%)  0.00 100.00  15.17 21.51 
Lost working days due to 
illness per year/HH 
(days)  0.00 509.00  42.46 58.29 
Giving help per year/HH  (days)  0.00  200.00  36.26  30.75 
Receiving help per year/HH  (days)  0.00  300.00  25.76  36.96 
Interest-free informal credit  (Mill. 
VND) 
0.00 18.00 0.18  1.36 
Thai/Tay  village  (yes/no)  0.00 1.00 0.72 0.45 
Market visits only by female 
HH members 
(yes/no)  0.00 1.00 0.36 0.48 
Age of the household   (years)  1.00  81.00  19.66  14.14 
Remoteness  (km)  1.50 24.00  10.48 7.47 
Market visits per month  (numbers)  0.00  30.00  5.63  6.46 
Different  markets  visited  (numbers)  0.00 5.00 1.13 0.47 
Poverty index     -1.82  3.09  0.00  1.00 
Supply of day labor  (yes/no)  0.00  1.00  0.35  0.48 
Receiving aid from govern-
ment 
(yes/no)  0.00 1.00 8.76 0.28 
Source: Own  calculations. 
Notes:   * Households containing only persons over the retirement age were counted as having 0.5  
   work-forces. 
   HH = household. Annex 
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Source:  Adapted from BARHAM et al. (1996) and HEIDHUES and SCHRIEDER (1998). 
Notes:  
1 Credit-rationed households do have access to the formal financial system and are therefore  
  not separated in the analysis. Besides, in one research area (Ba Be) not a single household  
  was rationed. Nine households were excluded from the sample because of missing values.  
  This decision tree includes the formal and semi-formal financial institutes, VBARD, VBP,  
  and the State Treasury. 
Figure A-2: Principal Component Indicators 
Ten indicators were chosen for the PCA, including the benchmark indicator, three asset-
related variables, one food-related variable, two dwelling-related variables and three indi-
cators related to human resources. The poverty component is given by: 
PC1  =  0.587 * per person expenditure on clothes and footwear 
  +  0.674 * total value of assets per person 
  +  0.662 * value of electronics and appliances per household (HH) 
  +  0.596 * value of transportation-related assets per HH 
  −  0.497 * months without enough to eat per year 
  +  0.531 * type of roof 
  +  0.566 * electricity supply 
  +  0.675 * percentage of adults with only primary education 
  +  0.592 * percentage of adults with college education 
  +  0.542 * percentage of literate adults 
This equation accounts for 35.4% of the total variance of the original data. 
Source: H ÄUSER et al. (2005). 
 
  
Table A-2:  Logit estimation of average utility values for credit attributes, by wealth classes  
    Indigent (N = 134)  Medium (N = 82)
1  Better-off/rich (N = 42)
1 Total (N = 258) 
    Utilities t-values Utilities t-values Utilities t-values Utilities t-values 
Livestock 
insurance 
Yes (5,000 VND per month 
and animal) 
1.541 6.800***  1.239 4.794***  8.949  0.170  1.562 9.353*** 
  No  -1.541 -6.800***  -1.239 -4.794***  -8.949  -0.170  -1.562 -9.353*** 
  Relative importance in %  21%  15%  21%  20% 
Disbursal time  Seven  days  2.078 4.801***  2.654 3.510***  6.019  0.130  1.947 7.032*** 
  60  days  -2.078 -4.801***  -2.654 -3.510***  -6.019  -0.130  -1.947 -7.032*** 
  Relative importance in %  28%  32%  14%  24% 
Lending 
scheme 
Group  lending  -1.109 -3.643***  -1.275 -2.942***  -3.903  -0.074  -1.184 -5.414*** 
  Individual  lending  1.109 3.643***  1.275 2.942***  3.903  0.074  1.184 5.414*** 
  Relative importance in %  15%  15%  9%  15% 
Land  use  certificates  0.857 2.616**  0.880 1.916*  5.106  0.098  1.261 5.744***  Collateral 
 requirement  Durable consumer goods  -1.645  -2.822***  -0.873 -1.011 -14.739  -0.196  -2.298 -5.989*** 
  No  collateral  0.788 1.940**  -0.007  -0.013  9.632  0.128  1.037 3.658*** 
  Relative importance in %  17%  11%  29%  22% 
District  -0.947 -2.648***  -0.756 -1.563 -11.481  -0.148  -1.388 -5.763*** 
Commune  -0.931 -1.622*  -1.894 -2.214**  10.405  0.146  -0.281 -0.823 




etc.  Relative importance in %  19%  27%  26%  19% 
None option    3.566 6.466***  3.895 4.338***  16.330  0.185  3.521 9.100*** 
Percentage of households choosing none  
option 
10% 7% 14%  10% 
Chi-square    385.170 277.465 113.648 734.149 
Source: Own  calculations. 
Notes:   * Significant at 10% level. **Significant at 5% level. ***Significant at 1% level. 
1 Due to the small sample size or little variance, the default settings  
   did not yield interpretable results for all attributes or the regression model did not converge. Therefore, the settings were changed to 30 iterations in 
   stead of 20, with a smaller step size between the iterations 0.5 instead of one, and the change of log-likelihood from one iteration to the next was  
   changed from 1e-005 to 1e-004. The attribute ‘interest rate’ was excluded from the analysis, as the level ‘0.5% interest rate/month’ was chosen in  
   100% of the cases.  
 
 
Table A-3:  Logit estimation of average utility values for saving attributes, by wealth classes 
  Indigent (N = 134)  Medium (N = 82)
1  Better-off /rich (N = 42)
1  Total (N = 258) 
  Utilities t-values Utilities t-values Utilities t-values Utilities t-values 
Interest rate and term             
No interest rate / demand deposit  -1.750  -2.355**  -2.120  -0.271  -2.026  -0.243  -1.401  -3.702*** 
0.3%  Per  month  for  a  one-month  deposit  -0.063 -0.105 -1.063 -0.136 -1.789 -0.214 -0.347 -1.075 
0.5% Per month for a three-month deposit  1.813  5.614***  3.184  0.204  3.815  0.229  1.747  8.243*** 
Relative importance in %  45%  26%  30%  38% 
Incentive scheme                
No  lottery    -0.069 -0.154 -3.802 -0.163 -3.297 -0.132 -0.612 -2.070** 
Lottery  0.069 0.154 3.802 0.163 3.297 0.132 0.612 2.070** 
Relative importance in %  2%  37%  33%  15% 
Location of depositing and withdrawing           
Village 1.935  5.820*** 0.645  0.083  -0.124  -0.015 1.448  8.077*** 
Commune  -0.571  -1.083  1.537 0.099 1.827 0.110 -0.251  -0.839 
District  -1.364 -3.018***  -2.182 -0.279 -1.704 -0.205 -1.196 -4.755*** 
Relative importance in %  42%  18%  18%  32% 
Minimum requirement for 
account opening 
           
No  minimum  requirement  0.458 1.483 1.828 0.156 1.884 0.151 0.589 3.045*** 
20,000  VND  -0.458 -1.483 -1.828 -0.156 -1.884 -0.151 -0.589 -3.045*** 
Relative importance in %  12%  18%  19%  14% 
None option  2.283 6.012***  4.251 0.218 2.726 0.131 1.864 6.483*** 
Percentage of households 
choosing none option 
17% 11%  5%  13% 
Chi-square  249.034 168.742  73.906  459.531 
Source:   Own calculations. 
Notes:   * Significant at 10% level. **Significant at 5% level. ***Significant at 1% level. 
1 Due to the small sample size or little variance the default settings  
   did not yield in interpretable results for all attributes or the regression model did not converge. There-fore, the settings were changed to 30 iterations  
   instead of 20, with a smaller step size between the iterations 0.5 instead of one, and the change of log-likelihood from one iteration to the next was  
   changed from 1e-005 to 1e-004. Studies on the Agricultural and Food Sector in Central and Eastern Europe 
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